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This dissertation addresses a common, but troubling, educational interaction: when a 
facilitator (whether teacher, professor, or organizer) announces that a discussion will take 
place about some subject or question, but proceeds to speak at length and field questions 
regarding that subject. In this case, a controlled and unequal form of interaction known as 
recitation has occurred, though the interaction was called a “discussion” at the outset. 
Since discussion, as a form of interaction, connotes democracy, equality, and freedom, 
this interaction (where recitation passes for discussion) is distorted. 
 
After a survey of discussion’s many pedagogical meanings, a Marxist theoretical 
approach—primarily drawing from Louis Althusser and Valentin Voloshinov—is used to 
critique the distortion of discussion. From the Voloshinovian perspective, the 
aforementioned distortion composes and iterates the social formation known as neoliberal 
capitalism. A psychoanalytic theoretical approach is then used to propose a new concept 
of discussion that works against this neoliberal distortion, one founded on Jacques 
Lacan’s early concept of dehiscence. The dissertation concludes with suggestions for 
dehiscent facilitation practices, calling for greater emphasis on the form of interaction (as 
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The Doctoral Student Discussion 
On September 25
th
, 2013, Teachers College, Columbia University, held a 
“doctoral student discussion.” A flyer for the event told its audience to “come grab a 







The second floor of the library had been set up for the occasion. Two plush chairs 
were placed at the front with a marble table in between them. Two bottles of water stood 
on the table, along with microphones within reach. Facing the two plush chairs were rows 
of plastic chairs. Participants took their seats and waited for the event to begin. Two 
speakers were introduced. They sat in the two chairs at the front, each speaking into his 
or her respective microphone for a time. After their presentations they took questions 
from the crowd, to which the presenters responded, and followed up with other 
comments. After an hour the event was more or less over.  
At that time there were other doctoral student discussions occurring throughout 
the building. A student movement had emerged in the months preceding the 
aforementioned event. This movement began with conversations in hallways, stairwells, 
and classrooms throughout TC’s complicated architecture, from which questions and 
critiques of the institution’s internal budget policies and external influence in society 
emerged. The conversations spread, blossoming into a larger series of meetings and 
actions. By September 25th, the student movement had organized two direct actions, 
distributed several communiques, and enacted various other forms of critique which 
confronted these troubling policies. One of those policies, an issue that galvanized the 
student movement, was President Susan Fuhrman’s relationship with a company called 
Pearson PLC. Pearson PLC is a multi-billion-dollar corporation that, in the last ten years, 
has become responsible for New York State’s standardized testing and teacher 
certification, as well as Texas’s, and has become similarly involved in education systems 
around the world.  
3 
 
President Fuhrman was on the Board of Directors of Pearson PLC from 2004 until 
2013. Not only was she a member of the Board but she was also compensated 
handsomely for her work with the company through a salary and stock benefits, which 
she may still hold. Many students—and increasingly staff, alumni, and faculty—thought 
this relationship was a conflict of interest. In the movement itself, students understood 
this state of affairs not as an isolated incident, but rather a manifestation of a widespread 
social and political phenomenon. In letters to the President
1
, students associated her 
personal gain from the privatization of public education with neoliberalism, a social-
political arrangement in which freedom is defined by freedom of the market and the 
privatization of public goods (more on this below).  
This dissertation’s central question about discussion derives from an interest in 
the pedagogy and the politics of events such as the aforementioned doctoral student 
discussion and its attendant political phenomena. Pedagogically, the seating arrangement 
of the event is significant: there were rows of seats facing forward; the presenters, seated 
at the front and facing the "audience," presented in a lecture-style, speaking at length into 
microphones, while participants faced them rather than facing each other; after the 
presenters presented they fielded questions from the participants, listening to and then 
answering these questions one at a time. In addition, the event was called a discussion 
where a select few would “share” their ideas about education. Politically, the contentious 
social-political arrangements and ideologies at play within the institutional milieu of 
Teachers College are also significant, specifically the neoliberal critiques coming from 
the student movement coinciding with the doctoral student discussion event in 
                                                 
1
 Reyes, C. (2013, June 12) “In Letter, Teachers College Students Slam TC President Susan Fuhrman,” 




This dissertation’s question derives from the possibility of a relationship between 
pedagogy and politics in cases such as this, particularly with respect to the word 
“discussion” and the verbal form of interaction to which it refers.  
There are two options when thinking through the possibility of such a relationship 
between pedagogy and politics. The first option is that there is no relationship. It might 
be the case that there was an event called a “doctoral student discussion” which was 
structured in a certain way, and this event occurred in the context of other events or 
trends that could be deemed neoliberal, but there is no relationship between them. The 
second option is that there is some relationship between the pedagogy and the politics of 
this event: that there is something going on between neoliberalism and the fact that the 
situation was called a discussion, while the verbal form of interaction that occurred was a 
lecture with a recitation. The basic characteristic of recitation, which I will elaborate 
more thoroughly in the third chapter, is an inequality and homogeneity in the sequence of 
turns taken during interaction, such that a minority follows up each comment, and the 
majority of participants address, interact, and attend only to that minority. Discussion, by 
contrast, I will argue, requires an equality and variety in the sequence of turns. In light of 
this discrepancy at the doctoral student “discussion,” couched as it was in neoliberal 
politics, I will make a case for the second option: that there is a relationship between 





Distortion is a crucial concept for this dissertation. We should therefore make a 
distinction between two conceptions of distortion before moving forward. The two 
conceptions derive from interpretations of what Louis Althusser called the effectivity of a 
social formation.
2
 Althusser famously interpreted Karl Marx’s claims about the ways in 
which a social formation like capitalism effects or determines the behaviors of its 
residents, both as groups and individuals. One sub-question in the general consideration 
of social formation effectivity is the causal relationship between what Marx called the 
base (or basis, or infrastructure) and superstructure. In its classic formation, from the 
1859 preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, the base is 
composed of “definite relations” into which individuals enter during the “social 
production of their existence.” The definite relations are “relations of production 
appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production,” 
the “totality” of which constitutes the “economic structure of society, the real foundation 
on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite 
forms of social consciousness.” Revolution occurs when the relations of production 
change along with the modes of production, in the economy, which goes on to change the 
“whole immense superstructure.”
3
   
There are generations of debates about the significance of these terms base and 
superstructure. Edward Thompson (1963) famously claimed that there is no such thing as 
the base
4
, and Raymond Williams has interpreted the base as a process.
5
 I side with G.A. 
                                                 
2
 Althusser, L. (1970). Reading Capital. New Left Books, p.65. 
3
 Marx, K. (1977).  A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Progress Publishers, retrieved at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm. 
4
 Thompson, E. P. (1963). The Making of the English Working Class. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd. 
5
 Williams, R. (1991). “Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory.”  Rethinking Popular Culture: 
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Cohen who sees these as misreadings of Marx. I will return to these terms in the second 
chapter. For Cohen, the base is “economic structure” and superstructure as “non-
economic institutions,” arguing that “the character of the superstructure is largely 
explained by the nature of the economic structure,”
6
 though the way in which he 
characterizes “explanation” leaves room for interpretation with respect to causality: 
whether mechanical or otherwise.  
Pushing Cohen further, with Althusser, I understand base and superstructure 
through the distinction of part and whole. The base/infrastructure is composed of 
everyday social-economic relations, a word I find both directly in Marx (as in relations of 
production) as well as the recent work of Boltanski (2011) (as in “social relations”). The 
base is an aggregation of social parts: an infinitely complex series of interactions 
occurring around and between us. I write aggregation because it connotes a non-whole 
series; not a set, per se, but rather an aggregate. Singular and plural terminology becomes 
grammatically difficult, since the base is really bases or infrastructures: “levels” or 
“instances” that are “relatively autonomous” and, argues Althusser, “fixed in the last 
instance by the level…of the economy.” 
7
 Many of these levels are what we know as 
classes, like the working class, composed of individuals who interact with one another in 
certain ways within an economic structure (interactions which occur within the context of 
the relations of production). Another “level” of the base is the economy itself, which 
                                                                                                                                                 
Contemporary Perspectives in Cultural Studies, 407, p.423.  
6
 Cohen, G. (2000). Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence. Oxford, p.217. 
7
 Althusser, L. (1970). Reading Capital.  New Left Books, Part II, chapter 4: “[t]he Marxist whole…is a 
whole whose unity, far from being the expressive or ‘spiritual’ unity of Leibniz’s or Hegel’s whole, is 
constituted by a certain type of complexity, the unity of a structured whole containing what can be called 
levels or instances which are distinct and ‘relatively autonomous’, and co-exist within this complex 
structural unity, articulated with one another according to specific determinations, fixed in the last instance 




includes both relations of production among individuals and groups of individuals 
(including how they speak with one another), and the modes of production they enact: 
manufacturing, resource extraction, etc. Certainly these levels are “themselves 
structured,” but once there is a singular statement with respect to these parts such that we 
refer to the whole structure, we move to superstructure, which classically includes 
elements such as political theory, law, and art (and other “theoretical formulations”
8
).  
What is the causal relationship between the base and superstructure and latter, and 
how do we conceive of the relationship between the whole of society and its parts? Is 
there an extant whole which determines the parts, or are the parts causing the whole? One 
conception of the causality is mechanical and vulgar: mechanical because events that take 
place occur in a Newtonian, billiard-ball fashion such that the whole of society 
determines its parts. In our case, on such a mechanical view, neoliberal capitalism would 
determine our discussions such that they are recitations. This first conception is vulgar 
because it presumes individuals and groups of individuals are determined by the social 
order: they are cogs in a great unjust machine over which they do not have control and 
which invades consciousness like an alien force.
9
 On this conception we live in a 
distorted world because we choose to live in an unjust machine which mechanically 
determines us to continue capitulating to it. There is a true or good way the world should 
be and capitalism distorts it into a worse world, and neoliberalism is a particular period in 
which that distortion is meticulously sold to us, in all corners of the base, as a just order 
imbued with individual freedoms.  
                                                 
8
 Ibid, Part II, Chp. 4. 
9
 Cf. Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. Clarendon. 
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What is an alternative to this mechanical and vulgar picture? “Marx thought social 
conditions must themselves be conflicted to be capable of generating a conflict between 
reality and appearance. And as long as society remains riven, the rift between reality and 
appearance will persist too.”
10
 I agree with Cohen that our current moment is conflicted, 
and I will argue in what follows that pedagogical situations such as the one I have 
described both iterate and constitute the conflict of the moment. However, I will not go 
so far as to claim that there is a conflict between reality and appearance. While I think 
there is a distortion of discussion that presents and composes the distortion indigenous to 
capitalist social-political arrangements, my concept of distortion, drawn as it is from 
Valentin Voloshinov’s Marxist philosophy of language
11
, operates with something closer 
(though not identical) to Althusser’s “Spinozist” conception of causality between base 
and superstructure, which has inspired recent generations of radical thinkers in the 
Marxist tradition.
12
 On such a theory, broadly speaking, there is no objective truth or 
ideal form of discussion which capitalism distorts, as the early Habermas would claim
13
, 
just as there is no ideal state of justice which capitalism distorts. Structure itself is an 
“absent cause” that occurs immanently in its parts, “in short…the structure, which is 
merely a specific combination of its peculiar elements, is nothing outside its effects.”
14
 
Capitalism does not affect its inhabitants in a mechanically vulgar sense. Rather 
                                                 
10
 Cohen, G. (2001). Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence, Oxford University Press. See Appendix I, 
“Withering Away of Social Science,” p.410. 
11
 Voloshinov, V. (1973). Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. trans. Matekja, M. and Titunik, I. 
Seminar Press. 
12
 Fourtounis, G. (2005). “On Althusser's Immanentist Structuralism: Reading Montag Reading Althusser 
Reading Spinoza.” Rethinking Marxism, 17(1), 101-118. See also Resch, R. P. (1992). Althusser and the 
Renewal of Marxist Social Theory. University of California Press. 
13
 Habermas, J. (1970). “On Systematically Distorted Communication.” Inquiry, 13(1-4), 205-218. 
14
 Althusser’s structural interpretation, particularly this passage is widely mentioned. One may find it in 
Jameson (1981) though it originally comes from Althusser (1970), part II, chapter 9. 
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capitalism is immanent in its inhabitants’ various interactions.  
Rather than being mechanically implanted on the true and good world, distortions 
on this second conception of causality manifest as conflicted understandings and 
discrepant realities, where terms such as “free” and “equal” refer to situations for which 
contrary terms are more appropriate, whether those situations are pedagogical or political. 
The difference between these two conceptions of causality may also be expressed, in 
social-political terms, as the difference between a correspondence and consistency theory 
of truth. Whereas truth in the former is a value of signs referring to an objectively 
existing reality (distortion occurring in the form of false consciousness ideology 
engendered by base and superstructure, as Engels claims), truth in the latter is a value 
held between signs within a complex system (ideology occurring as a semiotic mediation 
between base and superstructure, as Voloshinov claims). A distortion in the latter case is 
an inconsistency-indicating-injustice, a discrepant series of terms and forms of 
interactions, glitches, which we may investigate in order to examine the immanent 
structure as constituted by its many parts.  
One way to understand how such an immanent structure forms is through the 
work of Valentin Voloshinov, a Marxist philosopher of language from the early 20
th
 
century. Arguing against the positivist tradition which examines language independently 
of social-political context, Voloshinov instead argues that that language is series of 
ideological signs mediating between the base and superstructure in such a way as to 
register, index, and implement social changes. In one of two major works, Marxism and 
the Philosophy of Language, he explicitly rejects the mechanical picture of causality. 
Rather, words and verbal forms of interaction reflect and refract aspects of both base and 
10 
 
superstructure. What we say and how we say it iterates and constitutes the social world. 
Glitches may therefore occur between words and verbal forms of interaction, which 
present and implement aspects of base and superstructure in conflicting ways. The 
distortion of discussion is one such distortion. The purpose of this dissertation is to work 
through this distortion, and, having worked through it, recommend a way to work slowly, 
arduously, in ways whose consequences we most likely cannot verify, for a revolution of 
our conflicted social world. 
 This project is therefore located within a long and fragmented tradition of 
Marxism and educational theory.
15
 There is a variety of strands, debates, and orientations 
within this tradition, which Rikowski (1997) helpfully delimits in nine ways. Those 
interested in Marxist educational theory may: (1) focus purely on what Marx and Engels 
said on education; (2) study classical Marxists who developed, extended, and applied 
Marx’s thinking on education to political struggles of their time (Lenin, Lukacs, 
Gramsci); (3) develop new concepts within Marxism to apply to educational projects 
(Freire, Althusser, and others); (4) create emancipatory, liberatory, and critical discourses 
for use in a variety of educational and extra-educational struggles (American Critical 
Pedagogy: Giroux, McLaren, Apple, Schor, Horton); (5) as a teacher with socialist or 
Marxist commitments, draw upon Marxism explicitly for practice, research, or 
organizing; (6) as an academic Marxist disconnected from any particular struggle, draw 
from Marxism to generate articles, books, and other intellectual products; (7) flirt with 
Marxism as an educational theorist; (8) neither explicitly radical nor socialist, 
                                                 
15
 For recent work see Sarup, M. (2013). Marxism and Education : A Study of Phenomenological and 
Marxist Approaches to Education. Routledge. Small, R. (2005). Marx and education. Ashgate Publishing, 




academically plunder and vulturize Marx’s work for educational purposes; and (9) 
participate in a Marxist drift whereby concepts from Marxism, via osmosis, find their 
way into new arguments, significances, and contexts which tend to be politically tamed.
16
 
This list forms a spectrum of commitment to Marxist theory and active political 
engagement in thinking about education. To situate this dissertation, I will reject certain 
options. The dissertation is not one of options 6–9, as I will deal explicitly with Marxist 
theory for purposes of active engagement with political struggle. I will not attend to 
Marx’s and Engel’s exact statements about education, however, so option 1 is also out. 
This leaves options 2–5, which best characterize the dissertation. I will examine Marxist 
ideas, as well as new concepts sculpted from these ideas by interpreters and followers 
such as Lukacs, Cohen, Althusser, Voloshinov, Freire (and arguably Lacan).
17
 I aim to 
engage in critical discourse about educational thinking and derive emancipatory practices 
from this engagement, and as a teacher I recommend specific routines and techniques 
concordant with my arguments.  
Discussion and Neoliberalism 
Now I can make the case for the presence of discrepancies in pedagogy and 
politics, and sketch the relationship between discussion and neoliberalism that I will 
demonstrate more fully throughout the chapters of the dissertation. In the first chapter I 
will advance the following three-part definition of discussion, with which I demonstrate 
that discussion is distorted. First, discussion is “talking that is scheduled, formal, and to 
                                                 
16
 Rikowski, G. (1996). “Left Alone: End Time for Marxist Educational Theory?” British Journal of 
Sociology of Education, 17(4), p.422. 
17
 I recognize the breadth of Marxist commentators I draw from in the dissertation. I address this 
methodological choice in the conclusion. 
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which our participation is [somehow] obligated.”
18
 The French social theorist Gabriel 
Tarde wrote this is an essay on conversation in the early twentieth century. With this 
definition he differentiates discussion from conversation, which he defines as a pleasant, 
light talking that froths up between people while they’re walking together or waiting 
together. Conversation mustn’t have a direction or formal reason to occur, whereas 
discussion typically does. The second part of the definition is that discussion improves 
understanding through the consideration of many views in an appropriate form.
19
 This 
phrasing comes from David Bridges, who wrote what I consider a foundational work in 
philosophy of discussion: Education, Democracy, and Discussion. Finally, the discourse 
theorist James T. Dillon focuses Bridges’s definition, writing that discussion is “group 
address of a question in common”
20
 and, in another work, requires that discussion include 
an “equality and variety in the sequence of turns taken during interaction.”
21
 Whereas a 
lecture occurs when a single voice speaks at length before an audience, and a recitation 
occurs when a speaker initiates interaction, a participant responds, and the speaker 
evaluates and initiates again
22
—or whose basic quality, I claim in the third chapter, is an 
inequality and homogeneity in the sequence of turns taken. What occurred at the doctoral 
student discussion was a lecture with a recitation.  
At least since 1988, scholars have observed a similar distortion of discussion in 
which, according to Diana Hess (2009), “support for discussion is more rhetorical than 
                                                 
18
 Tarde, G. (1898). “Opinion and Conversation,” in Clark, T. (1969). Gabriel Tarde on Communication 
and Social Influence: Selected Papers. University of Chicago Press, p. 305. 
19
 Bridges, D. (1979). Education, Democracy, and Discussion. Windsor NFER, p.16-25. 
20
 Dillon, J.T. (1994). Using Discussion in Classrooms. Open University Press, p.4. 
21
 Dillon, J.T. (1990). The Practice of Questioning. Routledge: London, p.19. 
22




substantive” (p.24). An earlier study from 2001 bears out this discrepancy.
23
 Nystrand et 
al found that in 48 social studies classrooms (each classroom at a different school) where 
discussion was expected to occur, 90% of instruction involved zero discussion. In the 
remaining 10% of instruction during the period when discussion was expected to occur, 
discussion lasted for an average of 31 seconds. In 1988 Swift, Gooding, and Swift found 
that “that which follows from the introductory statement [“today we will discuss”] bears 
little resemblance to discussion.”
24
 Each of these observations accords with the distorted 
quality of the doctoral student discussion at Teachers College. In each of these studies the 
word discussion is meant to refer to a verbal form of interaction that does not have the 
qualities of a discussion. The term and the verbal form are discrepant. 
In order to establish a connection between the distortion of discussion and 
neoliberalism, we see that democracy comes quickly to mind when thinking of 
discussion. The connection to democracy is at best a connotation, not a denotation, but 
the significance of discussion to democracy and vice versa is strong enough for Hess to 
write that “to be against discussion is akin to opposing democracy.”
25
 Nick Burbules 
(1993) writes that there’s a “close link between communication and politics, particularly 
democracy.”
26
 Burbules cites John Dewey in that same passage, to whom he attributes 
the idea that “what sustains democracy” is its “public discourse.” William Keith (2007) 
                                                 
23
 Nystrand, Martin, Adam Gamoran, and William Carbonaro (2001). "On the Ecology of Classroom 
Instruction." Writing as a learning tool. Springer Netherlands. 57-81. cited in Parker,W. (1996) "Public 
discourses in schools: Purposes, problems, possibilities." Educational Researcher 35.8 (2006): 11-18. 
24
 Swift, J., C. Gooding, and P. Swift (1988). "Questions and wait time" in Dillon, James Thomas, ed. 
Questioning and discussion: A multidisciplinary study. Greenwood Publishing Group, p.212. 
25
 Hess, D. (2009). Controversy in the Classroom: The Democratic Power of Discussion. Routledge, p.16. 
26
 Burbules, N (1993). Dialogue in Teaching: Theory and Practice. Teachers College Press, p.13.  
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has written a history called Democracy as Discussion,
27
 and merely glancing at the title 
of Bridges’s Education, Democracy, and Discussion evokes the connection as well. 
Finally we have the first chapter of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, which is titled “Of the 
Liberty of Thought and Discussion,” in which he claims that "[l]iberty as a principle has 
no application to the state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become 
capable of being improved by free and equal discussion."
28
 At the very least, looking at 
these claims, the word discussion has a close link with democracy. At most, discussion 




If there are distortions of discussion, observed in a widespread fashion from at 
least 1988 until the present, and discussion strongly connotes democracy, then it would 
not be such a far leap to consider possible distortions in democratic politics occurring in 
and around these distorted discussions. Enter neoliberalism, which I will introduce here 
with reference to David Harvey’s (2005) Brief History of Neoliberalism.
30
  
I will characterize neoliberalism in three ways. The first is that neoliberalism is a 
political-economic phenomenon marked by periods of less-regulated capital after periods 
during which capital had been more regulated, independent of geographical-cultural 
                                                 
27
 Keith, W. (2007). Democracy as Discussion: Civic Education and the American Forum Movement. 
Lexington Books. 
28
 Mill, J.S. (2006). On Liberty. Pearson. 
29
 Bridges (1979, p.30) and Dillon (1994, p.8) mention other sets of liberal ideals that discussion fosters, 
like reasonableness, order, peace, truthfulness, equality, freedom, and respect for persons. 
30
 For more on neoliberalism: Chomsky, N (2011). Profit Over People: Neoliberalism & Global Order. 
Seven Stories Press. Crouch, C. (2011). The Strange Non-death of Neo-liberalism, Polity Press. Duménil, 
G. and Lévy, D. (2013). The Crisis of Neoliberalism. Harvard University Press. Foucault, M. (2008) The 
Birth of Biopolitics Lectures at the College de France, 1978–1979. London: Palgrave. Plant, R. (2009). The 
Neo-liberal State. Oxford University Press. Steger, M, and Roy, R (2010) Neoliberalism: A Very Short 
Introduction. Oxford University Press. 
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context. Harvey points out how neoliberalism emerges in different parts of the world. 
Neoliberal developments in the US (and, by neocolonial extension, Chile), UK, and 
China occurred almost simultaneously in the late 1970s and 1980s.
31
 During the period of 
more regulated capital market activities were “embedded” in regulations—what Harvey 
calls “embedded liberalism,”
32
—which constrained economic activities such as finance 
and other forms of profit-making within a series of governmental and public restrictions. 
For example, the banking industry experienced heavy regulations after the Great Crash of 
1929. Among other constraints banks were no longer permitted to buy and sell securities 
in addition to loaning money. Under the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 these activities were 
placed in “separate rooms” since their combined activity, while extremely profitable for 
those bankers both loaning money and buying/selling securities, concentrated 
dangerously high risk in a small number of financial institutions. Advocates of 
deregulation pushed for decades to chip away at this legislation, and a friendly political 
milieu for such advocates arose in the years 1976-1980, particularly in the United States 
when Ronald Reagan came into the Presidency and Margaret Thatcher came into power 
in the United Kingdom. During their tenures the market slowly became unembedded. To 
continue with the banking example, calling for deregulation and a free market, the 
Graham-Leach-Bliley Act formally removed the restrictions with which Glass-Steagall 
had regulated banking. Banks could now sell securities as well as provide loans. (Shortly 
thereafter, as predicted by several prescient Democrats in the United States Senate, there 
was a massive financial crisis in 2008 in housing markets.
33
) Senator Phil Gramm of 
                                                 
31
 Harvey, D. (2005). Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford University Press, p.2. 
32
 Ibid., p.3. 
33
 For a concise history see Grant, J. K. (2010). “What the Financial Services Industry Puts Together Let 
No Person Put Asunder: How the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Contributed to the 2008-2009 American 
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Texas, one of the architects of this legislation, told Congress that  
Abraham Lincoln used to like to use the analogy that old and outmoded laws need 
to be changed because it made about as much sense to continue to impose them 
on people as it did to ask a man to wear the same clothes he did when he was a 
child…We are here today to repeal Glass-Steagall because we have learned that 




Gramm’s rhetoric is potent. He invokes Abraham Lincoln, an icon of American 
progressivism, and likens banking regulations to a grown man wearing children’s clothes. 
Absurd and inappropriate constrictions on market activity are anti-progressive, and 
“government is not the answer…freedom and competition are the answers.” 
Significantly, Gramm utters freedom and competition as two separate entities. He does 
not qualify competition with free, but rather substantiates freedom with the notion of 
competition itself. The final aspect of neoliberalism to mention is the way in which it is 
“skillfully packaged,” as Hursh 2001 writes, using appealing political language. The 
unembedding of banking from its 1933 regulations will bring about freedom through 
competition, not just free competition through deregulation. This freedom will be the 
kind of freedom of which Abraham Lincoln would approve, and an adult would 
experience after having been freed from compulsion to wear children-sized clothing.
35
 
Neoliberalism, as a periodic unembedding of market activity, occurs throughout 
society through the widespread privatization of public goods. Rather than collective 
responsibility for securing goods and services there is now individual responsibility for 
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securing those same goods (such as housing, medical case, and education) from a 
competitive marketplace.
36
 On the supply side, production and distribution of those goods 
and services, once embedded in government regulation, become subject to market forces 
as well. Harvey cites the way in which officials from the United States, participating in 
nation-building, granted control of Iraqi social institutions (excepting petroleum 
production) to foreign investors, whose stockholders and boards of directors governed 
them from outside the country.
37
 In a neoliberal arrangement “individual freedoms,” 
continues Harvey, “are guaranteed by the freedom of the market”
38
 such that freedom, 
what it means to be a free person in society, is substantiated by unrestricted capital.  
However, unrestricted capital does not guarantee the kind of individual freedom it 
promises. A basic Marxist intuition about modern political economy explains what 
eventuates from such rampant privatization: when capital is deregulated, the extent to 
which the few exploit the many increases. Consider the following graph, published in the 
Huffington Post, the data presented in which were compiled by the Congressional Budget 
office.
39
 It depicts the growth in income across different percentiles from 1979-2007. On 
the right is “the 1%” of income earners in the United States, who saw a 275% increase in 
their real after-tax income during that time. To the left is everyone else. 
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Figure 1. Income Inequality 
Here is an expression of capital’s conflicted reality: a discrepancy between the 
political discourse of freedom and equality and the on-the-ground experience of 
constraint and inequality for the majority living within it. Such a distortion of society is 
not the result of some conflict between appearance and reality, but rather the presence of 
conflicting terms and realities within the social-political arrangement. Remember, 
however, that a neoliberal superstructure is immanent in its parts: the small interactions 
that occur in the base, relations of production, and infrastructure. The thesis of this 
dissertation is that the distortion of discussion described earlier, construed through 
Voloshinov as semiotic ideology, iterates and constitutes the distortion of society in 
neoliberal capitalism. The graph above is also visually suggestive of the pedagogical 
distortion mentioned at the outset: Fuhrman and James stood as they lectured during the 
discussion; standing much like that tallest column stands in front of the seated audience 
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members.  Through the same theoretical lens we may also conclude that these distortions 
are not necessary features of the pedagogical and political landscape. If we speak 
intentionally—both in utterance and facilitation, reconstituting what we say and how we 
say it—we can reconstitute the social world. 
Chapter Outline  
The first chapter will survey pedagogical understandings of discussion: its aims, 
roles, contexts, practices, definitions, theories, and ideologies. In that survey I find the 
word “exchange” and other economic language ubiquitous in writing and talking about 
what discussion is. I then read this situation through Marxist theory in the second chapter, 
presenting the “reified view” of discussion. Reification occurs when the commodity is the 
universal social form, as Georg Lukacs
40
 writes, when we experience the world in terms 
of commodity, and consciousness is affected by capitalist society and politics such that 
we think of talking and listening with one another as exchanging something, producing, 
or even giving, sharing, or contributing opinions, reasons, ideas, etc. I call this the first 
distortion of discussion, since there is a discrepancy between the economic behaviors of 
exchanging, producing, offering, and speaking and listening. The third chapter examines 
how, with this reified view, discussion is distorted such that the verbal form of interaction 
that goes by its name is recitation. I call this the second distortion of discussion. This 
chapter includes the central argument for how distorted discussions iterate and compose a 
neoliberal-capitalist arrangement. I also analyze the term recitation, describing what a 
basic recitative quality of interaction entails, and tracing the distortion of discussion over 
time through a genealogy of pedagogical practice in the United States from 1912 until 
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2006. The final chapter of the dissertation takes a constructive turn. There I present a de-
reified view of discussion, which I call the dehisced view, counter-posing the psychical 
state of dehiscence in Lacanian psychoanalysis to that of reification.
41
 I read dehiscence 
back into Freud’s work on mass psychology to find the dehiscence proper to discussion 
and, culling a distinction between group formation and mass formation, I recommend a 
series of dehiscing (that is, de-reifying) facilitation tactics. I conclude with contrasting 
examples of discussion from my research done in schools, and a series of critiques and 
reflections on the central claim of the work: that both the form and content of talking are 
sites of resistance and compliance to social-political realities. While there is no ideal 
social world, nor ideal interaction, we can have some control over the composition of our 
social world by interacting with one another intentionally; that, as we yelled in the streets 
in 2011, “another world is possible” when we change the way we talk, think about 
talking, and talk about talking.   
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While it would be simpler to launch directly into an analysis of the distortion of 
discussion, I will bracket the concept of distortion for now in order to derive the 
conditions for its analysis by looking exclusively at discussion. The general question is: 
What can the word discussion mean pedagogically? What are the aims, purposes, roles, 
contexts, and theories of discussion with which researchers and educators have imbued 
the concept and practice? Responding to this question has two purposes. The first is to 
organize existing knowledge about discussion. The second purpose is explicitly oriented 
towards my thesis, which is to derive the conditions for analyzing the distortion of 
discussion by looking at discussion itself. Throughout the chapter the reader should get 
the sense that there are many ways to think of discussion.  
I will begin by delimiting several basic distinctions. First, where does discussion 
happen? It is a Deweyan instinct to distinguish between education and schooling.
42
 
Education happens in school, but also in many other contexts. I follow this instinct and 
will focus on a broader scope than just schooling. Discussion, as an educational 
phenomenon not limited to schooling, happens throughout society. Much of the literature 
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on discussion I will examine in this chapter addresses schools, but I will build on those 
insights in order to widen my scope to other institutions, contexts, and age groups. 
Second, who discusses? The list of people that discuss goes on and on and on: teachers, 
parents, students, children, policy analysts, politicians, market strategists, friends, lovers, 
colleagues, workers, bosses, journalists, clergy, intellectuals, enemies, participants, 
facilitators... It is those last two, however, the dyad of facilitator/participant, that I will 
use throughout the dissertation, since there is a difference between those whom assemble 
for a discussion and the one or two individuals whom are responsible for initiating and 
organizing the encounter. Finally, how do we discuss: with oral or written language? I 
mean the difference here intuitively, since the word discussion is used both by writers, 
particularly academic writers, who aim to “discuss” some question or other in an essay, 
as well as talkers who get together and speak with one another. The difference between 
oral and written discussion is intuitive, however, so I will not linger on this difference. 
Other than the fact that I will address oral discussion in this dissertation, I will only 
mention that online discussion which takes place in social media’s many venues might be 






I have already included my definition of discussion in the Introduction: obliged 
talking that considers many points of view during group address of question in common, 
with an equality and variety in the sequence of turns. My definition is not the commonly 
used definition. In fact there is no commonly used definition. The word discussion is used 
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in many ways to refer to sometimes similar, sometimes different kinds of interactions. 
Dillon (1994) writes in a passage from Using Discussion in Classrooms that “the 
confusion can be entertaining.” There is an entertaining confusion of the way the word is 
used. He lists them: 
…discussion is scarcely a narrow term. It is confusingly used to denote any 
number and variety of exchanges. The confusion can be entertaining. For 
instance, an article on discussion in teaching bears the title of conversation..., 
while a book entitled teaching through conversation...bears on discussion, and 
another book entitled discussion... bears on recitation. A study on 
recitation...distinguishes it from discussion and reports data on each; a study of 
classroom processes...does not distinguish discussion from recitation but reports 
data for everything lumped as discussion. Finally, a book on using 
discussion...lists a dozen forms of discussion, including debate, panel, forum, 




Conversation, discussion, recitation, debate, buzz group, panel, forum, mentoring... this is 
a confusing family of words each of which refer to verbal forms of interaction, and 
researchers assign them definitions in different ways. Why have I chosen to define 
discussion as I have, as opposed to any other way? My definition incorporates several 
elements which I have determined, after examining the literature on discussion, are oft-
cited and important. First, my definition includes the definition stipulated by the most-
cited author in the small sub-field of philosophy of discussion (Bridges). Second, my 
definition includes the most-included feature of discussion among the literature reviewed: 
while authors do not attribute it to him, Gabriel Tarde’s distinction between conversation 
and discussion is one of the most common distinctions made in the literature (his 
statement of this difference is the earliest, explicit formulation I have found). Finally, my 
definition incorporates the criterion which most clearly distinguishes discussion from 
recitation (an equality and variety in the sequence of turns taken). Bridges’s definition 
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may actually be capacious enough to include an initiation-response-evaluation script (see 
chapter 3 for a detailed definition of recitation), and while Dillon reveres Bridges and 
takes much from him, I read Dillon as also asserting an implicit critique of his forbear. 
Dillon insists that many confuse discussion for recitation, and stipulates that an equality 
and variety in the sequence of turns must occur for there to be group address of a 
question in common. Bridges’s definition cannot ensure a difference, which pedagogical 
history has borne out as the distortion of discussion into recitation, the second distortion 





Why must the definition of discussion be one way or another, however? Why 
must it be what I have stipulated in my three-part definition? The predominant intuition 
about meaning in the largely positivist-pragmatist literature on educational discourse is 
that meaning is determined by use.
46
 Is the definition of discussion reducible to the way 
in which it is used, or could there be some aprioristic concept from which we would 
deduce a series of conditions for discussion to meet? One’s response will depend on 
one’s philosophy of language. I develop my own position in chapter three, but I raise this 
question now for several reasons. First, I pose the definitional gap to organize knowledge 
about discussion, as much of this research may be thought of as filling such a definitional 
gap. Second, introducing this split between the meaning of the word and the verbal forms 
of interaction that go by its name is a distinction that will be crucial for my argument in 
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the third chapter. Third, it is another phrasing of the central question of my dissertation: 
why do we think the word discussion means what it means, and why do certain 
interactions go by its name?  
There is a second gap besides the definitional gap to which I will return in the 
fourth chapter. Why should the definition of discussion require an equality and variety in 
the sequence of turns? I mentioned that this Dillonian requirement is the best way to 
distinguish discussion from recitation, but must we accept that requirement? This is a 
different kind of gap, a requirement gap rather than a definitional one, but it is similar to 
the above definitional gap since we need a reason for why this form of obliged talking 
would require that participants follow up one anothers’ comments equally and variously. 
In a way, this is the central question of the dissertation, since when we use the word 
discussion colloquially it is clearly not required that there be an equality and variety in 
the sequence of turns taken (thus the distortion of discussion into recitation). Here is yet 
another way of phrasing the distortion of discussion: when a recitation or lecture with a 
recitation, each of which entail an inequality and homogeneity in the sequence of turns, 
goes by the name discussion.  
 
Ways to Close the Definitional Gap: Etymology and Theory 
In closing the definitional gap, we might look at the etymology of the word 
discussion, which comes from “dis” and “quatere” which mean “apart” and “shaking” in 
Latin, respectively.
47
 There is a theorist named Robert E. Joyce who interprets the 
shaking imagery seriously in his theory of discussion, but, while interesting, such an 
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etymology is something of a dead end as it may open to interpretation what terms such as 
“shaking” might require. Theories of discussion, since they are more robust, are better 
suited for the task. David Bridges (1979) justifies his own definition of discussion in 
Education, Democracy, and Discussion with what he deems a liberal tradition. He 
engages with a series of authors’ thinking to ground the various aspects of his definition 
(improvement of understanding from many points of view in an appropriate form), 
proceeding from John Milton to John Stuart Mill to John Dewey and then Frederick von 
Hayek (among others). One image he uses to characterize this liberal tradition is the 
rotary. In a traffic circle there is not a centralized system for telling people when or how 
to move, such as the Place de L'étoile. We might characterize this lack-of-constraint 
theory as a lassiez-faire theory of discussion. Thus we close the definitional gap: 
discussion, argues Bridges, is the improvement of knowledge through many points of 
view in an appropriate form because the liberal tradition calls for decentralized, free 
individualized decision-making according to a basic set of rules which each participant 
must learn and exercise during activity, and the best situation results from permitting 
these individuals to go about their own business.
48
  
There are other traditions that Bridges includes. The victory tradition, Bridges 
claims, differs from the liberal tradition. Bridges mentions Schopenhauer and Marx as 
foundational to this tradition, and will add several other authors to it as well.   
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A painting by Emile Friant called “Political Discussion” depicts the victory 
element of discussion: the men look disturbed, they are disagreeing about something, yet 
they sit together and continue talking. The man in the hat appears to have been insulted, 
and his friend attempts to calm him down, and two men in the background are troubled, 
but in different ways.
49
 In explaining the victory tradition Bridges refers us to 
Schopenhauer’s “The Art of Controversy,”
50
 which speaks to this exact situation. For 
Schopenhauer, discussion is not an activity meant to reveal truths, but rather an 
opportunity for discussants to demonstrate prowess or winning spirit. Our base vanity 
must be vindicated in discussion, he claims. For Marx on the other hand, according to 
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Bridges, discussion will be a recapitulation of the class struggle, or a power struggle will 
ensue between economic groups during the interaction, one trying to gain power over 
another for exploitative or revolutionary reasons.
51
 There are others inspired by Marx, 
and other critical-social theories of discussion, that expand this list of the victory tradition 
of discussion. Lyotard’s (1979) The Postmodern Condition,
52
 includes a unique theory of 
discussion that combines Marx and Wittgenstein. Lyotard writes that there is a “general 
agonistics” in the stipulation of language game rules, which is a trademark characteristic 
of the postmodern condition: technocratic capitalism determines the rules by which we 
must speak.
53
 In this way, Lyotard critiques Habermas’s theory of consensus and 
competence, which I will mention later. Sloterdijk (1991) elaborates on this theme in his 
Critique of Cynical Reason.
54
 He writes that discussion, in an Enlightenment context, is 
an invitation to “free” discourse where participants must speak exactly as they are told 
“and in no other way.”
55
 Sloterdijk’s thesis in Critique is that cynicism is enlightened 
false consciousness, a thesis which, due to its complexity, I cannot elaborate fully here. 
However, he mentions that there are two engines or “axes” of enlightened false 
consciousness: reason and discussion. He adds that reasonable discussion is the way 
cynicism breeds. Foucault’s (1979) Discipline and Punish famously centers on the 
historical emergence of the panopticon in penitentiary design.
56
 He distinguishes between 
centralized forms of punishment, such as public executions at the gallows, and the 
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enlightenment transition, in the modern period, to a panopticon-style of justice which is 
silent, hidden, and private means of distributing power. He argues this decentralized form 
is a more effective way of punishing and maintaining a dominant order.  
Foucault’s is an important theoretical position to consider since, in this 
perspective, discussion may actually be a better way to exercise pedagogical power than a 
lecture or recitation. Such a theory might close the definitional gap in a novel way (as do 
the other theories), but this theory does so in such a way as to critique Bridges’s liberal 
theory by presenting its obverse. The reader might notice the symmetry between the 
circular panopticon formation juxtaposed with the circular formation of the traffic circle. 
Each of these images are symmetrical, finally, with the classic discussion formation: a 
series of individuals seated in a circle. Foucault’s critique, as it relates to discussion, is 
that the panopticon is the underside of the liberal tradition—it’s “obverse,” as Zizek 
writes
57
—and thus discussion is a better form of control over decision-making than 
centralized communication. I will address this important point in the conclusion of the 
work. Finally, Ellsworth (1997) draws from bell hooks to compose a feminist perspective 
on the discussion-and-dialogue-as-social-justice project in education.
58
 She critiques both 
liberal and critical pedagogy, as well as Marxist approaches to dialogue in education, for 
their patriarchy. Later theorists such as Doris Santoro (2008) and Liz Jackson (2008)
59
 
have developed these themes more extensively. 
I will briefly mention Jurgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action, as it 
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might be at home in the victory tradition. The difference between Habermas’s theory and 
the others I have mentioned is that it is optimistic: he theorizes the way in which actors 
within a social-political arrangement can, through communication, resist technocracy and 
the over-rationalization of the lifeworld. So long as discussion works towards the ideal 
speech situation, we can achieve an intersubjective rational autonomy from which to 
launch critique of an overly rationalized social order.
60
 To do so we must speak 
competently according to universal structures of language and arrive at certain validity 
claims: sincerity, comprehensibility, truthfulness, and appropriate expression. If we work 
towards the ideal speech situation, then we achieve mutual understanding and rational 
consensus “free of force, open or latent.”
61
  
Outside the liberal and victory traditions there are two Platonic theories to 
mention. One of them is Haroutunian-Gordon’s (2009), which casts discussion as a 
“turning of the soul” in a “new community of truth under the influence of the object.”
62
 
This perspective combines aspects of Platonic and Gadamerian theories, according to 
which Haroutunian-Gordon derives the interpretive questions, rather than evaluative and 
factual questions. Turning one’s soul involves reading a text’s meaning on its own terms 
rather than one’s own terms.  
Robert E. Joyce, a Catholic philosopher, builds a theory of discussion from a 
different premise in Republic.
63
 Plato claims that if we examine the just soul we can learn 
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about the just city and vice versa, as though each are differently-sized triangles, the 
formulae for which will be identical with respect to area and perimeter. Joyce applies this 
premise to the inner and outer worlds of discussion. There are three parts of the inner 
world (or psyche): self, consciousness of self, and consciousness of consciousness of self 
(understanding those terms intuitively). Discussion occurs when a series of psyches 
mimic or take the form of a single psyche, such that the self is the speaker, the 
consciousness of self is someone to whom the speaker speaks, and the consciousness of 
consciousness of self is the “guardian of dialog,” the rest of the group allowing relevance 
and meaning to occur during interaction. Those roles in a discussion switch from person 
to person, just as they would from thought to thought in the mind (and therefore we get a 
“striking back and forth,” in accordance with the etymology). Whenever participants and 
facilitators work together as would a psyche, externally matching the internal order, 
discussion occurs. 
 From this Platonic idea of community we may transition briefly to the 
Philosophy for Children movement, which has its own concept of “philosophical” 
discussion. Such discussion traditionally occurs during a community of inquiry, the 
theorization of which spans a nearly-forty-year tradition from Matthew Lipman
64
 to Anne 
Sharp and Laurance Splitter
65
 to Megan Laverty and David Kennedy.
66
 As a brief sketch, 
the community of inquiry aims to inculcate a certain type of thinking in its participants—
specifically children, via philosophical novels or texts—through dialogue. There is some 
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disagreement about what “thinking” entails in this tradition, which we might crudely (and 
problematically) draw along “analytic” and “anarchic” interpretations. The former 
follows a liberal, traditional, and “modern” or Aristotelian-logical form of “rigorous” 
deductive thinking. Lipman in particular was influenced by the pragmatists Dewey and 
Peirce.
67
 The latter, “anarchic” interpretation takes an attitude of creative, expressive 
formlessness, Gilles Deleuze being one of several influences (particularly on Walter 




Transition to Contemporary Philosophy of Discussion: Categorizing the aims, roles, 
contexts, and purposes of discussion 
Each of these theories in their various traditions may furnish a definition of 
discussion, or fill any definitional gap that might exist between the word discussion and 
its definition. The following three chapters of this dissertation will compose a theory 
which fills the definitional gap I have posed for myself. However, there are two other 
realms of thinking about discussion to survey. To pass from the theories to 
categorizations of discussion (or typologies of discussion), I will sketch a final theory 
which acts as a pivot between them. Such a pivot theory is a pragmatic theory. Burbules 
(1993), whom we have already cited, writes an intuitive response to this definitional gap. 
His response to the question “what does the word discussion mean?” is to say “look at 
how it is used.” Discussion, Burbules writes, is whatever you are up to, whatever you aim 
at, or, in his words, whatever game we play when we talk together. Burbules 
characterizes this theory of discussion as a non-theory. In contrast to the perspectives just 
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mentioned, in an essay with Bruce (2001), the authors claim that there should be no 
abstract theory of discussion, a claim with which Laverty agrees (for different reasons).
69
 
Generally speaking there is an implicit consensus among contemporary discourse 
theorists and philosophers of discussion around this non-theoretical approach. As 
Burbules and Bruce argue, the better we come to know the different aims, roles, and 
purposes of discussion, the better (that is, more effective) discussion will be. Therefore, 
the most recent research on the philosophy of discussion is typological and categorical, 
asserting theses by way of tables that categorize the various aims, roles, and purposes of 
discussion.  
Burbules’s central typology consists in a matrix of two “attitudes” and two 
“views,” which yield four different kinds of discussions.
70
 The first attitude multiplies 
interpretations (divergence), whereas another narrows interpretations (convergence). The 
first view grants provisional plausibility to thought (inclusive), whereas another doubts 
any given thought (critical). Accordingly, an inclusive-divergent form of discussion is a 
conversation; an inclusive, convergent discussion is an inquiry; a critical, divergent 
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Figure 1. Burbules’s Table 
 
Walton’s typology is a quite different example (figure 2).
71
 He defines dialogue as 
an “exchange of speech acts between two partners in a turn-taking sequence aimed at a 
collective goal” and stipulates that discussion is “a particular type of dialogue that has the 
goal of arriving at the truth of the matter.” He proposes eight possible goals that 
participants and facilitators can have during discussion: persuasion, advice-seeking, 
looking for information, consulting an expert, negotiating, inquiring, quarreling, or, 
eristic fighting (which recalls the Schopenhauerian pursuit of winning rather than getting 
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Persuading get the other party to accept a proposition 
Info-seeking transmission of info from one party to another 
Advice-soliciting one party seeks advice, the other provides it 
Expert-consulting non-expert consults an expert 
Negotiating two parties get what they want by making a deal 
Inquiring collectively prove a proposition/demonstrate unprovability 
Quarrelling defeat, humiliate, or “hit out” others 
Eristic truth is subservient to winning 
Figure 2. Walton’s table 
 
Farrar (1988, fig.3) elaborates three models of discussion: course-covering, 
integrating, and expressing discussion, which she analyzes in the dimensions of 
centeredness, focus, topic control, and predominant verbal interactional patterns.
72
 As do 
many other typologies in the literature, this table presents three options along what I will 
call a spectrum of “chaos,” a word that Farrar uses in her essay.
73
 Course-covering, for 
example, has tight topic control. On the other side of the spectrum is an “expressing” 
discussion, whose control is “loose.” In between course-covering and expression 
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discussion is a compromise between the two extremes: integrating discussion. We will 
see this pattern elsewhere, though not in the following table. 
 
Model of discussion Course-covering Integrating Expressing 
Centeredness Subject-centered Integration of subject 
and participant-centered 
Participant-centered 




facts and explanations 
with reflections based 




Integrating expressions of 
feelings and observations 
into some structural 
framework 












and/or questions and 









Figure 3. Farrar’s table 
 
Parker and Hess (2001, fig.4) make a distinction between “facilitating with” and 
“facilitating for” discussion. The former facilitates discussion for the purpose of learning 
to discuss and the letter facilitates discussion for some other reason, either making a 
decision or covering some material.
74
 Incidentally, they define discussion as “shared 
inquiry.” They also delimit three models of discussion—deliberation, seminar, and 
conversation—which they analyze in four dimensions: aim, text, focus, and exemplar. 
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Seminar is a familiar model: a standard procedure for schooling contexts, but the 
deliberation- conversation distinction is noteworthy. In deliberation there is a group who 
will be affected by some policy decision, and discussants want to know what this group 
should do. In such a discussion there may be some controversy (see Hess 2009). A 
conversation on the other hand may be controversial as well, however its purview is 
when a group must focus on itself and set its own goals for action.  
 
Dimensions Deliberation Seminar Conversation 
Aim 1. Reach a decision 
about what a “we” 
should do achieve an 
end 
 
2. Improve discussants’ 
powers of 
understanding 
1. Reach an enlarged 
understanding of a text  
 
2. Improve discussants’ 
powers of 
understanding 
1. Reach agreement on 
end 
 
2. Improve discussants’ 
powers of 
understanding 
Text Alternatives related to a 
public problem 
A print or film 
selection; artwork; 
exhibit; performance; 
cartoon; event; idea 
Goals related to a public 
problem 
Focus question What should we do? What does the author 
(artist, etc.) mean? 
What kind of society 
(room right now) do we 
want to have? 
Exemplar Structured academic 
controversy 
Socratic seminar Goal setting 
Figure 4. Parker and Hess’s table 
 
Golding (2011) distinguishes between the function and form of discussion, a 
distinction which he attributes to Burbules.
75
 Taking cricket as an example, we can play 
cricket in the backyard, we can play cricket with the local team, we can play cricket 
professionally—it is all cricket. Each of these are functions of the form of cricket, and 
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discussion is the same way. Golding recapitulates the spectrum of chaos we found in 
Farrar: unstructured discussion is a participant-directed, abandoned, independent, 
divergent, and relativistic function of discussion. On the other side of the spectrum we 
have the facilitator-directed function of discussion which is authoritative, instructive, 




Figure 6. Golding’s spectrum 
 
 
Finally I will include Sarid’s political-theoretical table,
76
 which delimits three 
dialogical approaches analyzed in six parameters. Sarid pushes the boundaries of the 
positivist-pragmatist consensus by associating each approach with a philosopher: 
Socrates, Habermas, and Derrida respectively. The spectrum of chaos appears again. On 
the Socratic side is a dialogic-autocratic pedagogical orientation, whereas the Derridian, 
deconstructive dialogue is “permissive.” Yet the end result of Socratic dialogue is aporia, 
and its political orientation is “authoritarian democracy,”
77
 whereas Derridian 
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 While much of this review has ignored the political aims of the dissertation, this aspect of Sarid’s table is 
fertile ground for Marxist interpretation: only in a capitalist social arrangement, perhaps, where the 
exploitation of the many by the few is skillfully packaged as freedom, would the phrase “authoritarian 
democracy” have meaning.  
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discussion’s political orientation is “radical democracy.” Habermas’s “communicative 











Basic Value Epistemological clarity/ 
self-knowledge 
Autonomy Difference/plurality of 
voices 
Personality-attribute Curiosity Agreeableness/ 
moral consciousness 
Creativity/ openness 
Pedagogical orientation Dialogic-autocratic Discourse-centered 
instruction 
Permissive 
Dialogical process Dialectical reasoning Communicative 
rationality 
Provocative exploration 







Authoritarian democracy Deliberative 
democracy 
Radical democracy 
Figure 6. Sarid’s table 
 
To conclude this section of the review, it may be possible to create a meta-table 
combining the dimensions, models, and approaches categorized in the tables above, 
analyzing them in each other’s terms. In addition to a discussion’s aim, text, focus, and 
exemplar, with such a table we might also refer to its function, centeredness, topic 
control, political orientation, etc. Applying all the dimensions to all the models may form 
new descriptive language for the aims, contexts, purposes, and roles of discussion. Such a 
table would be unwieldy however, as well as distracting to the other central purpose of 
this review: to create the conditions for an analysis of the distortion of discussion, and its 
relation to neoliberalism. I will therefore transition away from the positivist-pragmatist 
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consensus and move towards an ideological approach to thinking about discussion. It is to 
this purpose that I now turn in the last section of this survey of discussion’s meaning.  
 
Discussion as an Exchange of Ideas, and Other Economic Language 
While there are a plurality of definitions, aims, roles, contexts, purposes, and 
theories of discussion, there is something remarkably similar within the literature on 
discussion. This similarity has already occurred in several passages, though it is so subtle 
and oblique as to seem initially uninteresting. However the phenomenon is worthy of 
remark: economic language suffuses the literature on discussion, particularly the word 
“exchange,” though other economic terms are present as well. Examples of this economic 
language have already occurred in the passage from Dillon (1994), regarding the 
entertaining confusion of discussion’s meanings. He writes: “…discussion is scarcely a 
narrow term. It is confusingly used to denote any number and variety of exchanges.” For 
Walton, Dialogue is an “exchange of speech acts between two partners in a turn-taking 
sequence aimed at a collective goal.” Returning to the literature, we can find the word in 
a majority of research on the subject. What follows is a mere selection. 
Hulan (2010): “In addition, if students feel that their opinions or answers are 
being judged by a teacher, they can quickly become disengaged in a discussion. 
To prevent this, teachers must encourage a free exchange of ideas…”
78
 
Haroutunian-Gordon (1998): “As one speaks with others in the community, one 
discovers the community’s patterns of response to what one says…Through these 
exchanges, conclusions are drawn and actions are determined.”
79
 Lipman (2003): 
“A conversation is an exchange: of feelings, of thoughts, of information, of 
understandings.”
80
  Johnson and Preskill (2012): “…dialogue can work as a 
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written as well as spoken exchange.”
81
 Burbules (1993): “between two friends 





The above works are predominantly in the discipline of educational discourse and 
discourse analysis. The same is true however critical discourses on communication.  
Morris (2001): “[a]lso invaluable were my exchanges with Frederic Jameson.”
83
 
McCarthy (1978): “[Habermas] pick[s] up where Adorno left off in his exchange 
with Popper.”
84
 “A smoothly functioning language game rests on a background 
consensus formed from the mutual recognition of at least four different types of 
validity claims that are involved in the exchange of speech acts.”
85
 Habermas 
(1991): “[i]f one wanted to make a serious comparison between argumentation 
and chess playing, one would find that the closest equivalents to the rules of chess 




Extrapolating from exchange to other instances of economic language, we find 
more examples: 
Golding (2011): “The essential feature [of constructivism] is that students are 
active in their own knowledge production…”
87
 Burgh and Yorshansky (2011): 
“…a classroom community of inquiry depends on the deliberative skills of its 
members and their willingness to share ideas…”
88
 Parker and Hess (2001): “By 
shared inquiry…we mean that the inquirers hold in common the same object of 
inquiry, which is the discussion topic or material.”
89
 Schwab (1978): 
“[Discussion]…is also the experience of moving toward and possessing 
understanding…”
90
   
 
What are we to make of these utterances? On the one hand the economic words are not 
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quite metaphors, in that they are written with a kind of common-sense that appears, at 
first glance, to be uninteresting and obvious. Neither are they similes nor terms-of-art 
which the writers explicitly enunciate to create a mood or feeling. On the other hand, the 
words are at least a small step away from direct reference to talking, listening, and 
thinking together. It is neither grammatically nor analytically true that a discussion is an 
exchange in the same way, for example, that a bachelor is an unmarried man. The 
economic words have some qualities of what Michele LeDoueff calls an “imaginary,” 
which is the implicit institution of an emblem in writing or talking that creates an 
understanding, but without arguing for that understanding explicitly.
91
 However the 
economic words are not quite imaginaries, since they do not communicate an image like 
an island or river. Since the words are economic, they may indicate a Lyotardian 
metanarrative to the extent that any economic term carries an ideological significance, a 
grand story into which many social activities “fit.” Yet the mere presence of a seemingly 
innocuous word such as “exchange” is not even a partially developed metanarrative: the 
word might be ideologically pre-capitalist, capitalist, or even acapitalist and the word 
might indicate any or all of these designations. I will not venture an interpretation of 
these words at this point. Rather, I pose the question of their signifiance as part of my 
survey of the literature as I transition to the next chapter. As this chapter finishes, I 
include several oft-cited passages in the discussion literature where this oblique, 
unremarkable-remarkable, and economic language occurs. 
Below is a diagram from Sinclair and Coulthard’s Towards an Analysis of 
Discourse (1979), which depicts their schema for discourse analysis. The words 
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transaction and exchange figure prominently here, and studies which draw from their 





Figure 7. Sinclair and Coulthard’s Diagram 
Paul Grice’s Logic and Conversation is another oft-cited text, particularly 
passages relating to the “cooperation principle”: “Make your conversational contribution 
such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of 
the talk exchange in which you are engaged.”
93
 “Talk exchange” is a noun-phrase uttered 
in reference to what conversation is, though it is neither an explicit technical term nor an 
image. (He also includes “contribution” in the first clause.) Similarly to the passages 
above, there is no explicit account of the word’s presence, and nor does it appear that 
there should be. The same may be observed in a passage from Gadamer’s Truth and 
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Method. This particular passage is quite important for contemporary philosophers of 
education interested in discussion and dialogue, particularly Harotounian-Gordon, 
Burbules (1993), Hansen (2001)
94
: 
Every conversation presupposes a common language, or better, creates a common 
language. Something is placed in the center, as the Greeks say, which the partners 
in dialogue both share, and concerning which they can exchange ideas with one 
another…in a successful conversation they are both under the influence of the 




Again, the word occurs innocuously and without explicit reason: “partners in dialogue 
share” something that is placed in the center, about which they “exchange ideas.” There 
are two separate economic images here, one more market-oriented than the other. We see 
that participants in a discussion talk about the “something” placed in the center. 
Participants share this “something” with one another. However when they talk about this 
thing they share, they “exchange ideas with one another.” The participants’s words, 
which they speak and to which they listen, are another kind of “something,” a different 
kind of something from the something placed in the center. They can exchange this 
second kind of “something” with one another, rather than sharing. The following image 
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Figure 8. Free Exchange 
 
What do these words mean, and what might they have to do with the distortion of 
discussion? I will address these questions in the next chapter. The purpose of this chapter 
was to organize knowledge about discussion from texts in the philosophy of discussion 
and discourse analysis, surveying the various meanings of discussion, while also deriving 
the conditions for an analysis of the distortion of discussion. The oblique economic terms 
just observed, present as they are throughout the literature on discussion, are precisely the 

















I will claim that the instances of economic language in utterances about discussion 
observed in the previous chapter are intellectual ideologemes, which, following Jameson 
(1981), are discrete constituents of ideology.
97
 Interpreting such ideologemes is a way of 
reading a text’s political unconscious, or the extent to which the text is a working-through 
of conflicts and contradictions in the social-political arrangement within which it was 
composed.
98
 I will argue in what follows that these particular ideologemes, mentioned in 
the previous chapter, are traces of reification. The tradition of this word in Marxist 
theory, starting with Georg Lukacs, defines it as the internal impact on individuals of the 
commodity as universal social category. When the commodity is the predominant mode 
of intersubjective agency, individuals engaged in relations of production within that 
social formation experience facets of the world in commodity terms, even experience 
itself. Thus we have the first distortion of discussion: when reified consciousness works 
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through its experience of capitalist relations of production (specifically the selling of 
one’s labor as a commodity) within which it finds itself, such that it views speaking and 
listening as economic behaviors. I call this a distortion because speaking and listening are 
discrepant with exchanging, producing, consuming, offering, giving, and other economic 
terms observed in the previous chapter. While this reified view of discussion is distorted 
intellectually, it is not yet distorted pedagogically (an analysis of which occurs in the 
third chapter). The second distortion will follow from the first. At this point I will note 
that first distortion, which may occur in any period of capitalism, distorts speaking and 
listening with economic activity. It occurs only at the level of words, whereas the second 
distortion occurs at the levels of both words and forms of interaction. While this first 
distortion occurs within any period of capitalist relation of production, the second 
distortion will only occur in a neoliberal period of capitalist relations of production. 
These claims will only make full sense at the end of the next chapter, though I introduce 
them here to foreshadow the argument. 
This chapter first introduces the distortion operant in characterizing discussion as 
an exchange of ideas. Next, this distortion is cast in the Marxist-theoretical terms of 
reification, but only after a brief tour through several foundational Marxist terms: base 
and superstructure, social form, relations of production, and the commodification of 
labor. The chapter concludes with an intellectual-ideologemic analysis of four texts that 
address discussion, tracing the increasing prevalence of this first intellectual distortion 






Robert Quillen famously quipped that “discussion is an exchange of knowledge; 
argument is an exchange of ignorance.”
99
 What follows is a short battery of nested 
questions and reflections with which I intend, at least, to defamiliarize the reader with 
exchange language in utterances about discussion and, at most, point the reader to the 
presence of a distortion stemming from a social world whose bottom line is the 
commodity.  
First question: Is an idea a thing? When we say we exchange ideas in discussion, 
is this idea the phoneme, meaning, or the referent itself? Is it a signifier or a signified? Is 
it all of them, or none of them? The image at the end of the previous chapter (“The Free 
Exchange of Ideas”) shows an arm reaching over and placing a square card marked 
“idea” into the brain of another person. The word “idea” is written on the square, but is 
an idea a thing like a card or other objects? The image mistakenly identifies an idea with 
the word “idea.” The word “idea” is a different kind of entity from that to which it refers. 
The word itself is a phoneme if spoken, a concatenation of letters if written. Certainly the 
word may refer to something. But what is that something, and do we exchange it when 
we speak and listen? Some argument is required to confirm that ideas, or that which is 
spoken during discussion, have a thing-like quality that makes them apt for exchange.  
For sake of argument, we might agree that ideas are things. However, a second 
question arises: Are these things exchangeable? George Simmel (2004), in The 
Philosophy of Money, writes that sacrifice is an essential feature of exchange.
100
 If A 
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exchanges something with B, then A sacrifices some aspect of what A had. In turn B 
sacrifices the thing that B exchanged with A, and now each has gained the other’s object. 
However if A exchanges an idea with B, the former does not sacrifice her idea. A has not 
forgotten the idea once she has said it, for example. Discussion defies this concept of 
exchange. Though it requires an argument to do as the previous question broached, if A 
and B “have” their ideas and then discuss, A has what A has and B has what B has, and 
vice versa, when the discussion concludes. Though the murky category of “information” 
may approximate this situation (during online music-sharing, for example), such an 
interaction is not an exchange: no amount of material is reduced with respect to a 
person’s holdings.
101
 There is such a thing as a public good that a group may share in 
equally, but even in this case there should be some deficit or scarcity with respect to the 
idea itself if it is the object of exchange. Public goods decrease, as do shared and given 
goods. Ideas, if they are the kind of thing that is apt for use and consumption, increase in 
amount during consumption. 
Yet again, for the sake argument, we may grant that ideas are exchangeable 
things. A third and final question regards currency. Is there anything like a common 
equivalent that prizes or prices or makes precious, in a standardized way, what is said in 
discussion? Such a common equivalent emerges as a requirement during economic 
activity. How might persons share, barter, or exchange if there were not some agreed 
upon sense of worth, whether implicit or explicit? Ideas might not be the kind of entity 
for which a currency or common standard of value may be possible. What A takes to be 
droll and dull B might find inspiring, for example.  
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To conclude this short section, there may be entities that satisfy the 
aforementioned criteria (thing-like, exchangeable, apt for currency). Time is one of 
them.
102
 To say the discussion was waste of A’s time means that A sat talking and 
listening for an hour but at the end feels dissatisfied with what occurred.  Intellectual 
property may be another example. A might ask B for a non-disclosure agreement because 
what A may tell B has the potential to earn A or B (or whoever hears of it) a substantial 
amount of money. However the financial potential of this idea makes it valuable in this 
situation. Is the idea itself a thing that they exchange—is it property—or is the 
“intellectual property” the capital A or B may accrue when one of them puts the idea into 
action economically speaking? Earning power is a feature of the idea but not identical to 
the idea itself. The final thing that may be exchanged is “the floor,” or the opportunity to 
speak. If A talks and then B follows A, A may be giving B “the floor,” which in this case 
refers to the opportunity to speak. There may be a free or fair exchange of opportunities 
to speak. However, like time and earning power, the floor is not identical to speaking and 
listening.  
Why might speakers and writers confuse time, earning power, and the floor with 
the comments said during discussion? More generally, why would speakers think of 
discussion as an economic activity—sharing, producing, consuming, or contributing? 
There is a Marxist response to this question, but before moving in that direction I will 
phrase an objection to the question itself. We have analyzed the extent to which 
economic exchange is an adequate description of what occurs during discussion, in order 
to interpret the “political unconscious” of such utterances. There may, however, be an 
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exchange proper to talking that is different than the exchange proper to economic 
activity. Rather than a philosophical tension deserving of examination such utterances 
might merely be one way people speak about speaking. Perhaps exchange, goes this 
objection, has multiple meanings. In response I will appeal to the reader’s intuitions 
about our shared social-political world. Perhaps we can agree on the following premises: 
(a) that there are economic injustices in this shared world which require attention; (b) 
these economic injustices have something to do with the social formation or arrangement 
within which we live; (c) finally, the way in which we understand our social world and 
speak about it in our everyday lives can have some positive or negative effect on it such 
that our thought and speech either bolster or frustrate the arrangement (or some 
designation along a spectrum between bolstering and frustrating). To the extent that the 
reader agrees with these premises, an analysis of discrepant economic language in 
utterances about discussion is one way to focus our attention on a social world with 
unjust aspects. A more discomfiting objection would be to claim that such interpretation 
of a political unconscious in the discussion literature is not a way to focus attention on an 
unjust world. The following arguments respond to such an objection. 
 
The House and The Theater: Fundamental Terms in Marxism According to Cohen and 
Althusser 
A brief tour through Marxist terminology will ready the ground for an explanation 
as to how this first distortion, as well as the second distortion in the next chapter, occurs. 
I will draw primarily from Cohen (2000) and Althusser (1977), two cornerstone 
interpreters of Marx from whom contemporary traditions of thoughts inherit an 
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understanding both of what Marx means by terms like social forms, base and 
superstructure, relations of production, and productive forces (Cohen), as well as what 
these terms mean for the history of philosophy more generally (Althusser).
103
 I will argue 
that when considered together, their reflections on these aspects of Marxist theory form a 
profound mosaic with which we may understand how a speaker might come to think that 
talking and listening are economic activities.
104
 This distortion occurs when thinking of 
non-commodity entities and actions in terms of commodity. I will claim this is the result 
of reification, a closely-related phenomenon to the better-known case of commodity 
fetishism, which is its inverse: when commodities are understood in terms of non-
commodity entities and actions. To appreciate reification, however, we must understand 
the framework within which such a phenomenon arises. 
Marx is said to have composed a theory of social forms, or formations. A social 
formation is a social-political arrangement such as capitalism, socialism, or serfdom. It 
includes a basis (infrastructure)
105
 and a superstructure. There is a question as to what 
exactly the basis contains and how exactly it forms the basis of the superstructure. Finally 
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there is a third question about the causality or effectivity of the social formation on 
individual experience. Cohen’s interpretation will carry us as far as the first and second 
questions and Althusser’s will push us to the third. Much of the following summary is an 
elaboration of what has already been said in the Introduction. The exegesis will converge 
on two images with which the authors depict their arguments: a house on struts (Cohen) 
and a theater (Althusser). 
The basis is the economic structure of society, “the entire set of production 
relations obtaining within it.”
106
 It is not the superstructure, which is composed of 
theoretical formulations (laws, cultural artifacts, philosophies) that hold the economic 
structure in place. Rather the basis is a structure.
107
 Relations of production, which hold 
between individuals and forces of production, compose the economic structure.
108
 To be 
clear: “[a]ll production relations are either between a person (or group of persons) and 
another person (or groups of persons), or between a person (or group of persons) and a 
productive force (or group of productive forces).”
109
 Means of production, such as 
instruments of production and raw materials, as well as labor power itself, compose 
productive forces. “A mode is a way or manner, not a set of relations. The economic 
structure is not a way of producing, but a framework of power in which producing 
occurs.”
110
 This framework of power is defined by its relations of production such that a 
mode of production may be identical to two contrary social forms, each with a distinct set 
of relations of production. These distinctions are difficult to parse without examples. One 
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of many that Cohen includes is the following. 
The Soviet collective farm and the American “agribusiness,” despite their 
difference of social form, display the same material mode of production of grain, 





The Soviet farm entails a distinct set of relations of production from the American 
agribusiness. The ways in which persons interact with one another positionally—their 
powers over one another, technology, and raw materials—will be worlds apart. However 
their means of production, insofar as they plough, sow, and reap, will be identical. The 
relations of production, which compose the social form, are different, yet the modes of 
production are the same. When the relations change, so does the social form.
112
 
The legal rights each person has within these social forms compose the 
superstructure: laws, constitutions, charters, edicts, policies, standards, etc. “In law-
abiding society, men’s economic powers match the rights they have with respect to 
productive forces.”
113
  These rights are not co-extensive with powers. During moments of 
social change, for example, a person’s powers may be outside their legal right.
114
 Here is 
one definitive boundary between base and superstructure: power and right. For Cohen, 
power is to right as base is to superstructure. But how does the base relate to the 
superstructure exactly? Consider the following image.  
Four struts are driven into the ground, each protruding the same distance above it. 
They are unstable. They sway and wobble in winds of force 2. Then a roof is 
attached to the four struts, and now they stay firmly erect in all the winds under 
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force 6. Of this roof one can say (i) it is supported by the struts, and (ii) it renders 
them more stable. There we have a building whose base and superstructure relate 




The struts of this house analogously form the economic structure, the roof the 
superstructure. Without the roof the struts would fall in a stiff breeze, but with the roof 
they stand stronger.  What does it mean for the superstructure to “rest on” the basis in this 
way? There are two meanings which Cohen distinguishes, both of which he includes in 
his characterization of the base/superstructure relationship:  
x is the basis1 of y = x is that part of y on which (the rest of) y rests 
x is the basis2 of y = x is external to y and is that on which (the whole of) y rests 
 
Therefore, “the economic structure is the basis1 of the social formation…whereas 





In the above formulation the struts of the house are essential for the house’s form (basis1). 
While these struts hold up the roof, the struts are not part of the roof itself (basis2). So it 
is with the base and superstructure of a social formation: the base are the struts, the roof 
the superstructure, and the formation the house.  
At this point we have introduced the terms social formation (base and 
superstructure together), relations of production (connections between persons and modes 
of production), modes of production (raw materials, instruments, and labor power), and 
superstructure (laws, policies, or other theoretical formulations that hold relations of 
production in place). We have also defined the relationship between base and 
superstructure. There is a remaining question with respect to the effectivity or causal 
relations between aspects of a social formation, as well as the effectivity of the social 
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formation on persons within it. We now turn to reflections on this question, elaborating 
what has already been said in the introduction with respect to mechanical and non-
mechanical causality. In terms of the causality between base and superstructure, and the 
wider philosophical status of the social formation with respect to its various aspects and 
their dynamics, Cohen claims that the base “explains” the superstructure. He also 
mentions the distinction I posed in the Introduction between a mechanical/vulgar 
interpretation of causality and Althusser’s structuralist/Spinozist causality. He writes that 
the former, according to Thompson, “ignores the open drama of historical process,” a 
premise with which Cohen “has no quarrel.”
117
 Althusser phrases a more vivid telling of 
this open drama, however, one with which I will conclude the tour through Marxist terms 
and extend the analysis to reification and the first distortion of discussion.  
In keeping with Cohen’s strutted house, we might ask: what determines the house 
as a whole entity, with respect to it parts? Is it the upward-facing stability of the struts or 
the downward stability of the roof, or somehow both? How might we think about the 
house as an existing whole with respect to its parts? What is the “effectivity of the 
structure”
118
 on its parts? Recall the Soviet farm collective and American agribusiness. 
What is the effectivity of capitalism and communism with respect to the farmers, owners, 
and other persons involved in these relations and modes of production? We might say in 
response to the question about effectivity that capitalism or communism is the house 
itself, a whole entity which determines the placement of the struts’ wood, the roof, etc. 
Capitalism and communism, with their various relations of production in the base and 
their superstructural laws, determine the farmers and other persons within these 
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institutions such that they think and act in particular ways concordant with the social 
formation. Althusser (1977), in the ninth chapter of Reading Capital, disagrees with this 
mechanistic picture (he also designates it “transitive”). Rather, Althusser’s central claim 
is that Marx’s “immense” innovation in the history of philosophy was to reverse this 
mechanical picture of the social world’s effectivity. Championing a Spinozist 
interpretation, rather than “determined from the outside,” for Marx, “the structure is 
immanent in its effects…the whole existence of the structure consists of its effects.”
119
 In 
other words, capitalism or communism is nothing except what occurs between persons 
and productive forces in the base—the on-the-ground enactments of relations of 
production—held in place by superstructures. Cohen’s image is ambiguous with respect 
to this distinction, but Althusser is decisive and poetic in his articulation of this important 
issue. Althusser includes an image that is meant to illustrate his non-mechanical reading 
of effectivity: a theater. Again, rather than an outside object arriving to “imprint its mark” 
on persons interacting in relations of production, Marx must be read as claiming the 
opposite, that “the very existence of [the social form’s] machinery [is] in its effects.” To 
be clear, the position here is a structural rather than transcendent or expressive view of 
causality. A transcendent view of causality casts the social whole as an existing object 
over and above its parts, transitively-mechanically determining each individualized part. 
An expressive view of causality posits a whole-essence within every part of a whole such 
that each part is the whole and vice versa. However, an immanent-structural view of 
causality claims that the global whole emerges as a complex interaction among regions 
within it such that the whole is immanent in interactions between regional parts and 





elemental members of each region.
120
 Spinoza’s theory of substance and attribute is the 
model for this view, which I will not explicate here but only mention.
121
 What is salient is 
Althusser’s claim that the effectivity of the social form on its parts is structural-
immanent. Rather than linger in Spinozist terminology (modification, substance), we 
should come away with a general understanding of what life in a structural-immanent 
social formation is like, particularly for persons in capitalist relations of production. 
Althusser describes the effectivity of the social form upon its various parts as 
the mode of existence of the stage direction of the theater which is simultaneously 
its own stage, its own script, its own actors, the theater whose spectators can, on 
occasion, be spectators only because they are first of all forced to be its actors, 
caught by the constraints of a script and parts whose authors they cannot be, since 




This is a dense image. Reading it continuously with Cohen however will aid us in 
understanding what it might mean. Rather (or perhaps in addition to) a house with struts, 
a social form is a theater with actors, spectators, and scripts. However, during the play, 
director and writers are not explicitly present: only those on stage and those in the 
audience are immediately visible. Extrapolating Cohen’s metaphor into Althusser’s 
immanent-causality, a social formation like capitalism is not just a building with struts 
and roof where any variety of activity occurs. Capitalism is a theater. What distinguishes 
the theater from a mere building are the dramatic interactions between various persons 
that constitute its existence as a theater. The building can help to determine the theatrical 
quality of what occurs within it, but it is rather the feelings, confusions, and haunting 
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actions of the persons as they perform and witness the production that compose the 
theatrical event. No one is the sole author of this experience, nor is there any simple way 
of demarcating its aspects. We may even say that, during a production in a theater, roles 
can blur such that the audience members may feel as though they are part of the show. A 





When people are engaged in capitalist relations of production, they must sell their 
labor to others.
124
 Considering themselves as commodities interacting with other 
commodities, those people will experience interactions in commodity terms. They will 
therefore construe interactions between themselves and others in commodity terms. This 
is known as reification in Marxist theory, which originates from Marx’s Critique of 
Political Economy (second draft, 1858) and the Economic Manuscripts.
125
 Burris (1988) 
summarizes the original Marxist concept as “a form of social consciousness in which 
human relations come to be identified with the physical properties of things, thereby 
acquiring an appearance of naturalness and inevitability.”
126
 The concept is therefore 
“multi-dimensional” in that it “addresses both the nature of the social structure and the 
nature of social consciousness, as well as the reciprocal relations between these two 
levels.”
127
 Georg Lukacs was the first theorist to develop the concept in some depth. In 
“The Phenomenon of Reification,” an essay in History and Class Consciousness, he 
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writes that reification is the “[i]nternal impact” of a “universal structuring principle of 
society or universal category of society.”
128
 Reification was not a popular concept among 
Marxist intellectuals in the middle of the 20
th
 century, though there is some treatment of 
it by the Frankfurt School, as well as Althusser
129
, who critiques the concept. I am 
primarily interested in more contemporary treatments of Lukacs’s development.  
There has been a recent resurgence of interest in reification, in fact. A recent book 
by Timothy Bewes (2002) called Reification, or the Anxiety of Late Capitalism, for 
example, explores the tension inherent in the concept of reification itself. Bewes claims 
that reification is reified itself, exhibiting an anxiety indigenous to the capitalist social 
form (in contrast with previous social forms, particularly those in which religious themes 
may have been universal social categories).
130
 Bewes initially defines reification as 
“thingification” at the outset, but there is a more precise phrasing when he claims that 
reification occurs as a “[s]ubjective universal [category]...demand[ing] objective 
agreement” and as such is “inseparable from its application in various contexts.”
131
 As 
with Lukacs, in the social form of capitalism that universal category is the commodity. 
Finally, Axel Honneth (2008), in a series of lectures called Reification, writes that 
reification occurs “[w]hen subjects relate to one another primarily via” commodity 
exchange, and the commodity has become “[t]he prevailing mode of intersubjective 
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 Each of these phrasings builds into the others, describing a phenomenon that 
occurs within persons engaged in immanently emerged capitalist relations of production. 
When acting with one another, the “mode of intersubjective agency” is defined in 
commodity terms, which “demands objective agreement” between them. However the 
phenomenon of reification is an “internal impact” of these relations, which are immanent 
aspects of the social structure. Reification is therefore a “subjective universal.” 
Each of these definitions delimits reification as a way in which persons’ inner 
worlds react and respond to capitalist relations of production. Lukacs focuses specifically 
on the consequences for consciousness when activity is considered as labor; in other 
words, reification is also thought to be a “special case of alienation.”
133
 In order to 
understand why we might think of speaking and listening as exchanging, or another 
economic activity, we must understand what it means to consider our own activities as 
commodities, or objects with exchange-values. Thinking of oneself as a commodity 
renders that which the self encounters as a commodity. The majority of persons in a 
capitalist social form must sell their labor, which compels them to consider themselves in 
terms of commodity. To think of one’s own activities as a commodity is to think oneself 
and one’s actions in terms of commodity, or exchange value, which requires an 
abstraction from use value: attention is drawn away from an object’s concrete usefulness 
in order to consider the other objects for which it might be exchanged. 
134
 If activity is 
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considered labor, it will consequently be considered a commodity, because the way we 
come to recognize our own labor in a capitalist society is as commodity. If our activities 
are labor-commodities, and we are forced to sell these labor-commodities, then we begin 
to think of ourselves as commodities. When we think of ourselves as commodities, we 
begin, as a consequence, to also think of others around us as commodities. What happens 
as the strange result of this, the aforementioned alienation, is that, since they are now 
commodities, our own activities and selves are abstracted from their use values and 
considered only in terms of their exchange values.
135
 When the object is one’s own 
activities, which must occur in capitalist relations of production, 
 [commodity] stamps its imprint upon the whole consciousness of man; his 
qualities and abilities are no longer an organic part of his personality, they are 





Althusser will take issue with Lukacs’s phrasing here, though we may interpret Lukacs 
with Althusser’s social form’s immanent effectivity. When a “commodity stamps its 
imprint,” it is not the case that an external aspect of the economic structure causes some 
effect “upon the whole consciousness of man.” Rather, in relations of production that are 
capitalist, consciousness is such that the commodity is definite within it.
137
 Selling my 
labor requires that I think of myself as a commodity, and consciousness is a definitive 
aspect of myself. Paulo Freire describes two consequences of this impact in the Pedagogy 
of the Oppressed. 
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[T]he person is not a conscious being (corpo consciente); he or she is rather the 
possessor of a consciousness: an empty “mind” passively open to the reception of 




The impact at the level of consciousness can have two consequences in Freire’s view. 
The first consequence is that consciousness becomes a thing that one possesses, like an 
object with exchange-value. The second consequence is that consciousness becomes a 
kind of thing that is empty and ready to receive things, such as deposits, as would a bank 
account which accrues exchange value. This second consequence renders the world of 
speaking and listening apt for commodification. When consciousness bear the 
commodity’s (authorless) imprint, activities such as speaking and listening will also bare 
that imprint.  
We are now in a position to analyze the first distortion of discussion. The first 
distortion of discussion occurs when speaking and listening are understood in terms of 
commodity and other economic activity. When persons consider themselves and others in 
terms of commodities, then they will express interactions between themselves in terms of 
commodities, or objects with economic value. To a reified inner world, discussion is an 
exchange of ideas, a sharing of inquiry.  
Yet after all that has been said above we still do not know exactly how the word 
discussion has come to mean both talking-listening and economic activity. While the 
concept of reification may be necessary for an explanation of the distortion of discussion, 
this explanation is insufficient until we include a theory of language adequate to the 
experience of persons engaged in capitalist relations of production. Such an explanation 
will not be complete until the analysis of the second distortion through a reading of 
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Valentin Voloshinov’s Marxist theory of language (chapter 3), and the presentation of 
Jacques Lacan’s concept of dehiscence (chapter 4). Before proceeding to these analyses 
however I will end this chapter with two illustrations of its arguments. The first is an 
excerpt from Frederick Taylor’s Principles of Scientific Management which demonstrates 
the way in which relations of production in capitalism reify consciouness. The second is 
an ideologemic analysis of exchange language in three philosophical texts that address 
discussion: Areopagitica by John Milton, Lectures on Jurisprudence by Adam Smith, and 
On Liberty by John Stuart Mill. 
 
Schmidt and Taylor 
To observe how reification of a consciousness may occur in capitalist relations of 
production, consider a transcript from Frederick.W. Taylor’s Principles of Scientific 
Management.
139
 In this classic text of 20
th
 century business management practices, Taylor 
lays out a method for achieving “maximum prosperity” through “maximum 
efficiency.”
140
 This method is called scientific management, and requires four steps if it is 
to be implemented in an institution. The first step is to isolate every aspect a task 
requires, no matter how banal. The second is to define “mastery” of these aspects by 
observing what a "first-class man" would do: the ideal time, energy, and cost the task 
entails. The third is to create a formula for this mastery that details the time, energy, and 
cost of the mastered task. This formula will be used to test each worker in order to 
determine his or her efficiency. The fourth and final step is to implement the formula by 
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managing individuals such that they learn the standard, meet the standard, and are 
evaluated accordingly. (Taylor reserves the word "teaching" for this final step.)
141
 
To educate his readers about implementing scientific management Taylor 
includes vignettes, anecdotes, and transcripts that show the ways in which he 
accomplishes each step at particular firms. We will read one such transcription here and 
interpret it in light of the Marxist concepts outlined previously. The transcript is of a 
conversation between himself and an immigrant worker named Schmidt, a hauler at a pig 
iron factory in Pennsylvania. Schmidt, Taylor says, is 
a little Pennsylvania Dutchman who had been observed to trot back home for a 
mile or so after work in the evening, about as fresh as he was when he came 
trotting down to work in the morning. We found that upon wages of $1.15 a day 
he had succeeded in buying a small plot of ground, and that he was engaged in 
putting up the walls of a little house for himself in the morning before starting to 




Schmidt was in the process of building his own house with his wages from the factory. 
What Taylor implies with these details is that Schmidt has enough energy, at the end of 
the workday, to walk home and continue building a house. If the goal of management is 
to maximize efficiency and thereby maximize prosperity, the energy that Schmidt has to 
walk home and build the house should go into his factory work rather than his life beyond 
the factory. Taylor uses scientific management to determine what changes should be 
made. Schmidt, according to Taylor, had only been hauling 12 tons of pig iron a day. 
Taylor describes “the task before us” as “getting Schmidt to handle 47 tons of pig iron 
per day [the ideal Taylor calculated “scientifically”] and making him glad to do it.” 
Taylor includes the following transcript to model how such a conversation sounds, 
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representing Schmidt’s German accent in the transcription with a racist, literary flourish.  
Taylor: Schmidt, are you a high-priced man? 
Schmidt: Vell, I don’t know vat you mean. 
Taylor: Oh yes, you do. What I want to know is whether you are a high-priced 
man or not. 
Schmidt: Vell, I don’t know vat you mean. 
Taylor: Oh, come now, you answer my questions. What I want to find out is 
whether you are a high-priced man or one of these cheap fellows here. What I 
want to find out is whether you want to earn $1.85 a day or whether you are 
satisfied with $1.15, just the same as all those cheap fellows are getting. 
Schmidt: Did I vant $1.85 a day? Vas dot a high-priced man? Vell, yes, I vas a 
high-priced man. 
Taylor: Oh, you’re aggravating me. Of course you want $1.85 a day-everyone 
wants it! You know perfectly well that that has very little to do with your being a 
high-priced man. For goodness’s sake answer my questions, and don’t waste any 
more of my time. Now come over here. You see that pile of pig iron? 
Schmidt: Yes. 
Taylor: You see that car? 
Schmidt: Yes. 
Taylor: Well, if you are a high-priced man, you will load that pig iron on the car 
to-morrow for $1.85. Now do wake up and answer my question. Tell me whether 
you are a high-priced man or not. 
Schmidt: Vell-did I got $1.85 for loading dot pig iron on dot car to-morrow? 
Taylor: Yes, of course you do, and you get $1.85 for loading a pile like that every 
day right through the year. That is what a high-priced man does, and you know it 
just as well as I do. 
Schmidt: Vell, dot’s all right. I could load dot pig iron on the car to-morrow for 
$1.85, and I get it every day day, don’t I? 
Taylor: Certainly you do, certainly you do. 
Schmidt: Vell, den, I vas a high-priced man. 
Taylor: Now, hold on, hold on. You know just as well as I do that a high-priced 
man has to do exactly as he’s told from morning till night. You have seen this 
man here before [Taylor points to a manager, we assume], haven’t you? 
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Schmidt: No I never saw him. 
Taylor: Well, if you are a high-priced man, you will do exactly as this man tells 
you to-morrow from morning till night. When he tells you to pick up a pig and 
walk, you pick it up and walk, and when he tells you sit down and rest, you sit 
down. You do that right straight through the day. And what’s more, no back talk. 
Now a high-priced man does just what he’s told to do, and no back talk. Do you 
understand that? When this man tells you to walk, you walk; when he tells you to 
sit down, you sit down, and you don’t talk back to him. Now you come on to 
work here to-morrow morning and I’ll know before night whether you are really a 




There is much to say about this passage. While tempting, our purpose is not necessarily 
to read this conversation for its racism, bullying, and dominance, which are evident. 
Rather we should interpret this interaction as a capitalist relation of production in process, 
occurring in the theater of the capitalist social form. Most relevant to our purposes is the 
way in which Schmidt, in his conversation with Taylor, comes to understand what it will 
mean for him to become a “high-priced man,” and what this may mean for his ongoing 
experience, both in his life at the factory and in his life outside the factory. The first half 
of the conversation is meant to convince Schmidt that he wants to become a high-priced 
man (“make him glad to do it”). At first Schmidt does not know what “high-priced man” 
means. Taylor demands, like a capitalist Socrates, that Schmidt “wake up” and answer his 
questions. The implication is that Schmidt is asleep, meaning that he does not understand 
the truth with respect to being a high-priced man. He does not understand that he must 
define himself in terms of his labor and its price. A high-priced man is a man who works 
more in order to earn more. He is a man whose wages are higher. Schmidt does not 
understand. This may be for a number of reasons. Schmidt might not understand because 
of a language barrier. He might also feel afraid, as anyone in his situation might, that one 
                                                 
143
 Ibid., p.44. 
68 
 
wrong step in talking with Taylor could cost him his job. Finally, perhaps he is confused 
about Taylor’s phrasing of this term: “a high-priced man,” which seems to mean that a 
man has a price, like a shoe or a pound of pig iron. Schmidt may have not heard such a 
formulation before, perhaps because men are different than shoes or pig iron. In any case, 
Schmidt believes that a high-priced man receives the wages he already receives. Taylor is 
aggravated and tells Schmidt that “of course” Schmidt wants higher wages: “everyone 
wants it!” Schmidt agrees, though we cannot know why.  
The second half of the conversation addresses what it will require for Schmidt to 
become the high-priced man he has just agreed to become. First, Schmidt must do exactly 
as he is told. Taylor points to the unnamed man and tells Schmidt he must follow every 
direction. Importantly for this dissertation, there is no “back talk.” Schmidt may never 
respond to what the boss says. There must be an inequality and homogeneity in the 
sequence of turns during their verbal forms of interaction. The boss speaks and Schmidt 
follows in word and deed, period. Second, to be a high-priced man, Schmidt must work 
“straight through the day,” or “from morning till night” a phrase Taylor repeats twice. 
Schmidt must exert all his energies at the factory in order to be a high-priced man, such 
that, we imagine, he will not have enough energy to continue building his house. The 
extent to which Schmidt follows these directions will decide, for Taylor, whether he is 
“really a high-priced man” or, as Taylor mentioned earlier, “one of these cheap fellows 
here.” 
Recalling Althusser, think of Schmidt as a person in the theater of the capitalist 
social formation. He will go from hauling 12 tons of pig iron a day to hauling 47 tons of 
pig iron in that same time period. He will work straight through the day, from morning 
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till night. After a day’s work as a high-priced man he will not have any energy for 
building his house. He will most likely not have energy to do anything except sleep and 
rest in order to prepare for the next workday. Engaged in this relation of production, his 
boss watching closely, his experience filled with work, Schmidt may come to think of 
himself and his world as a commodity, in terms of the labor he is doing, since now he is a 
“high-priced man.” The commodity is now his societal center of gravity. Perhaps, much 
like the phenomena Ranciere has observed in France during this time, Schmidt wrote 
poetry or did some other creative work other than house-building outside of his work at 
the factory.
144
 Perhaps he did not think of himself as much in terms of his work. While he 
will never be fully defined by his life at the factory, in this conversation with Taylor the 
extent to which his being is defined by his wages and the tons of iron he will lift 
increases. He will most likely not have sufficient energy to continue building his house. 
He may begin to think of others as being “high-priced men” or “low-priced men” (those 
cheap fellows over there) in terms of the quantities of iron they lift and wages they make. 
Exhausted from work, Schmidt will begin to recognize this world of commodities will 
feel necessary, settled, and confined to the new Taylorist constraints. As a player-
spectator-author in the theater of the capitalist social relation, as a being of love and loss 
whose psyche is always (de)forming,
145
 we cannot know exactly what Schmidt’s 
experience is like at this moment or moving forward. However the theory of reification 
names a likely outcome: Schmidt may begin referring to other things in his experience—
like discussion—as being produced, manufactured, contributed, exchanged, as these 
terms become definite in his own life. The emergence of exchange and economic 
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language in reference to discussion, which such capitalist relations of production 
immanently inspire, is traceable in texts ranging from 1644 to 1859. We will now turn to 
an ideologemic analysis of three such texts. 
Ideologemic Analysis 
I have claimed that the ubiquitous and oblique instances of economic language 
observed in the previous chapter are examples of the first distortion of discussion: traces 
of reified consciousness working through the alienation inherent to capitalist relations of 
production. In Jameson’s Marxist literary analysis, we may designate these traces as 
ideologemes: basic constituents of ideology interpretable as traces within texts of a 
“political unconscious.” Ideologemes inherit and pass along paradigms or abstract values, 
or proto-narratives, and display an author working through the tensions and struggles 
within their social form.
146
 In Milton’s Areopagitica there are remarkably few instances 
of exchange or economic language with respect to talking. Milton rather writes words 
like “versify” or “phrase” where we might utter “use” or “give.” Milton also writes that 
findings are “furnished,” reasons are “drawn forth”
147
; ideas are transfused, collated, and 
propagated
148
; and in conversation there are responsories, antiphonies, complements, 
ducks, reverences, and intellectual offspring.
149
 These intellectual ideologemes may 
derive from a political unconscious, but they are not as explicitly economic as the two 
texts we will interpret next. In fact Milton explicitly states, in reference to publishing 
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Truth and understanding are not such wares as to be monopolized and traded in by 
tickets and statutes and standards. We must not think to make a staple commodity 





Milton claims here that knowledge itself is not the kind of thing to be sold like a 
commodity. He very clearly distinguishes things like broadcloth and woolpacks from 
truth. In 1644, when the Areopagitica was written, the commodity was perhaps not in the 
same place of prominence in Milton’s social form. The commodity was not the universal 
structuring principle or social category (at least in comparison to later centuries, such as 
ours, which is becoming more and more technological
151
). The commodity did eventually 
become the universal social category, however, a transition we traditionally attribute to 
the writings of Adam Smith. If we compare the above passage from Milton to a lecture 
Adam Smith published in 1763, we see a different claim with respect to the relation 
between knowledge and exchange.  
In this short lecture Smith speaks about the division of labor, arguing against an 
ancient policy attributed to the Pharaoh Sesostris that “everyone should forever adhere to 
his father’s [profession].” In his counterargument to this policy, Smith phrases an 
anthropological presumption that would ground political economy in the English 
speaking world for generations to come. Sesotris’s policy fails because human beings 
have a “natural disposition to barter, truck, and exchange.”
152
 In the next line Smith 
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addresses this premise’s implications for interpersonal interaction: 
If we should enquire into the principle of human mind on which this disposition 
of trucking is founded, it is clearly the natural inclination every one has to 
persuade. The offering of a shilling, which to us appears to have so plain and 




The disposition to barter, truck, and exchange is founded on the idea that human beings 
are naturally inclined to persuade, such that persuading substantiates exchanging. Once 
Smith establishes this premise, the offering of a shilling is “in reality…offering an 
argument.” Not only does persuasion substantiate exchange but offering currency is “in 
reality” offering an argument. It is not incidental for this ideologemic analysis that Smith 
would use the verb “offering” to express the utterance of an argument. Offering 
arguments and offering currency are, he claims, the same thing. Smith’s writings have 
been interpreted as being foundational for modern capitalist ideology, and the extent to 
which Smith and Milton differ on the issue of speaking, knowing, and exchanging is 
indicative of the changes in social formation that occurred in the century between 
them.
154
 Another century later, the presence of economic language would increase, along 
with the presence of capitalist relations of production in the United Kingdom, continental 
Europe, and its colonies  
We can see increasing evidence of the economic language in John Stuart Mill’s 
On Liberty, particularly the first chapter “On the Liberty of Thought and Discussion.” 
Mill’s enunciations are similar to the intellectual ideologemes prevalent today in writing 
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 In chapter three I will elaborate on the relationship between language and ideology. 
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about discussion. To recapitulate the short history I am tracing from the previous two 
texts: Milton dissociates money from speech, while Smith makes a case for identifying 
them. Finally, in Mill’s writing we find the economic ideologemes in their current state: 
oblique, ubiquitous, and seemingly innocuous
155
:  
Because it has been [a speaker’s] practice to hear all that could be said against 
him; to profit by it as much as it was just (p.80); No wise man ever acquired his 
wisdom in any mode but this” (p.80); the truth of an opinion is part of its utility 
(p.82); he must feel the whole force of the difficulty which the true view of the 
subject has to encounter and dispose of, else he will never really possess himself 
of the portion of truth...(p.95); it is indispensable to imagine and supply them with 
the strongest arguments (p.95); the words which convey it cease to suggest ideas, 
or suggest only a small portion of those they were originally employed to 
communicate (p.97); the nonconforming opinion is needed to supply the 
remainder of the truth of which the received doctrine embodies only a part. 
(p.103) 
 
Here we have phrases like “portion of the truth” which are “possessed.” Ideas are 
“employed.” There are supplies of opinions which have utility. There is no explanation as 
to how a speaker profits from a practice, or how wise men acquire knowledge, or minds 
receive opinions, which can have utility, or how, exactly, we come to possess portions of 
the truth. In this chapter I have argued that these are intellectual ideologemes that may be 
interpreted as the author working through contradictions and conflicts in his social 
formation. The first distortion of discussion occurs when discussion is unproblematically 
referred to with such economic language which, as I argued in the first part of the 
chapter, does not occur so naturally/intuitively, as the ideologeme would have it appear. 
There are important questions to ask of such language: Are ideas things? Are they 
exchangeable? Is there a common form of equivalency we can develop to measure their 
worth? A writer or speaker may distort discussion into an economic activity because of 
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his or her place in the theater of capitalist relations of production, where persons must sell 
their labor as though it were a commodity. Marxism names reification as the effect such 
relations of production have on consciousness. While the effectivity of the social form is 
not mechanical, I maintain with Althusser that it is structural such that the social 
formation, as whole, is immanent in the effects within it. We saw an example of the 
immanence of capitalist social form in the case of Schmidt, who we imagine will 
experience the world more in terms of commodity after he has become a “high-priced 
man.”  
As mentioned near the end of the chapter however, we do not yet have a sufficient 
explanation of the relationship between language and the capitalist social form. Nor do 
we have a sufficient theory to explain the distortion of discussion exemplified in the 
doctoral student discussion described in the Introduction, though we have enough to 
explain why the flyer told participants that the speakers would “share their reflections on 
education.” We may say that the phrase “share their ideas” is an intellectual ideologeme 
of the kind analyzed in this chapter: it is a case of the first distortion. Why this doctoral 
student discussion was, in its verbal form of interaction, a lecture with a recitation, 
however, is still opaque. We can render it more transparent if we examine a second kind 








On Recitation, or The Second Distortion 
 
 
The second distortion of discussion occurs when a recitation, or an interaction with the 
basic recitative quality, goes by the name discussion. In this chapter I will first define 
recitation as a verbal form of interaction in its process, product, and politics. To present 
the second distortion of discussion I will compose a brief genealogy of recitation in 
American education from Hoetker and Ahlbrand’s (1969) essay on “the persistence of 
recitation.” Extending their historical research I will include the studies mentioned in the 
Introduction as the most recent development in the history of recitation since the 1980s 
when recitation has gone by the name discussion. Posing Hoetker and Ehlbrand’s 
concluding question in a new ideological light (why does the recitation persist?), I ask 
another closely related question: Why does the recitation persist in such a way as to pass 
for discussion?  
In response I present a reading of Valentin Voloshinov’s Marxism and the 
Philosophy of Language to explain how this second distortion occurs. For Voloshinov, 
both words and verbal forms of interaction (such as discussion, recitation, etc) are 
ideological signs that reflect and refract aspects of the base and superstructure of a social 
form. Like Althusser, Voloshinov rejects a mechanical view of the whole’s effective 
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relationship to its parts. In slight contrast to Althusser, however, he focuses on the 
semiotic facets of this effectivity within and between regions of the social formation. 
Words and verbal forms of interaction therefore iterate and constitute the social 
formation. In relations of production, these verbal forms of interaction implement the 
social formation as persons interact with one another. The verbal form reflects and 
refracts aspects of those relations of production, just as the word discussion reflects and 
refracts other aspects of the social form. Rather than an intellectual ideologeme like the 
first distortion, the second distortion is a pedagogical ideologme. Such an ideologeme is a 
peculiar case wherein two distinct types of ideological signs, one referring to the other, 
reflect and refract discrepant aspects of the social form. Discussion is the case in point: 
“discussion” is a word, and according to Voloshinov words are ideological signs. 
However the word “discussion” refers to a verbal form of interaction, and according to 
Voloshinov verbal forms of interaction are also ideological signs. The second distortion 
of discussion occurs when the word discussion and the verbal form of interaction that 
goes by its name reflect/refract aspects of the social form discrepantly. I will conclude the 
chapter by claiming that, whereas the first distortion of discussion occurs among persons 
within any variety of capitalist relations of production, the second distortion of discussion 
occurs in neoliberal-capitalist relations of production. We will therefore have a sufficient 
theoretical explanation for the distortions of discussion observed in the Introduction and 
we will move on to practical, constructive concerns.  
 
Recitation 
The verbal form of interaction known as recitation has a unique process, product, 
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and politics. I will describe each. The most often-cited phrasing of recitation-as-process 
comes from Cazden (1986), who builds the acronym IRE: facilitator initiation, participant 
response, and facilitator evaluation—repeat. It is a continuous script wherein the 
facilitator is perpetually initiating, typically with questions, and evaluating what 
participants say in response to these initiations, typically by saying “right” or “good,” but 
an evaluation can be any attribution of worth or value, such as “interesting” or “okay.” 
Cazden includes a list of observable behaviors that indicate recitation: 
(a) The facilitator nominates who will speak.  
(b) After a participant has spoken, the facilitator regains the floor. This continues 
after each comment.  
(c) The facilitator will speak whenever, to whomever, in whatever way, about 
anything, without objection from anyone else. No one would think it strange for 
the facilitator to do these things, at least not in the same way they would if a 
participant did them.  
(d) Facilitator “wait time” during recitation is nearly non-existent (e.g., after a 
participant says something, the facilitator will respond quickly.
156
)  
(e) The pace of talk during recitation is somewhat fast, and/or the kind of talk may 
be generally characterized as "final draft" rather than "exploratory."  
(f) In recitation participants will look at the facilitator more than elsewhere. Even 
when another participant speaks, they will watch the facilitator as they listen to 
the speaker instead of the speaker herself (participants may also look down or off 
into the distance).  
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(g) The facilitator is the constant addressee of comments made during recitation: 
participants will respond to one another while looking at the facilitator or, 
strangely, they will look at the other participant but address them in the third 
person rather than the second.
157
  
As I will mention later, the basic quality that underlies nearly all of these indications is an 
inequality and homogeneity in the sequence of turns taken. Before I make this claim 
about the basic recitative quality, there are other dimensions of recitation to consider. The 
following passage summarizes concisely the content or product of a recitation. According 
to mainstream progressive educators, Swidler (2000) writes that 
[Recitation] is intellectually conservative, textbook-based, and teacher-controlled. 
Student interest and intention are epiphenomenal pedagogical concerns. It is 
possible to claim that it is not academically demanding and does not press 
students for "higher order thinking." It embodies a concept of knowledge that it is 
created elsewhere by experts and codified in textbooks, implying a passive theory 
of student learning. It does not involve any "place-based curriculum"...the 
language of curriculum development and reform of the last decade, such as 
"constructivism," does not emerge in the talk of the teacher… Students do not 
interact with each other around their assignments. There are no sustained common 
projects in which students of varying age levels engage. Academic work is 
composed entirely of discrete assignments in content areas that have no 
connection to one another. And, it is easy to name the usage of classes as 




Recitation is conservative, cognitively undemanding, passive, aloof, excludes imbricated 
activity, and is better described as a management technique than an educational 
interaction. In this particular essay Swidler is engaged in an ethnographic project in his 
research of rural Nebraska country day schools that use recitation explicitly as a means of 
delivering curriculum, and he is properly well-rounded in his attitude towards the verbal 
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form of interaction. He claims that it is functional for those teachers, students, parents, 
and administrators that rely on the country day schools. John Dewey advocates for 
recitation more generally than Swidler: 
In the recitation the teacher comes into his closest contact with the pupil. In the 
recitation focus the possibilities of guiding children's activities, influencing their 
language habits, and directing their observations….The method in which the 
recitation is carried on is a crucial test of a teacher's skill in diagnosing the 
intellectual state of his pupils and in supplying the conditions that will arouse 
serviceable mental responses: in short, of his art as a teacher.
159
  
Dewey describes the positive side of recitation here: its potential for close contact and 
guidance between facilitator and participant, which allows a facilitator to “diagnose” 
intellectual states and “supply the conditions” for “serviceable mental responses.” Dewey 
goes so far as to claim that the recitation is the teacher’s “art.” There is no question about 
the efficacy of recitation in forming psyches according to predetermined or determined 
criteria. It is this aspect of the form of interaction that provokes the kinds of responses 
that Swidler surveys. This efficacy has also inspired political critique. In thinking about 
classroom interaction Gutierrez and Larson (1992) describe recitation using concepts 
such as hegemony, exclusion, closure, subordination, monopoly, and dominance.
160
 
Politically, they claim, recitation is a pedagogical assurance against student participation; 
a script that maintains the interests of dominant ideology. Recitation is a language 
practice that protects the cultural capital of the dominant society through a hierarchical 
participation structure that forms rigid borders around activity.
161
 In a recitation the 
teacher is the sole constructor and distributor of knowledge. In this political dimension 
recitation is a restricted form of classroom discourse, an asymmetrical social relationship 
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that reproduces social inequalities and differential access to knowledge.
162
 This political 
commentary echoes Freire’s (2000) delimiting of the banking concept of education, 
which is a pedagogy that participates in the oppressor-oppressed relationship.  
The reader may presume that my own stance with respect to recitation is in line 
with Guitierrez, Larson, and Freire. I reply that I do believe recitation has political 
significance as a verbal form of interaction and that that significance is less revolutionary 
than discussion. The argument required for this subtle point must come later in the fourth 
chapter. The reader might also conclude that I think recitation miseducative, such that 
recitation should not be used as a form of interaction during any educational interaction 
whatsoever. This conclusion is quite broad, unsubtle, and severe and requires a much 
longer response, which would be distracting to the present in full detail. I reply that such 
a conclusion will depend on whether revolution is the only aim of education, however 
even in this case recitation will have a place in the spectrum pedagogical tactics in 
educational interactions. Practically speaking it makes little sense to restrict such an 
effective verbal form of interaction. I claim that there is a difference between relying on 
recitation as a normal and “default” script and working consciously against its 
unquestioned normalcy in pedagogy. One may still facilitate recitations in such a case, 
intentionally mobilizing its efficacy within the larger spectrum of discussive pedagogical 
approaches. This is the avenue I recommend.  I refer the reader to the next chapter for a 
more in-depth adjudication of this issue.  
To summarize this brief review of literature on recitation, I will claim that 
recitation’s genotype is an inequality and homogeneity of turns taken during the 
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interaction. Such an inequality and homogeneity is recitation’s basic quality. While a 
recitation may present itself in various phenotypes, any one or combination of the above 
behaviors, for example, a verbal form of interaction with an inequality and homogeneity 
in the sequence of turns has the basic recitative quality, even if few of the behaviors 
above occur. In such a case one person, be it facilitator or participant, follows up each 
comment such that attention is directed toward that single person. There may be an 
interaction with an equality and variety in the sequence of turns taken, though every turn 
yields a comment on the same idea or conclusion. However this counterexample relies on 
the content of interaction for its definition of recitation. If we attend exclusively to the 
verbal form of interaction, the basic recitative quality is an inequality and variety in the 
sequence of turns. Cazden has claimed that recitation, in this form, is the “default pattern 
of educational interaction” such that facilitators fall instinctually into its IRE pattern.
163
 
Not only was is the default pattern then, but the recitation has persisted throughout the 
history of educational interaction in the United States. What follows is a brief genealogy 
of recitation from 1912 to 2006 where we may observe both the ways in which recitation 
manifests as well as the emergence of the second distortion of discussion.  
  
 “The Persistence of the Recitation”
164
 
In her study of the number of questions that teachers ask students, Stevens (1912) 
found "two, three, and four questions per minute, the speed of one teacher after another, 
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in one subject after another."
165
 She reflected that “[t]he large number of questions [from 
teachers] suggests the maintenance in the classroom, for considerable portions of the 
time, of a highly strung nervous tension” where “the teacher is doing most of the work” 
and “the largest educational assets [for students] that can be reckoned are verbal memory 
and superficial judgment.” “A glance through the stenographic reports,” she observes, 
“shows that few questions are asked by the pupils, and when they are asked, they are 
passed over apologetically or deferred.” Stevens points to a “discrepancy between our 
theory and practice” such that, on the one hand, there is a popular call “to teach boys and 
girls how to study, and how to command their intellectual forces” but on the other hand, 
the same educators who make this call keep their students “at the point of the bayonet.”
166
  
Miller (1922) saw the same rushed pace and style in his observations of “the work 
of over one hundred practicing teachers.” “If an answer is not given almost immediately,” 
he reported  
the teacher interrupts by [making] meaningless remarks, by a needless repetition 
of the question, by passing the question on to some other pupil, or by answering 
the question herself. She cannot endure the silence that must prevail while the 
pupil is thinking and organizing his material and commonly feels she must break 




Barr (1929) finds the same thing. “The three most conspicuous findings in [his] 
data were (a) the great amount of talking done by both good and poor teachers, (b) the 
short responses made by pupils (about twelve seconds ... on the average), and (c) the 
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large number of questions asked by both good and poor teachers.”
168
 The same 
phenomenon continues to occur. The authors, as the years go by, report the same 
observations over and over again. Colvin (1931) recorded “one English teacher [who] 
asked 376 factual questions in 180 minutes of class time spent on Julius Caesar. Another 
asked two hundred factual questions in five periods spent on Scott's Lady of the Lake.
169
  
In their analysis of a discussion group led by one Dr. Kilpatrick, Delong and 
Smith (1931) found that the leader asked more than twice as many questions as the 
students and made about 57 percent of all the statements, that two participants (out of 
twenty) made almost one-third of the contributions, and that nine of the twenty spoke 
only once. The "teacher," they wrote, “still dominated the group.”
170
 Bagley (1931) 
would conclude with them that “the work of the typical American classroom…has been 
and still is characterized by a lifeless and perfunctory study and recitation."
171
 These 
authors continue to observe recitation as the predominant script of interaction in the 
classrooms.  
The same was true for Briggs (1935) who claimed that sixty-five percent of a 
group of secondary teachers he observed used "the conventional procedure of questions 
by the teacher on the assignment with answers by the pupils."
172
 Corey (1940) was even 
more exact in his analysis of “thirty-six stenographic records” where “[teachers] talked 
two-thirds of the time.” 
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In thirty-six hours, teachers asked 1260 questions, pupils only 114. The average 
pupil utterance was eleven words long…[The teachers dominated every class 
session]...Of a total of approximately thirty-nine thousand inquiries, the pupils 
were responsible for fewer than four thousand."
173
 
Bellack et al’s (1966) research is a summary of these findings. He found that 
“teachers are responsible for…soliciting responses. The pupil's primary task is to respond 
to teacher's solicitations.... The core of the teaching sequence found in the classrooms 
studied is a teacher's question, a pupil's response, and, more often than not, a teacher's 
reaction to that response.”
174
 The recitation has persisted for decades. It continues now, 
but in a slightly different form. 
We might now remember some of the more recent claims mentioned in earlier 
chapters, though they will have a different significance after the century of research 
reiterating the same observations. Alvermann, O’Brien, & Dillon (1990) observe that 
“teachers who claim they are leading discussions are, when observed, often leading 
recitations.” Note that this observation does not occur in any of the studies mentioned 
previously. Throughout the century, recitation persisted. In the early 80s and 90s, studies 
observe that not only does the recitation persist, but it goes by the name discussion or 
occurs during moments when discussion is expected to occur. Hoetker and Ahlbrand do 
not show what Swift, Gooding, and Swift (1988) report: that “the term ‘discuss’ seems to 
be misused. Often, that which follows from the introductory statement [today we will 
discuss] bears little resemblance to discussion.”
175
  
Cazden (1988) claimed the same year that “the three-part sequence of teacher 
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initiation, student response, teacher evaluation (IRE) is the most common pattern of 
classroom discourse at all grade levels.” Then in 2001 Nystrand, Gamoran, and 
Carbonaro (2001) found that in 48 high school social studies classrooms, where 
discussions might be expected to occur with some regularity, 90% of instruction involved 
zero discussion. In the remaining 10%, discussion lasted on average for 31 seconds. 
Finally, Parker (2006) asserts that the “sequence of teacher initiation, student response, 
and teacher evaluation is the robust norm.” Later in 2009 we have Diana Hess claiming 
that discussion is supported rhetorically but not in substance, which means that people are 
saying that discussion is important but, when it comes down the verbal form of 
interaction, we see that discussion is not occurring. The more recent form of recitation’s 
persistence, passing for discussion, is what I call the second distortion of discussion. 
At a certain time, the word discussion began to refer to recitation. Interestingly 
enough, the word recitation itself does not appear as frequently during this later period 
after the 1980s. The word disappears. It may sound to the reader a somewhat foreign 
word from a different age. What is salient is that each of the accounts, beginning in 1912 
and continuing to 2006, makes a nearly identical observation: recitation is the dominant 
form of educational interaction in US classrooms. Each of these studies also comes with 
scientific, taxonomic, and typological distinctions; tips, tricks, and suggestions; as well as 
transcripts of carefully recorded and coded interactions between teachers and students. As 
Ahlbrand et al observe throughout this literature, the recitation persists. They end their 
essay with two questions. First is a question about recitation itself: “[w]hat is there about 
the recitation... that makes it so singularly successful in the evolutionary struggle with 
other, more highly recommended, methods?” Second is a question about educational 
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research and teacher training: “If the recitation is a poor pedagogical method, as most 
teacher educators long have believed, why have they not been able to deter teachers from 
using it?”
176
 Rather than a positivistic response, which has constituted much of the social-
scientific research on recitation throughout the last century, I will respond ideologically. 
In so doing I will address this second distortion of discussion, when recitation passes for 
discussion, which emerged in the 1980s. To do so I will present an interpretation of an 
early 20th century Marxist theorist of language named Valentin Voloshinov. 
 
Voloshinov and the Peculiar Case of the Pedagogical Ideologeme 
In the decade between the October 1917 Revolution and Joseph Stalin’s rise to 
power in the United Soviet States of Russia, there was a time of intellectual creativity in 
Russia’s urban centers.
177
  The Bahktin Circle, formed around the literary theorist 
Mikhail Bahktin, was one of many groups of academics and intellectuals working in the 
new milieu of communist Russia after the fall of the monarchy. Valentin Voloshinov is 
believed to have been part of Bahktin’s group, to whom two books are attributed: 
Marxism and the Philosophy of Language and later Freudianism: A Marxist Critique.
178
 
Commentators are still unsure whether Voloshinov authored these books. Bahktin was 
known to publish writings using his friends’ names, and also writing collaboratively. In 
addition, under Stalin’s violent regime, many of the records on individuals in the 
subsequent decades have been lost. There is some agreement that someone named 
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Voloshinov wrote at least part of Marxism and the Philosophy of Language,
179
 and I will 




Marxism is an attempt to apply Marxist thinking to the philosophy of language, as 
the title suggests. Voloshinov places himself to the left of positivistic philosophies of 
language that detach the study of language from its social-political context. He associates 
himself with aspects of Ferdinand Saussure’s linguistics, though retains important 
critiques of the langue-parole distinction. Within that period’s tradition of Marxist 
thought Voloshinov rejects what we have called the mechanical picture of causality: there 
is not a simple effectivity of the social formation on groups and persons. Rather language 
itself is the mediating causal pathway between the base and superstructure of a social 
formation. The base and superstructure meet in language, claims Voloshinov, which, in 




I have chosen Voloshinov’s theory of language because it adequately explains 
both the first and second distortions of discussion. It is adequate for three reasons. First, 
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he claims that language is a series of ideological signs. These signs have meaning only 
because they are uttered, enunciated, and performed in the context of a social formation. 
The study of language must not occur without consideration of the a social and political 
context within which it is spoken. The way signs accrue meaning is through reflection 
and refraction of aspects in the base and superstructure of a social formation. Second, 
because signs reflect and refract aspects of the base and superstructure, language 
registers, implements, and indexes social change. There is a way of reading Voloshinov 
to say that these are active, constructive processes within the social formation. Language 
is the medium where base and superstructure meet and affect one another, and where 
speakers therefore have agency within the social form to affect social changes. Finally, 
there are several kinds of ideological signs and Voloshinov distinguishes between two 
extremely important types in the context of this dissertation: words and verbal forms of 
interaction. Verbals forms of interaction are the way in which speakers speak to one 
another, which includes etiquette and whom speaks with, before, and after whom. Verbal 
forms of interaction, in addition to words, are ideological signs which reflect and refract 
aspects of the base and superstructure. These verbal forms not only register and index 
aspects of the social formation, but they implement these aspects as well. They are what 
Voloshinov calls “behavioral ideology,” or as Althusser has called “ideology in 
practice.”
182
 In what follows I will do closer exegesis to demonstrate more carefully what 
I take Voloshinov to mean by each of these premises. I will then examine the second 
distortion of discussion through my understanding of Voloshinov’s Marxist theory of 
language, concluding that there is a peculiar type of ideologeme that is pedagogical. This 
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pedagogical ideologeme occurs when a word referring to a verbal form of interaction is 
an ideological sign, and the verbal form of interaction to which it refers, in practice, is 
also an ideological sign. The second distortion of discussion occurs when the word 
discussion and the verbal form of interaction that goes by its name reflect and refract 
aspects of the base and superstructure discrepantly.  To begin, for Voloshinov, language 
is composed of signs which are essentially ideological:  
Signs…are particular material things; …any item of nature, technology, or 
consumption can become a sign, acquiring in the process a meaning that goes 
beyond its given particularity. A sign does not simply exist as part of reality—it 
reflects and refracts another reality. Therefore, it may distort that reality or be true 
to it, or may perceive it from a special point of view, and so forth. Every sign is 
subject to the criteria of ideological evaluation…The domain of ideology 
coincides with the domain of signs. They equate with one another. Wherever a 





Signs are material “segments of reality” in addition to being “shadows” of reality. They 
are things in the world like tables or iPads or pens. A sign however, unlike mere “items 
of nature, technology, or consumption,” is presentative of something else: a sign presents 
something other than itself, “another reality,” the presentation of which can occur in a 
reflective and/or refractive mode.
184
 I say presentative and not representative 
intentionally, as one possible reading of the above passage is that signs may “distort” 
reality or be “true to” reality. Yet Voloshinov also writes that a sign reflects and refracts 
“another reality,” giving the impression that there are only “other” realities presented by 
signs, rejecting the notion that there is one single reality which signs may successfully or 
unsuccessfully represent. There are two distinct readings here between which I will 
adjudicate in light of the causal view I have espoused thus far in the dissertation. 
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One reading of Voloshinov accords with a mechanical, transitive view of 
causality in the social formation (as well as the expressive view, though in a different 
way). Such a view would posit a reality which signs represent truly or falsely. Call this 
the representational reading. What I have called the presentational reading above suggests 
that signs reflect and/or refract another reality without implying a claim as to which 
might be an actually existing reality. Both readings are valid but there is a stronger claim 
to be made for the presentational reading for two reasons. First, the reader should 
consider Voloshinov’s usage of the terms reflection and refraction. He rarely, if ever, 
writes one without the other, and the words occur in both a disjunctive mood (“reflection 
or refraction”) and a conjunctive mood (“reflection and refraction”). Voloshinov is 
committed to the legitimacy of dynamically spoken language and a representational 
reading would contradict this commitment. Second, at the very outset of Marxism, he 
explicitly rejects a mechanical view of causality between base and superstructure.
185
 This 
rejection further commits him to what Althusser would deem a “complex” relationship 
between groups and persons within the social formation. Since Voloshinov takes 
language to be the mediating force between base and superstructure, a representational 
reading would violate these commitments as well. I therefore read him presentationally.  
What does it mean to say that language is the mediation between the base and 
superstructure? “The word,” he writes, “is the ideological phenomenon par excellence.” 
                                                 
185
 “The problem of the relationship of basis and superstructures—one of the fundamental problems of 
Marxism—is closely linked with questions of philosophy of language…When the question is posed as to 
how the basis determines ideology, the answer given is: causally…If what is meant by causality is 
mechanical causality (as causality has been and still is understood and defined by positivistic 




“Verbal interaction,” as ideology, is the “transitional link” between social relations.
186
 
Specifically,“[t]he problem of the basis and superstructures…can be elucidated to a 
significant degree through the material of the word” since “[p]roduction relations and the 
sociopolitical order shaped by those relations determine the full range of verbal contacts 




It stands to reason, then, that the word is the most sensitive index of social 
changes, and what is more, of changes still in the process of growth, still without 
definitive shape…The word is the medium in which occur the slow quantitative 
accretions of those changes which have not yet produced a new fully-fledged 
ideological form. Signs have the capacity to register all the transitory, delicate, 




Having established that language is a series of signs that reflect/refract realities 
presentationally, we might now ask: which realities? Since language occurs in a context 
of relations of production, signs, as ideological, reflect/refract these relations. Language 
has the capacity to reflect/refract social changes and aspects of the basis that are “still in 
the process of growth.” Signs are ideological therefore because they are indexes of social 
changes, the media through which changes in social and political life occur. Signs 
“register” changes in the base and superstructures, which meet “in the medium” of 
language: “countless ideological threads running through all areas of social discourse 
register effect in the word.”
189
 Language “reacts with its entire constitution” to changes in 
the base, for example. It is therefore an “index of social change,” summarized in the 
statement “The immediate social situation and the broader social milieu wholly 
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determine—and determine from within, so to speak—the structure of the utterance.”
190
 
While these statements may sound mechanistic, the meanings of words as they register 
changes in the base and superstructures are quite fluid and indeterminate: “In actual fact, 
each living ideological sign has two faces, like Janus. Any current curse word can 
become a word of praise, any current truth must inevitably sound to many other people as 
the greatest lie.”
191
  How does this variety and ambiguity arise? Because reflections and 
refractions are determined 
By an intersecting of differently oriented social interests within one and the same 
sign community, i.e., by the class struggle...As a result, differently oriented 





Therefore “the word sensitively reflects the slightest variations in social 
existence.” Sensitive reflection of slight variations will not be easily-determinable, large-
scale phenomena. Since language, as depicted above, is the mediation of between the 
base and superstructure, every individual experience and utterance can come to bear on 
the meanings of words, as individual speakers live their lives in society. Raymond 
Williams (1976) in Keywords makes a careful study of how the meanings of words shift 
with relations of production in this Voloshinovian way.
193
 Parrington (1997) cites Mike 
Beaken’s (1996) research on the English word “have,” as an example of how such an 
analysis works.  
Beaken tells us that pre-political languages do not have the equivalent of the verb 
to have, whereas in modern English the verb has become so central that it can 
play not just a direct role, as in, “Have you any money?” but also an auxiliary 
one, as in, “Have you finished?” Beaken argues that because ownership has 
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become so central to social consciousness, to have has become embedded in our 
grammar to the point where we don’t notice anything odd about it. So to have is 
used to express the past tense, I’ve eaten; to express necessity, I have to go; to 
express the future, I have some work to do; to express agency, Have a think about 
it, and so on. As Beaken puts it, “Once commodity exchange becomes an 
organizing principle of social life, the relationship of ownership comes to 
dominate us, to take a life of its own. In this process it comes also to permeate our 




Here we have the same claim from the previous chapter, though now, with Voloshinov, 
we have a theory to explain the phenomenon: the verb “to have” reflects/refracts a reality 
of the social form (in this case property rights), aspects of the base and superstructures, 
which relate to ownership. Parrington characterizes Beaken’s research as being 
deterministic and myopic given that the verb “to have” can function differently in other 
European languages. However, in a footnote that cites Portuguese as an example, 
Parrington riffs on Beaken’s analysis and in so doing demonstrates the fluidity and the 
explanatory potential of Voloshinov’s theory of language. 
In Portuguese, instead of an auxiliary verb being used to express “I would” 
instead one uses the conditional tense e.g. eu comeria (I would eat) or the future 
indicative, e.g. eu comerei (I shall eat). The conditional is also used in French, 
e.g. je finirais (I would finish). Given that Holland was the other country besides 
Britain to have an early bourgeois revolution, it would be interesting to study 




In these passages we see the possibility for a Marxist discourse analysis, which, at this 
point, becomes sufficient for explaining the first distortion of discussion. Living in 
capitalist relations of production will register effects in words. One such registration 
occurs when the word discussion comes to mean exchanging, producing, offering, and 
giving. This registration depends on a person selling their labor as a commodity and 
coming to think of themselves and others in terms of commodity. The word discussion 
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reflects and refracts aspects of the relations of production in the social form, in this case 
the base. However this interpretation is not yet sufficient for the second distortion of 
discussion, when a verbal form of interaction with an inequality and homogeneity in the 
sequence of turns goes by the name discussion. The third and final facet of Voloshinov’s 
theory of language addresses this distortion however. 
Voloshinov distinguishes between words and the verbal forms of communication 
in which words are spoken and “themes are implemented.”
196
 Words are not the only 
ideological signs: “None of the fundamental, specific ideological signs is replaceable 
wholly by words...Words cannot substitute a religious ritual [for example]…”
197
 In this 
case the ritual itself is an ideological sign as well as the words spoken during the ritual. 
Rituals will entail certain verbal forms of communication, which are the way we talk, the 
form of how we communicate, not what we say but how we say it: “unofficial 
discussions, exchanges of opinion at the theater or a concert or at various types of social 
gatherings, purely chance exchange of words, one’s manner of verbal reaction to 
happenings one’s life and daily existence...”
198
 These verbal forms of interaction, which 
include “etiquette”  
operate in extremely close connection with the conditions of the social situation in 





Voloshinov goes so far as to say that verbal forms of communication are a “concrete 
implementation of the spirit [of the age]”
200
 and to that extent he calls these forms of 
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interaction, of which discussion is one kind, “behavioral ideology.” Just as the word is an 
index of social change, the verbal form of communication is a register or index of the 
social changes as well, but in addition these verbal forms “implement” or put into 
practice aspects of the social formation. So not only what we say, but how we say it, is an 
ideological sign. We are now in a position to explain the second distortion of discussion.  
“Discussion” is a word. Words for Voloshinov are ideological signs, which means 
that the word discussion will be registering and indexing social changes from the base 
and superstructures. It so happens that discussion refers to a verbal form of 
communication. Discussion is a way in which we talk with one another. Discussion is 
therefore both a word-as-ideological sign and a verbal form of interaction-as-ideological 
sign, each of which can reflect/refract aspects of the base and superstructure. Call this 
peculiar situation a pedagogical ideologeme: where a verbal form of communication and 
the word referring to it reflect/refract realities of the base and superstructure. This 
ideologeme will differ from the intellectual ideologemes and grammatical ideologemes 
already mentioned since the pedagogical ideologeme both implements aspects of the base 
and superstructure, as well as registers aspects of the base and superstructure (thus 
differentiating from the first distortion, which only registers these aspects). Because the 
pedagogical ideologeme both implements and registers aspects of the base and 
superstructure, I will claim that it both iterates the social formation and constitutes the 
social formation. The pedagogical ideologeme may be read as a working-through, but 
also an enactment of the social relation within which speakers live. The word discussion 
reflects/refracts a certain set of aspects from the superstructure (terms like freedom, 
equality, democracy, etc), while the verbal form of interaction to which it refers (what I 
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have called recitation) is reflecting/refracting other aspects in the base (the few exploiting 
the many). Each recitation that is called a discussion iterates some aspect of the social 
formation and implements the social formation as well. It constitutes the formation, 
implementing the spirit of the age. The pedagogical ideologeme of a recitation that goes 
by the name discussion can both tell us something about social and political life and also 
composes that social and political life at the same time.  
 
Neoliberalism 
Whereas the first distortion of discussion reflects/refracts aspects of capitalist 
relations of production, particularly the alienation of labor, the second distortion of 
discussion is a more recent phenomenon. It is not until the 1980s that recitation passes for 
discussion, or discussion does not occur where discussion is meant to occur. Incidentally 
neoliberalism begins during this period as well. My claim at the end of this chapter is that 
the second distortion of discussion reflects/refracts aspects of neoliberal relations of 
production, rather than the first distortion which occurs in any capitalist relations of 
production. Returning to the genealogy, we might explain the persistence of the recitation 
between 1912 and 1968 in two ways. Marx, in Capital, Vol. I, claims that there is an 
indirect relationship between hierarchy within firms and the regulation of market activity 
in civil society. In this case light regulation of market activity means intense hierarchy 
within institutions. If, throughout the 20th century, there was low regulation of market 
activity, this may have entailed a more rigid hierarchy in the ways that people like 
facilitators and participants interacted with one another in institutions such as schools. 
The verbal form of interaction would reflect/refract in such a way as to present that 
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reality. Call this the inverse hypothesis. The veracity of such an argument will depend on 
sociological-discursive analysis, and is not as salient as the possibilities it introduces for 
such further research: will educational interactions within socialist and communist 
countries, or in our country during periods of high market regulation, promote verbal 
forms of interaction that are more or less hierarchical? What are the verbal forms of 
interaction like in Norway or Germany, for instance? Whereas Marx poses an indirect 
relationship between hierarchy and regulation of market activity, Freire (2000) poses a 
direct relationship: the extent to which a society is defined by oppressor-oppressed 
relations, educational interaction will also have an oppressor-oppressed character.
201
 Call 
this the direct hypothesis. Like the indirect hypothesis, its veracity is subject to 
observation. However each of these hypotheses for recitation’s persistence are 
Voloshinovian hypotheses: to complete the analysis we would embark on a research 
project to see whether or not oppression and regulation register certain effects in the 
verbal forms of interaction at certain periods in certain countries, and whether these 
verbal forms constitute the social formations within which they occur. I leave it to future 
research projects to continue such a project that Williams, Parrington, and Beaken have 
undertaken, though not specifically with regard to education.  
The final issue to address is the switch that occurs in the 1980s, when recitation 
persists such that it goes by the name discussion. My argument, in light of the studies 
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mentioned in the Introduction, is that this pedagogical ideologeme iterates and constitutes 
neoliberal relations of production. Remember from Harvey (2005) that in neoliberalism 
the freedom of the market substantiates freedom in general. Deregulation, said Senator 
Gramm, is the way to govern a country of free citizens. This includes entitlements and 
other typically public services such as housing, education, healthcare, transportation, etc; 
or, in other words, the privatization of public goods. Whereas market activity was 
historically embedded within regulation, neoliberalism unembeds that market activity. In 
the Introduction I distinguished neoliberalism for its periodic quality. Neoliberal policies 
occur after a period of embededness. Relations of production change in neoliberalism as 
deregulation alters the connections between persons, raw materials, and instrumentation.  
In order to unembed market activity politicians and others whose powers range 
more widely than most must make the case to the majority that such changes should 
occur. They must convince persons in the social formation that deregulation is just and 
right. The ways in which this language must function is to create justifications to a 
populace accustomed to embedded market activity, while on the one hand advocating for 
deregulation. After the success of such a transition in social formation there will be 
superstructural aspects that conflict with experiences in the base when inequality rises 
from the deregulation. Hursh (2001), for instance, examines neoliberal education policy. 
He argues that “education in the U.S. has been increasingly transformed to meet the 
competitive needs of corporations within globalized markets.”
202
 He goes on elsewhere 
(2005) to characterize the process of this “reform,” or the way in which these changes are 
brought about:  
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Because the public might object to cuts in social spending and increasing 
economic inequality, neoliberal policy makers have skillfully packaged the 
reforms to make it appear that they are promoting equality...they use discourses 




There are several examples of this “skillful packaging” where the privatization of public 
education is spun as progressive reform. The No Child Left Behind Act’s (NCLB) 
prioritization of high-stakes testing to close the “achievement gap” for instance: Michael 
Gurson, a speech writer for George W. Bush’s first election campaign, composed the 
following slogan to promote NCLB: “the soft bigotry of low expectations.”
204
 High-
stakes standardized tests, whose results would determine whether a school would receive 
certain resources, were the means for addressing racial injustices which prevent people of 
color from advancing within the social formation. It is not this dissertation’s place to 
evaluate the accuracy of this slogan over the last 15 years. However it is relevant to note 
that large corporations such as McGraw-Hill and Pearson PLC have made significant 
financial gains during this period, acquiring contracts to create, evaluate, and 
communicate the results of these standardized tests. Pearson PLC and similar private 
sector institutions are now also taking charge of teacher certification through edTPA. 
Becoming a public school teacher now requires exclusive dealings private corporations. 
In the case of Gurson’s slogan, on the one hand we have words reflecting and refracting 
aspects of the superstructure: “soft bigotry of low expectations” explicitly critiques, with 
language from a left-leaning concern with racial inequality, those who have not 
implemented policies centered on high-stakes testing. On the other hand the policy itself 
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has furthered a rightist agenda in the base of privatizing the public good.
205
 On a 
Voloshinovian theory of language, what do these observations tell us generally about 
forms of verbal interaction in neoliberal relations of production?  
On the one hand, there is skillful packaging of deregulatory changes to make them 
appear to promote values such as freedom and equality. However the consequences of 
these policies in the economic structure will be quite the opposite: a mostly constrained 
and unequal base, particularly after financial crises such as that from 2008. However the 
superstructure will retain those political-theoretical ideas from the skillful packaging. 
Thus we are left in a uniquely neoliberal-capitalist social formation, whose transitions 
were justified with language discrepant with eventual economic realities in the base. A 
recitation that passes for discussion is iterative and constitutive of such a state of affairs. 
The interaction is described with words that connote fair, equal, and participatory talking 
and listening, while the verbal form of interaction is quite constrained and unequal. Thus 
the pedagogical ideologeme iterates the neoliberal social formation. However it also 
implements neoliberalism as well: participants in a distorted discussion will come to 
know that free, equal participation is constrained and unequal. The second distortion of 
discussion is itself a neoliberal relation of production, an immanent effect of the 
neoliberal social formation. 
To conclude, we have examined the second distortion of discussion with an 
adequate theory of language and at the same time composed an adequate theory for the 
first distortion of discussion. The second distortion of discussion is a peculiar state of 
affairs we may interpret as a pedagogical ideologeme, which both iterates and constitutes 
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neoliberal relations of production. The next and final chapter will address what we should 














In light of the critical claims made in the previous two chapters, my focus will now be 
constructive. Discussion is distorted, but what should be done? This concluding chapter 
will address ways in which we might work against the distortions analyzed in previous 
chapters. Two central tasks are before us in this pursuit. The first is to develop the proper 
concept to work against the distortions. The second is to describe suitable pedagogies and 
techniques that readers might practice as facilitators. The chapter will proceed in those 
two larger phases. To introduce the first phase I will first make a distinction between an 
active and passive reading Voloshinov’s theory of language as presented in the previous 
chapter. Advocating the active reading I recommend a transition to Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, taking aim at reification. I claim that the Lacanian concept of dehiscence, 
derived from the more familiar idea of the “mirror stage,” is the complement of 
reification. I develop this concept’s place in discussion by reading Freud’s (1921) 
Massenpsychologie und Ich-analyse with dehiscence in mind. I argue that discussion is 
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prolonged dehiscence, where ego ideal contents lift in a partial hypnosis but are not 
quickly replaced by a single object or idea, but rather many objects, voices, or questions. 
In contrast, whereas recitation ends dehiscence quickly, discussion prolongs it. Finally I 
include two pedagogies, Harkness and horizontal pedagogy, as examples of discussion as 
dehiscence. I finally suggest several facilitation tactics adequate for prolonging 
dehiscence. 
 The cornerstone argument of the previous chapter is the interpretation of 
Voloshinov’s theory of language and its application to the second distortion. Two options 
emerge from this argument, each a different reading of language’s role in the iteration 
and constitution of a social formation. The first option is passive and the second active. 
The word is a sensitive index for social changes in society, and the first reading 
understands this indexing as a mirror. On this reading speakers having little agency with 
respect to its reflections and refractions. On such a reading, since language mediates 
between the base and superstructure, the social formation is somewhat out of the control 
of individual action. An active reading of the Voloshinovian theory would claim the 
opposite: that speakers may control the way in which ideological signs—both words and 
verbal forms of interaction—reflect and refract the base and superstructure, which in turn 
would reconstitute society interaction by interaction. If the distortion of discussion into 
recitation iterates and constitutes the neoliberal-capitalist social formation, then 
facilitating and participating in discussions that do not iterate and implement those 
aspects can work against neoliberalism’s continued health as a social formation. I will 
proceed in this chapter on the active reading. The chapter’s arguments will motivate this 
second reading, demonstrating that it is possible to facilitate interactions intentionally and 
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in such a way as to work against the second distortion of discussion.
206
 I will demonstrate 
this by responding to two questions. I posed the first question as part of the presentation 
of my definition of discussion: why must discussion require an equality and variety in the 
sequence of turns? The second question is a practical extension of the first. Once we 
know why there should be such an equality and variety in this sequence, how might we 
facilitate and participate in discussions to work against the distortion?   
I begin with the first question because the distortion of discussion relies on there 
being an inequality and homogeneity of that sequence. If there were an equality and 
variety in the sequence of turns the distortion would fail. But why must discussion 
require an equality and variety in the sequence of turns? In the second chapter I claimed 
that reification occurs when a person is engaged in capitalist relations of production. The 
selling of one’s labor as a commodity will have an internal impact such that non-
commodity activities have a commodity character. Reification therefore holds a person 
within the capitalist relation of production: these relations cannot persist, or at least 
persist in the same way, if persons do not think of themselves as commodities or 
exchangeable things. If we work against reification during the verbal form of interaction, 
then we can work against the social formation itself.  
 
From Voloshinov to Lacan: Dehiscence, Part I, The Eye 
 
Voloshinov writes in Marxism and the Philosophy of Language that “there is no 
basic division between the psyche and ideology: the difference is one of degree only.” I 
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cite this passage to frame the domain of our present inquiry on the inner world of persons 
engaged in capitalist relations of production. To the extent that we talk to ourselves, or 
hear ourselves think in language, Voloshinov claims that the psyche is composed of 
ideological signs. While Voloshinov argues against Freudianism in his other major work, 
it is not a great leap to transition from his theory of language to Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
which also claims that language structures the inner world.
207
 In the first part of my 
argument for discussion as prolonged dehiscence, I will briefly survey the word’s two 
colloquial meanings. I will then interpret a passage from “The Mirror Stage” where the 
word occurs, reading it through an observation Ludwig Wittgenstein makes in his 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. This passage will serve as a description of the inner 
consequences of dehiscence, and a second passage from Lacan’s second seminar will 
serve as a way of interpreting the outer consequence of dehiscence. At that point we will 
be in a position to claim that dehiscence is reification’s complement, from which we will 
move to Freud’s Massenpsychologie.
208
  
Dehiscence has a botanical and anatomical sense. The botanical sense refers to a 
fruit which is ripe enough such that its skin opens, revealing its seeds, which then fall to 
the ground. The anatomical sense of dehiscence refers to an opening of skin on the body. 
It is contrasted with an evisceration, where certain vital organs have begun to fall out of 
such an opening. In a dehiscence no organs have fallen out, rather there is merely an 
opening in the skin. In each case the word refers to an opening which reveals something 
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vital within an object. It is important to notice for our purposes that certain dualities fail 
in a dehiscence of both kinds: inside and outside, young and old, whole and fragmented: 
the singular concept of dehiscence frustrates these distinctions, and Lacan’s utterance of 
the word plays upon this unsettling characteristic. In his essay on “The Mirror Stage,” he 
writes that a human’s 
relationship to nature is altered by a certain dehiscence at the very heart of the 
organism, a primordial Discord betrayed by the signs of malaise and motor 
uncoordination of the neonatal months…[which] confirm my view that we find in 




Lacan continues to claim that prior to our “social dialectic” is “an organic inadequacy of 
natural reality—that is, the way in which our innwelt relates to our umwelt.”
210
 At the end 
of this short piece Lacan claims that the mirror stage itself institutes, like a basic initial 
condition of the psyche, an “ecstatic limit of the ‘thou art that’…”
211
 I will interpret these 
dense phrases by raising the allegorical proposition that the eye is not included in the 
visual field. 
In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s first major written 
work on language, he includes a helpful observation near the end of the fifth proposition. 
He writes that in the visual field one “really do[es] not see the eye.”
212
 “Nothing in the 
visual field allows one to infer that it is seen by an eye,” he continues. “The form of the 
visual field is surely not like this”: 
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Figure1. Wittgenstein’s Eye 
 
In his illustration, the eye is included in the visual field; however the visual field is 
“surely not” like that: the eye is never in the visual field. The eye will never see itself. 
Even a reflection of itself in a mirror is not really itself: it is a reflection of the eye. We 
may understand what Lacan intends in the above passages by personifying the eye that is 
never in its own visual field (which, if the reader would read the word aloud, 
phonemically matches the word “I”). The psychoanalytic insight regarding the mirror 
stage, the reason why Lacan interprets the baby’s “malaise and uncoordination,” why he 
concludes that there is an “organic inadequacy” that prefigures entry into the social 
dialectic, is that the psyche can never quite understand itself, just as the eye will never be 
in the visual field. Psychoanalysis pushes Wittgenstein’s observation further to say that 
the eye wants to be in the visual field but cannot be in the visual field. The allegory is that 
this eye, because its purpose is to see, will want to enter the visual field. Just as it sees the 
world it wants to see itself, but never can. “At the very heart of the organism,” the psyche 
is founded on a “primal Discord.” Persons are therefore “prematurely” born. A mature 
birth, coming into the world fully, so to speak, would entail the absence of such a 
Discord—an experience without this discordant malaise which arises, even in the 
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neonatal months, because the psyche cannot understand itself.
213
 This initial stage of the 
psyche is the “the mirror stage,” which I have explained with this allegory of the eye: 
what we see in the mirror is never all of what we are, and yet we want to see it all. This 
gap, the Discordant space at the heart of the organism, Lacan labels with the word 
“dehiscence.” In the mirror stage, we therefore find “the ecstatic limit of the ‘thou art 
that’.” Wittgenstein, in the same passage as the above, calls the subject a “limit”—just as 
the eye is the limit of the visual field. Similarly the mirror stage is an “ecstatic” limit 
because the psyche will attempt to understand what it is and cannot, hitting upon the 
primal Discord at the foundation of the organism. It is an ecstatic limit of “thou art that.” 
Thou are never “that,” no matter how much you desire it to be the case. Every image the 
psyche composes will be inadequate and the psyche will be inadequate in its ability to 
compose a complete image. These are the inner consequences of dehiscence: the word 
refers to that very inadequacy, the prematurity, the fact of the opening or separateness of 
innwelt and umwelt. Language fills this gap, overlaying the images that the psyche 




 However we have not fully interpreted the way in which this organic inadequacy 
constitutes a separation between the inner and outer world. The next passage I will work 
through will touch upon the outer consequences of dehiscence. While the first passages 
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are from a written essay, the following long excerpt is taken from the second of Lacan’s 
seminars. Lacan wrote and published very little in comparison to his transcribed courses 
on Freud and psychoanalysis. The following is an excerpt from such a course, where 
Lacan elaborates on his idea of the mirror stage. 
What did I try to get across with the mirror stage? That whatever in man is 
loosened up, fragmented, anarchic, establishes its relation to his perceptions on a 
plane with a completely original tension. The image of his body is the principle of 
every unity he perceives in objects. Now, he only perceives the unity of this 
specific image from the outside, and in an anticipated manner. Because of this 
double relation which he has with himself, all the objects of his world are always 
structured around the wandering shadow of his own ego...Man’s ideal unity, 
which is never attained as such and escapes him at every moment, is evoked in 
this perception. The object is never for him definitively the final object, except in 
exceptional circumstances. But it thus appears in the guise of an object from 
which man is irremediably separated, and which shows him the very figure of his 
dehiscence within the world--object by which essence destroys him, anxiety, 
which he cannot recapture, in which he will never truly be able to find 
reconciliation, his adhesion to the world, his perfect complementarity at the level 
of desire. It is in the nature of desire to be radically torn. The very image of man 
brings in here a mediation which is always imaginary, always problematic, and 
which is therefore never completely fulfilled...this experience either alienates man 
from himself, or else ends in a destruction, a negation of the object.
215
   
 
Remember that the first passages from “The Mirror Stage” essay addressed the inner 
consequences of dehiscence. This passage on the other hand addresses the outer 
consequences of dehiscence, what happens between the innwelt and umwelt because of 
dehiscence. That the “image of his body is the principle unity he perceives in objects,” 
refers to the sense of one’s self as an imaginary situation: a baby imagines that his eye is 
in the visual field, to continue with the metaphor from Wittengenstein. Every unity the 
psyche perceives in other objects is founded on that original imagination that it is what it 
understands itself to be. Therefore “[t]he object for him is never for him definitively the 
final object”: whenever something appears to be a thing it must be taken into 
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consideration that there is a dehiscence at the heart of the organism to which it appears, 
such that anything presented to the psyche must be presented through this inadequacy 
within the psyche. This is why “every experience either alienates man from himself, or 
else ends in a destruction, a negation of the object.” Either, when I encounter my 
dehiscence, the table is not the table anymore or I am alienated from myself: I am not 
what I take myself to be.
216
 Taking that dehiscence into account at the presence of any 
object is what it means to be “radically torn.” When Lacan writes that “the nature of 
desire is to be radically torn,” this is an intimidating phrase. For our purposes, this 
reference to desire is a reference to the allegorical situation of the eye wanting to be the 
visual field. Thus there is a tornness as the I desires to be what it imagines itself to be, 
which the word dehiscence does well to express.  
I have chosen this complex discourse because the concept of dehiscence 
sufficiently complements reification. Why is dehiscence the complement of reification? 
We have established that there is something premature, inadequate, and discordant in the 
initial conditions of the psyche. The inner world that it imagines itself to be is never quite 
what it imagines, and the outer world is therefore never quite what the psyche imagines 
either. The psyche wants the world to be as it is, wants the object to be definitively how it 
appears, just as it primally wants its own image to be what it is. This desire for fulfillment 
is a separation, or tornness in the world. Thus the dehiscence: the opening, the separation. 
Fink (1995) utters the word alienation to describe this feature of the psyche, but I will 
make the case since “[this alienation] already appears in his article on the mirror stage” as 
the primal Discord, that the word dehiscence be conceived as the conditions for 
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alienation. It is neither a positive nor negative state of affairs of the psyche, nor even a 
“struggle” between an “either/or.” Fink writes of alienation that it “is not a permanent 
state of affairs; rather it is a process, an operation that takes place at certain times.” The 




Recall that reification is the internal impact upon the person engaged in a 
capitalist relation of production. Honneth (2008) writes that reification is a process and a 
result.
218
 There is a reification that the inner world undergoes (reification as process), 
whereby the psyche understands itself to be a commodity. There is also therefore a 
reification of things in the outer world which it perceives (reification as product), which 
applies to these things such that they appear as commodities after the psyche takes itself 
to be one. Similarly, dehiscence occurs both as a process and a product. There is a 
dehiscence the psyche undergoes in its mirror stage, which constitutes its inner 
consequences (dehiscence as process), when it is not what it takes itself to be. 
Undergoing such a process, no object is quite what it is for the psyche, which I have 
called dehiscence’s outer consequences (dehiscence as product). In other words, whereas 
reification is a thingification (as Bewes remarks
219
) both in process and product, 
dehiscence is de-thingification, both in process and product. In short, dehiscence is a 
particular “moment” or state of the psyche described by the mirror stage (“an operation” 
and “not a permanent state of affairs” writes Fink), whereas reification is a particular 
“moment” or state of psyche, placed as it is in the symbolic order, when it is engaged in a 




 Honneth (2008), p.32. 
219
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capitalist relation of production such that it takes itself to have the qualities of a 
commodity.  
The claim that dehiscence is reification’s complement is quite unfinished 
however. We have observed that Lacan thinks dehiscence is a primal aspect of the 
organism, but we have not yet seen the way in which we undergo dehiscence throughout 
life; that is, when dehiscence occurs and how, including during a verbal form of 
interaction. I will respond to these questions in the next section. I will claim that the 
dehiscence proper to discussion occurs during group formation, rather than mass 
formation. I will distinguish these two interpsychical formations through a close reading 
of Freud’s (1921) Massenpsychologie und Ich-analyse.  
 
Dehiscence, Part 2: Freud and The Lifting 
The psyche, imagining what it might be, is overlaid with language. However 
language will never fully cover the organic inadequacy in the psyche, it will never fill the 
gap of the mirror stage. Like the story of the princess and the pea, adding mattresses to 
relieve discomfort, the psyche will continue adding layers of language and images from 
the outer world in its desire to be included in the visual field. There are spaces between 
these mattresses however, which permit them to be lifted off periodically just as they may 
be added. I will now go on to describe both processes as they relate to discussion: the 
way in which layers of language (de)form the psyche over time in its attempts to 
understand itself
220
 and also the moments when this language deactivates, or lifts.
221
 I 
will closely read Sigmund Freud’s Massenpsychologie Und Ich-Analyse (typically 
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translated as Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego) to do so, claiming that there 
is a dehiscence that occurs when psyches congregate and this dehiscence may be 
prolonged or ended quickly. The former I will call group formation whereas the latter is 
Freud’s mass formation. Discussion, I will argue, occurs when dehiscence is prolonged in 
group formation, whereas recitation is the case whereby the dehiscence ends quickly. The 
equality and variety in the sequence of turns taken during interaction can determine 
which of these formations prevails, and therefore whether reification is most effectively 
complemented. 
Massenpsychologie is Freud’s response to a series of questions about "inter-
psychic" social behavior—what psyches do among other psyches—as opposed to the 
intra-psychic behavior—what psyches do by themselves—which had been his primary 
focus. What happens among psyches was a popular intellectual issue in 1921.
222
 As the 
19th century became the 20th large-scale industrialization inspired upheavals that yielded 
a “society” not fully understood in Europe or its colonies. Attempting to account for 
human behaviors en masse authors such as G. Le Bon, W. MacDougall, W. Trotter, and 
G.Tarde addressed questions such as: What is the difference between publics, masses, 
crowds, and groups? What positive and negative forms of social behavior are there? Why 
are people “suggestible,” and why do they act “unlike themselves” among others? 
MacDougall writes of group “organization” under “a primitive induction of emotion”—in 
other words, “infection” of behaviors among people. Le Bon theorized the “group mind” 
and “the prestige of leaders,” whereas Trotter proposed the existence of a natural 
gregariousness, or “herd mentality.” Tarde attributed mass behavior to imitation, and 
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many would dismiss this claim by arguing that imitation can be reduced to suggestion or 
suggestability.  
Freud found these responses unsatisfactory. None of the other authors, he claims, 
are able to explain the phenomenon of suggestion, but rather reduce collective behavior 
to this “magic word.” Freud proposes to discover “the psychological explanation of [the] 
mental change” that occurs in massenbildung, or the formation of a mass.
223
 Freud’s 
focus is the libido, the “love force” (Liebeskraft) or “love instincts” (Liebestriebe) that 
have their origins in sexual instincts (Sexualtriebe) which “force their way towards sexual 
union.” These “love relationships” that emerge between people, he claims, “constitute the 
essence of the Masse mind.”
224
 More specifically, Freud is interested in what causes the 
“removal (Aufhebung) of those inhibitions (Triebhemmungen) upon [the mass member’s] 
instincts (Trieben).”
225
 The word Aufhebung, which, beginning with Hegel in the 
continental tradition of philosophy, carries some philosophical heft and may also be 
translated as “lifting,” refers to an extremely important concept for the purposes of this 
exegesis. In Totem and Taboo, Freud uses the same word to describe the effects of 
emotional ties between individuals where, for these individuals, certain neurotic 
“embargoes on the whole world” can “lift” when in the presence of others.
226
 In what 
follows, I am primarily interested in how these embargoes (which Lacan would associate 
with the symbolic order) emerge through the frustration of emotional ties and the ways in 
which they lift among other psyches, returning the psyche to a state of dehiscence. 
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Dehiscence, Part 2.1: Church and Army 
Freud’s interest is in how love relationships constitute the essence of the mass 
mind, and he mentions two examples to articulate his thinking: church and army. 
Members of churches and armies are “bound in two directions”: on the one hand a 
parishioner is bound to Christ; on the other, he is bound to the other parishioners as 
“brothers through the love (durch die Liebe) which Christ has for them.”
227
 “There is no 
doubt,” Freud continues, “that the tie (Bindung) which unites each individual with Christ 
is also the cause of the tie that unites them together.” Here is a central claim in response 
to the question of suggestability: the relationship to a leader causes the relationships 
between members of a mass. In the case of an army, for example, there is a “head” 
(Oberhaupt) or “leading idea” (fuhrende Idee) through the love of which all soldiers feel 
in virtue of belonging to the mass (e.g., a general or patriotism). Thus a mass is founded 
on emotional ties with a leader (Fuhrer) or leading idea (fuhrende Idee). I will focus 
somewhat exclusively on the nature of this relationship in my composition of the 
dehisced view of discussion. 
Having described the “essence of the mass mind” as two “emotional ties”—a tie 
between each member and the leader, which causes a tie among the members 
themselves—Freud elaborates on what these ties are and how they come to be. The 
“emotional ties” that “hold the mass together” are “libidinal cathexes” 
(Libidobesetzungen). The translator of the 1959 edition includes a footnote explaining 
why he uses the word ‘cathexis’ for this crucial psychoanalytic term Besetzung. The 
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former derives from the Greek word that means “I occupy” and is used on the analogy of 
an electric charge, and...means the concentration of accumulation of mental energy in 
some particular channel. Thus, when we speak of the existence in someone of a libidinal 
cathexis of an object or, more shortly, object-cathexis, we mean that his libidinal energy 
is directed towards, or rather infused into, the idea of some object in the outer world.
228
 
Cathexes are therefore occupations, infusions, or settlements of that love-force or love-
drive (Liebestriebe) mentioned earlier. When the baby looks at himself or at his parent 
and vice versa there is a strong cathexis there in which the he imagines an ideal of 
himself. The baby idealizes the parent as a maternal/paternal function: takes himself to be 
them. The parent is an “object” (Vosrtellung) with which the baby’s cathexes are 
occupied, within which cathexes are infused and on which cathexes settle. Such 
occupations, infusions, and settlements are object-cathexes, for which we may use the 
simpler word “tie.” 
Now Freud must characterize these cathexes in the mass context: what is the tie to 
the leader or leading idea like in a mass? In light of the examples he’s used, as well as 
mentioning other associative formations like families, towns, and nations, a mass is a 
formation where “those instincts which still pursue directly (direkt) sexual aims...have 
been diverted from th[ose] original aims.”
229
 The diversion of sexual aims is what creates 
neurosis, while this very diversion also permits associative formations like families and 
towns to form (see Civilization and its Discontents for an elaboration on this idea). These 
blocked, frustrated, or rerouted infusions of sexual instinct suggest “degrees of being in 
love” and “involve a certain encroachment (Beeinträchtigung) upon the ego.” In other 
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words, to be a member of an associative formation, one has to redirect directly sexual 
aims to some degree, and the way one does this is via an “encroachment” on the ego by 
the superego/ego ideal, which we will see in the next section. 
It is in this Beeinträchtigung of the ego—a word which translates also to 
interference and disruption— where Freud proposes to “find...the conditions” that create 
mass ties. The way to understand mass formation is to understand the consequences of 
frustrated sexual instincts when ties form between individuals and a leader or leading 
idea. The “condition” of mass ties that Freud investigates first is identification, which is a 
“mechanism for emotional ties.” Identification is an early form of emotional tie which 
“helps to prepare the way” for the Oedipus complex.
230
 A cursory understanding of this 
process furnishes an understanding of the discussion participant’s psyche before s/he 
enters discussion. Just as engagement with capitalist relations of production is crucial for 
thinking of discussion as an exchange, the Oedipal aspects of the psyche are crucial to 
thinking of discussion in terms of dehiscence. 
 
Dehiscence, Part 2.2: Introjection 
Going back to that original situation of a baby with his parent: the baby inevitably 
forms a true cathexis for something (mother, kitten, toy), but something else (father, 
death, loss) calls that first thing away, interrupting the baby’s cathexis. The baby 
therefore takes the interrupter as a “model” (Vorbild), since this is where the loved object 
has gone. In this sense the baby identifies with the interrupting function. “[I]dentification 
endeavors to mold a person’s own ego after the fashion (das eigene Ich ähnlich zu 
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gestalten) of the one that has been taken as a ‘model’ (Vorbild).”
231
 The baby’s ego 
molds to take the form of the interrupter. Identification thereby “becomes a substitute 
(Ersatz) for a libidinal object tie...by means of the introjection of the object into the ego 
(durch Introjektion des Objekts ins Ich).”
232
 Introjection is a self-shaping process that 
occurs in response to lost love, and is an important opportunity to understand the 
discussion participant in a very different way than via reification. Introjection can happen 
in a number of ways. I will mention two that Freud describes. Having lost a loved object, 
a person may sometimes “transform themselves into” (wandelt sich in sie) the loved 
object, “replacing the ego (die ihm sein Ich ersetzen)” with that object’s qualities. Freud 
writes of a boy that loved a kitten, for example. The kitten died and the boy began to act 
like it, meowing under the dinner table. The replacement (ersetzen) process in this case 
transforms (wandelt) the person’s sense of self.  
In another case of introjection (which Freud calls “melancholia”), rather than 
preserving the qualities of the lost object of love by taking them on, the person will 
deprecate, reproach, and criticize themselves in a way that recalls or “applies” to the lost 
love object. In this case it can seem as though the ego holds itself accountable, “rages” at 
itself, for not being a certain way, or not meeting an expectation that has somehow been 
informed or substantiated by the lost object of love. Keeping with the boy and his kitten, 
if he felt guilty for betraying the kitten when playing with others, for instance, this might 
be a case of melancholic introjection. Rather than mere preservation of the lost object, 
this introjection—which takes the form of self-accountability—is a kind of “revenge” on 
the self (Rache). Thus, in one of Freud’s more poetic formulations (that he repeats in 
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future works on the ego ideal): “a shadow [will fall] upon the ego” in the shape of the lost 
object, a shadow of a memorial built by the ego within itself in the shape of what it has 
lost. This falling shadow, formed from melancholic introjection, is the origin of the 
superego/ego ideal, a structure of the psyche that is integral to Freud’s account of mass 
formation, since it upholds the embargoes and prohibitions mentioned earlier and, when 
interacting with others, can lift. I therefore quote Freud at length on the formation of this 
structure and analyze the long passage, drawing from Lacan in order to distinguish the 
superego (the action) from the ego ideal (the content directing the action). Again, 
remembering that a psyche has identified in such a way as to become melancholic, there 
is a “piece” of the psyche which now 
...comprises the conscience, a critical faculty within the ego, which even in 
normal times takes up a critical attitude towards the ego, though never so 
relentlessly and so unjustifiably. On previous occasions we have been driven to 
the hypothesis that some such faculty develops in our ego and comes into conflict 
with it. We have called it the ‘ego ideal’ (Ichideal), and by way of functions we 
have ascribed to it self-observation, the moral conscience (moralisch Gewessien), 
the censorship of dreams, and the chief influence in repression… 
 
[The ego ideal] gradually gathers up from the influences of the environment the 
demands which the environment makes upon the ego and which the ego cannot 
always rise to; so that a man, when he cannot be satisfied with his ego itself, may 
nevertheless be able to find satisfaction in the ego ideal which has been 
differentiated out of the ego...[its] origin [is] in the influence of superior powers, 




In this passage I distinguish (with Lacan via Chieza) between the content and the action 
of what Freud singularly calls “Ichideal.” The first part of the passage describes what the 
ego ideal does: it observes the self, provides a moral conscience, censors dreams, and is a 
chief influence in repression. The second part of the passage describes the reason why the 
ego ideal will pick out certain things to observe, moral injunctions to make, repressions to 
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enact, or dreams to censor rather than others. The ego ideal will tend to do all of these 
things in accordance with “influences of the environment,” or “demands that the 
environment makes on the ego and which the ego cannot always rise to.” These 
influences and demands come from “superior powers” and “parents.” That is, the first 
part of the passage describes that the ego ideal observes, censors, and represses the ego; 
whereas the second part of the passage describes why the ego ideal observes, censors, and 
represses certain things instead of others. Among the superior powers that furnish the ego 
ideal’s content, as Freud writes elsewhere, are political, cultural, social, historical, and 
educational institutions and their various influences. 
Where Freud equivocates on this distinction between the content and the action of 
the ego ideal, and in later works uses the terms “superego,” “ego ideal,” and “ideal ego” 
interchangeably with it, Lacan calls the action of reproachment (that it does so) superego 
and the content (why it does so for certain things) ego ideal. Thus this melancholic 
process of introjection, with which Oedipus is associated, is an “entrance into the 
symbolic order.” Discussion participants come to discussions with unique histories of 
love, loss, and psychical (de)formation. Their superegos have formed in certain ways 
with certain ego ideal contents. They have all entered the symbolic order through 
different paths, holding themselves accountable and repressing according to the tenets of 
that order: politics, culture, and language. In capitalist relations of production, for 
example, an aspect of the ego ideals must be to consider themselves as labor. Their 
embargoes concern their own statuses as commodities. But something happens when they 
come together to talk and listen to one another. Their engagement with the embargoes 
and prohibitions of the order is dynamic. 
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Identification continues throughout an individual’s life: perpetually infusing and 
settling new objects with sexual instincts: there is perpetual love and loss. The ego ideal’s 
content is therefore constantly changing as one goes through social, political, and cultural 
life. Again, in identification “the ego has enriched itself with the properties of the object, 
it has “introjected” the object into itself (Im ersteren Falle hat sich dan Ich um die Eigen 
Schaften does objektes bereichent).” This ongoing process of identification occurs with 
objects that the ego perceives as similar to its original objects (the maternal and paternal 
functions). Freud characterizes it as an act of substituting those original objects. The ego 
“surrenders itself to the object it has substituted for its most important object (hat sich 
dem objekt hingesgeben).” In Lacanian terms, these imaginary objects all have a 
symbolic character in language.
234
 
The nature of a mass tie is a kind of identification, which Freud derives by 
distinguishing between two versions of the ego’s tendency to substitute objects. On the 
one hand, an object is lost or given up and then “set up again inside the ego” such that 
“the ego makes a partial alteration in itself after the model of the lost object”
235
 (this is 
the very definition of introjection). On the other hand, there is a case where the object is 
retained and there is a “hyper-cathexis and at the ego’s expense.” Freud’s question is this: 
which introjection constitutes a mass tie? Is an object put in place (an die Stelle...gesetzt) 
of the ego during a mass tie, or is it substituted for the ego ideal? 
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Dehiscence, Part 2.3: Hypnosis 
Recalling that sexual tendency will be inhibited in the mass, or rather sexual aims 
will not be satisfied in mass formation (limited along with narcissistic and aggressive 
feelings), mass ties cannot have directly sexual aims. A mass tie is therefore the latter 
kind of introjection, which Freud claims is a hypnotic relation. The mass ties that form 
between members and the leader are hypnotic, “the devotion of someone in love to an 
unlimited degree but with sexual satisfaction excluded.”
236
 Hypnosis also “contains an 
additional element of paralysis derived from the relation between someone with superior 
power and someone who is without power and helpless” wherein there is almost 
“complete suggestive compliance”
237
 of the powerless to the powerful. 
Two chapters later Freud returns and elucidates the hypnotic mass tie to the 
leader, writing that “hypnosis has something positively uncanny (direkt Umheimliches) 
about it.”
238
 “The hypnotist asserts that he is in possession of a mysterious power which 
robs the subject of his own will, or, which is the same thing, he believes it of him.”
239
 
“And how does he manifest [this power]? By telling the subject to look him in the eyes; 
his most typical method of hypnotizing is by his look.”
240
 The hypnotized person “fixes 
his eyes” on the hypnotist and is “riveted” in such a way that “the rest of the world is 
quite uninteresting.” Freud repeats this aspect of hypnosis several times: the hypnotized 
person sinks “into an activity in which the world is bound to seem uninteresting to him.” 
However, “at the same time the subject is in reality unconsciously concentrating his 
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Transference, like ego, ego ideal, and identification, is a foundational concept in 
psychoanalysis. It is when a person understands their experience in terms of their Oedipal 
past, or “awakens...a portion of...archaic inheritance.”
242
 This is what it means for a 
hypnotized person’s “attitude” to be “unconsciously directed” toward something in the 
world. When the unconscious directs itself at something it infuses, settles, and occupies 
that something in the world with the influences of its parents. “When a hypnotist gives 




It is the command to “sleep” that induces the hypnotized person “to withdraw all 
interest from the world and to concentrate on the person of the hypnotist.” (Later Freud 
qualifies this phrasing by saying that hypnotic withdrawal is from “the outer world.”) The 
hypnotized person has become “compliant” in the same way he was compliant with his 
parents, particularly “in relation to his father...to whom [his] will has to be 
surrendered.”
244
 These are the “uncanny” (Umheimlich) and even “coercive” qualities of 
mass formation. They indicate a “thirst for obedience” slaked in the exact way Freud has 
been arguing: “the mass ideal...governs the ego in the place of (an Stelle) the ego 
ideal.”
245
 The claim is phrased once again: “hypnosis has a good claim to being described 
as a mass of two; [and] there remains as a definition for suggestion.” 
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More carefully, Freud claims that suggestion—rather than being an exact 
occasion of hypnosis, such as would occur between a hypnotist and a hypnotized 
person—is instead “a partial manifestation of the state of hypnosis.” I take him to mean 
that in mass formation, members are not aware that they are being hypnotized, nor is the 
context in any way medicinal or therapeutic. Rather, it is a political occasion of 
transference. Again, rather than constituting the total essence of mass formation, hypnosis 
characterizes one crucial element: “the behavior of the individual to the leader (Fuhrer).” 
Remember that a mass has a leader, or leading idea (fuhrende Idee). Hypnosis is therefore 
the way in which each member of a mass relates to that leader or leading idea. 
 
Dehiscence, Part 2.4: The Mass 
Having posed the question about suggestability, having described identification in 
detail, and having sketched the way in which identifications shape, (de)form, and remold 
the ego, Freud writes his response to the initial question and defines a mass as: “a number 
of individuals who have substituted one and the same object for their ego ideals and have 
consequently identified themselves with one another in their egos.”
246
 He includes the 
following diagram to illustrate the point: 
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 Figure 2. Freud’s Primary Mass 
In this diagram each straight line is an individual psyche. The outer object, perceived as 
an “object” by each of them, moves (by way of the arching arrows) into the position of 
their ego ideals. The ego ideals align with one another, thus the dotted line between them, 
and the egos align as well. A primary mass forms. He has therefore answered his initial 
question. What it means to be a mass member is to be hypnotized by a leader or leading 
idea and identify with others who are similarly hypnotized. Hypnosis is a de-sexualized 
process of introjection that “substitutes” or “puts [the leader] in place of” each group 
member’s ego ideal. Since the extant contents of the ego ideal deactivate during this 
substitution, and the person introjects different contents for the ego ideal, the person will 
behave differently among others than when he is on his own. What was once compelling 
the person to behave in certain ways, his “embargoes on the whole world,” has lifted. I 
claim that the moment of the psyche just before the new introjection is dehiscence, as 
Lacan describes it. At such a moment the extant ego ideal contents have lifted but there is 
no replacement as of yet. The Aufhebung that characterizes the mass member’s instincts 
is in play. In a mass a replacement comes quickly, imbuing the superego with new ego 
ideal content. However, as I will argue in the next section, there is a possibility of 
maintaining that dehiscence during an interaction such that Aufhebung prolongs. I will 
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claim that discussion is an interaction where dehiscence prolongs 
 
Dehiscence, Part 3: The Group and The Mass 
Eugene Wolfenstein, in Psycho-Analytic Marxism, depicts mass formation in a 
similar way to Freud.
247
   
 
 
Figure 3. Wolfenstein’s recitation 
 
The black dots beneath the X are psyches, all of whom introject the one object X. 
Returning to the definition of recitation in the previous chapter, we see that such a verbal 
form of interaction has the necessary ingredients of a mass: all participants attend to the 
facilitator, who follows up each comment with a comment of his or her own. Even if the 
participants respond to what another participant has said, their eyes focus on the 
facilitator. The facilitator in this case secures his or her place as the object/voice the 
participants introject together, replacing their ego ideal contents with aspects of this 
object. The facilitator temporarily replaces their ego ideal contents through partial 
hypnosis. In a recitation, whose basic quality is a homogeneity and inequality in the 
sequence of turns, a mass forms.  
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In a mass formation dehiscence occurs, though the dehiscence ends quickly. 
There is a temporary lifting of the extant ego ideal contents, but these contents are 
replaced by the leader. In the case of a recitation, the leader is the facilitator. Without 
dehiscence then the facilitator would not be able to facilitate. At the same time, the 
recitation would not succeed if the dehiscence continued: the participants must replace 
their ego ideal contents with the facilitator for the recitation to succeed. In this verbal 
form of interaction there is a quick deactivation of the extant ego ideal contents and the 
activation of a new set of contents in the form of the facilitator. The collective Aufhebung 
ends in a matter of seconds or minutes, each participant fixing their eyes upon the 
facilitator. At this juncture I claim that it is possible to work against the mass formation 
in these initial moments, and throughout an interaction. It is possible to facilitate such 
that the dehiscence, via partial hypnosis, prolongs. It is not inexorably the case that the 
facilitator or speaker must replace the ego ideal contents of the participants’ psyche once 
they have been partially hypnotized. Facilitators can make sure that this replacement of 
ego ideal content does not occur. Rather than replacing the participants’ ego ideal 
contents with a single voice or idea, facilitators can work keep the participants lingering 
in the dehiscent state, such that their extant prohibitions and compulsions are deactivated 
and lifted. Rather than end the collective dehiscence facilitators can maintain its strength. 
Maintaining the collective dehiscence requires that psyches not introject one singular 
voice or idea. Therefore, if they introject many voices, many ideas, or questions—or 
nothing at all—their psyches will not form a mass. A group is an aggregate of psyches 
lingering in dehiscence. I follow Wolfenstein, who depicts “group membership itself” 





Figure 4, Wolfenstein’s discussion 
 
In this picture, the nodes around the circle represent individual psyches. Notice how each 
psyche equally and variously introjects other psyches rather than one object. To answer 
our initial question at the start of the chapter, there must be an equality and variety in the 
sequence of turns taken during the interaction to avoid a mass formation. In terms of a 
verbal form of interaction, I designate the term discussion for an interaction that achieves 
group formation rather than mass formation. We established earlier that dehiscence is the 
complement to reification, which holds persons in capitalist relations of production. 
Whereas a recitation quickly ends dehiscence, it is therefore not as effective for working 
against reification as group formation, which prolongs dehiscence. An undistorted 
discussion will therefore have an equality and variety in the sequence of turns taken 
during the interaction. 
There are precedents for the group-mass distinction in the works of later 
psychoanalytic theorists who take up Freud’s claims in the Massenpsychologie, which 
enliven the distinction between discussion and recitation in the verbal form of interaction. 
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Wilhelm Reich’s (1946) The Mass Psychology of Fascism, for example.
248
 Reich 
theorizes the rise of German fascism in the late 1930’ss through an analysis invoking the 
powerful libidinal hypnosis to which German citizens were vulnerable during that time. 
Fascism requires a libidinous connection with a Fuhrer, he claims, which creates a feeling 
of “infantile helplessness” in the citizen, making “him forget to what extent he has 
become an insignificant uncritical follower.”
249
 On the other hand, work democracy, 
rather than the mass hypnosis of a hateful leader, occurs when there is no Fuhrer and 
requires “consciousness on the part of the working people in all professions and their 
responsibility for the social process.”
250
 
Wilfred Bion (2004), in Experience in Groups, makes a distinction between basic 
assumption groups and work groups.
251
 Bion helped develop group psychology in the 
20th century, and he claims that when people get together there are “basic assumptions” 
at play that guide the group unconsciously. The work of group psychology is to become 
aware of how these basic assumptions operate. One of the three basic assumptions is 
dependence. In a dependence basic assumption group, a correlate of mass formation, 
everyone assumes unconsciously that one person will fulfill their every need. Inevitably 
they’ll be frustrated when this doesn’t occur, but the whole group depends unconsciously 
on this one person—the facilitator—to provide full security and fulfillment. Work groups 
become aware of these assumptions and work through them.  
Finally Felix Guattari (2000) distinguishes between a subject group and 
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subjugated group using Sartrean concepts of “seriality” and “fusion.”
252
 “The members of 
a series are united in being turned towards an exterior object in which they have an 
interest…without really being aware of each other.”
253
 Participants in such a serial 
arrangement are members of a “subjugated group,” whose “unity lies…outside itself…” 
This “serial being” is a way of understanding mass formation. However the subject group 
has “liquidated its seriality” and has negated “an external negation” thereby “com[ing] 
together in the ‘flash of a common praxis’, in mutual reciprocity rather than mutual 
Otherness…” As part of a subject group, a participant can “reveal him/herself to 
him/herself beyond his/her imaginary…impasses.”
254
 The subject group therefore 
achieves a kind of freedom within institutions. The liquidation and negation of seriality 
via mutuality is akin to group formation through prolonged dehiscence.  
 
Tactics 
Discussion is a prolonged collective dehiscence, which can only occur through an 
equality and variety in the sequence of turns taken. We have now responded to the initial 
question about why discussion must require an equality and variety in the sequence of 
turns. This response addresses both distortions of discussion. On the one hand, the 
dehiscence itself works against the reification that casts discussion as an economic 
activity. On the other hand the equality and variety in the sequence of turns works against 
discussions that have a basic recitative quality. In one move we have countered the two 
distortions theoretically. The final consideration will be practical. In this last part of the 
                                                 
252
 Guattari, F. (2000). The Three Ecologies, trans., Pindar, I. and Sutton, P, The Athlone Press. 
253
 Ibid., p.125. 
254
 Ibid., p.124. 
131 
 
chapter I will address the question of tactics. How do we facilitate for prolonged 
dehiscence? I will describe two adequate pedagogies, Harkness and Horizontal pedagogy, 
and make general recommendations at the end of the chapter.  
 
Harkness Pedagogy 
Perhaps the oldest example of a technique that works against mass formation is 
Harkness pedagogy. I will characterize the pedagogy as advocating a modulated authority 
that encourages teachers to refrain from replacing students’ ego ideals with their own 
voices or ideas. The style of teaching began as a proposal between two men conversing 
about Exeter Academy during the Great Depression. The son of oil magnate Stephen 
Harkness, Edward Harkness was interested in giving a large endowment to Exeter, but on 
one condition. He asked that classes at the school become “conferences” between 
teachers and students sitting around a table “with discernment, sympathy." This teacher 
"is not a drill-master, but a partner in human enterprise."
255
 In the 81 years since 
Harkness gave Exeter that endowment the "conference plan" has come to define the 
school. Harkness tables—designed and manufactured specifically for the pedagogy—sit 
in every classroom, and all teachers are expected to teach in this “conference” style. 
Harkness is therefore "a system of learning based upon class discussion," but, as Sam 
Shapiro writes, it is more than just “teaching through discussion.” Harkness is not the 
Socratic method, which Shapiro characterizes as “teacher-centered: the teacher is the 
sage on the stage” and “focuses too much on the personality and interests of the teacher.” 
Though Exeter teachers insist that the Harkness method differs from subject to subject, 
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teacher to teacher, and group to group (many hesitate to use the word ‘method’) one 
theme is consistent throughout the handbook and the Exeter Humanities Institute 
conference: the Harkness teacher must intelligently “modulate” her authority in the 
classroom by behaving as if she has renounced it. She must “let it go.” 
In a chapter of the handbook entitled “Sample Strategies,” one section, called 
“Keeping Quiet” says: 
A major challenge in discussion-based teaching is modulating the authoritative 
voice of the teacher. These strategies may help you combat the natural tendency 
that students have to listen for, and to, your voice. 
 
●     Invite students to take responsibility, to be clear when they change subjects in 
the flow of discussion, rather than looking to you to clarify transitions. 
 
●     When the class has gained its own dynamic and degree of familiarity, sit 
away from the table on occasion, or outside the circle. Say to the students that you 
understand how much more demanding your absence may be but that you think 




When teaching Harkness, the teacher must be “silent.” But silence is more than merely 
not speaking. The authority of the teacher’s voice breeds dependence. To teach Harkness 
a teacher must be “absent.” During discussion students should neither listen for, nor to, 
what the teacher says. Though this tendency for students to rely on teachers may be 
“natural” the Harkness teacher “combats” it. “Keeping quiet,” being absent as a teacher, 
is therefore an essential part of intelligently modulating authority. But what does it mean 
for a teacher to be “absent” in this sense? What is modulated authority? Peter Greer, an 
English teacher at Exeter, does not “make eye contact with the students when they are 
talking. I scan the room to judge the engagement of other students, I look down, I flip 
through the text, I look into the center of the table, but I rarely look at the student who is 
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speaking because I know that he or she is then likely to look back at me.” Intentionality 
with eye contact is paramount in Harkness teaching. Similarly, when asked “[w]hen did 
you first think of yourself as a Harkness teacher?” Becky Moore, an English teacher, 
responded, “The first time I sat quietly without getting nervous while students thought 
and then began the conversation again in a useful and detailed way--without my 
prompting...” This is because, as Moore writes in another response, “the students’ ideas 
[in a Harkness discussion] are to structure the outcome...students eventually choose, 
steer, junk, embrace, and clarify ideas.” This is why Meg Foley, a history teacher, writes 
that “how much and when I intervene is a constant issue for debate in my mind and one 
that I feel pretty insecure about...” Similarly, a teacher just beginning to learn how to lead 
a Harkness discussion at EHI reflected afterwards that "The whole time I was thinking 
'when should I say something...shut up...shut up...don't talk'." Though unstated, there is a 
fascination with working against mass formation: Harkness teachers behave in ways that 
discourage the introjection of a single leader or leading idea, particularly in their 
intentionality with eye contact and voice. 
In all these physical behaviors, both subtle and extreme, the Harkness teacher tries 
to lessen or negate her presence as authority. Though he may be physically present 
students must not “look to” him: to be a Harkness teacher, he must “sit quietly” and 
withhold any prompt or encouragement towards specific learning outcomes. The 
Harkness teacher uses his authority to encourage students to have that authority instead of 
him. Thus, by being absent, he “modulates” his authority. Silence can also mean silence 
of concept or content in what the teacher says. For example some Harkness teachers 
speak during discussion, but they are careful to remove any suggestive content from what 
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they say that might undermine student authority over the outcome. Kathy Brownback 
writes that she plays “a pretty significant role in a lot of discussions, less in others, but [I] 
try to make sure it’s not to interject my own point of view as much as to open questions 
or ideas that no one has yet brought up yet...” Despite this “significant role” however, 
Brownback admits that “the less the classroom is about me either personally or as the 
teacher the better off we seem to do.”  The Harkness teacher paradoxically improves the 
more she lessens her own presence as a teacher, makes the classroom less “about her.” 
Bruce Pruitt, a history teacher, says being a Harkness teacher requires “a sense of 
humor...sensitivity to group dynamics, individual needs. Humility.” Though one might 
think that a teacher must naturally have authority, that being a teacher entails having 
power and controlling learning outcomes by directing students to specific knowledge, the 
Harkness method requires that this “natural” element of teaching be absent. Rather, the 
Harkness teacher—as authority—is humble, non-authoritative. The connections between 
Harkness pedagogy and the claims about dehiscence above come into better focus now. 
Below is an image from another private school that casts the group-mass distinction 







Figure 4, Harkness: Traditional :: group : mass 
The “traditional model” is a near copy of Wolfenstein’s depiction of mass formation. It is 
also symmetrical with Freud’s diagram if we turn it 90 degrees to the right. The facilitator 
with his hands on the desk is the object X, and the students below him are participant 
psyches. The lines appear to represent the inequality and homogeneity in the sequence of 
turns taken: the teacher follows up every comment, etc. On the other side however is a 
symmetrical depiction to group formation: an equality and variety in the sequence of 
turns taken. According to my argument in this chapter the latter is discussion, prolonged 
dehiscence. Harkness pedagogy prevents the introjection of one voice and prolongs the 
dehiscence. Each of those Harkness teachers cited from the Handbook describes various 
ways to prolong dehiscence. 
 
Horizontal Pedagogy 
The second pedagogy I will present is horizontal pedagogy. Horizontal pedagogy 
is a way of learning and teaching that emerged during the Occupy Wall Street movement 
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(OWS) in 2011. Two recent articles have come out that think through horizontal 
pedagogy. DiSalvo (2013) has gone into some detail about various educational projects 
within OWS,
257
 and Berry et al (2013) articulate the use of horizontal pedagogy during 
activist work with Occupy Museums.
258
 Lewis (2013) has mentioned it in passing, but 
only the two essays mentioned above none have written exclusively on its theory and 
practice.
259
 As is evident from the above as well, there are many conceptions of 
horizontal pedagogy: many activists and educators have written and spoken the term in 
various contexts. I will present horizontal pedagogy as a pre-figurative educational 
experiment that emerged from the Occupy University. This experiment drew together 
several traditions of facilitation practices in order to work against neoliberal-capitalist 
relations of production, but also learn what another kind of relation of production might 
entail. The following is therefore one description of the pedagogy’s history and practice 
from 2011-2012. I will argue that discussion as group formation is a fundamental aspect 
of this perspective’s general approach to learning, teaching, and studying. Understanding 
this perspective on the pedagogy requires a brief summary of the Occupy Wall Street 
movement. This dissertation is not the place for a fully (or even partially) developed 
account of OWS, however. I will cite the initial call to action and move swiftly into a 
narrative of my membership in the Empowerment and Education Working group and 
eventually the Horizontal Pedagogy Workshop. 
From the event description published in Adbusters in July of 2011
260
 we read 
“#OCCUPYWALLSTREET: On September 17th, flood into lower Manhattan, set up 
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tents, kitchens, and peaceful barricades and occupy Wall Street.” This initial call 
continues with the following description: 
A worldwide shift in revolutionary tactics is underway right now that bodes well 
for the future…The beauty of this new formula, and what makes this novel tactic 
exciting, is its pragmatic simplicity: we talk to each other in various physical 
gatherings and virtual people's assemblies … we zero in on what our one demand 
will be, a demand that awakens the imagination and, if achieved, would propel us 
toward the radical democracy of the future … and then we go out and seize a 
square of singular symbolic significance and put our asses on the line to make it 
happen. 
 
The time has come to deploy this emerging stratagem against the greatest 
corrupter of our democracy: Wall Street, the financial Gomorrah of America.  
 
 Inspired by radical activists from Egypt and Spain, Adbusters framed Wall Street as a 
symbolic center of capitalism, calling on all those dissatisfied with a social world defined 
by Wall Street to swarm that symbolic center. On September 17th protesters went to Wall 
Street and simply did not leave. They flooded Zuccotti Park, a privately-owned public 
space in the heart of the financial district only a few blocks away from the New York 
Stock Exchange. The occupiers established a community through a complex organization 
of working groups, which used direct-democratic facilitation procedures centered on the 
daily meeting of a general assembly. The nascent community considered proposals 
brought to the general assembly, moving forward with actions if all the members 
expressed consent. Hundreds of working groups emerged from the activists’ interests, 
including a group called Empowerment and Education (E&E). E&E became the main 
working group for those interested in educational issues, and a number of subcommittees 
formed within it, including Open Forum, Occupy Student Debt Campaign, and later the 
Free University. Another subcommittee, formed early in the occupation, was known as 
Nomadic University. Cognizant even at the outset that the occupation would end, 
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members of the Nomadic University subcommittee of the Empowerment and Education 
working group proposed to create an institution that would carry the flame of Zuccotti 
Park by teaching, learning, and studying in ways consistent with the occupation. 
Nomadic University drew artists, intellectuals, professors, students, and workers 
to its large meetings. Members of this subcommittee formed task forces devoted to 
particular organizational goals for creating a university. There was a task force devoted to 
curriculum (what subjects, themes, or ideas would the university address?), a task force 
devoted to outreach, and another task force to analyze particular concepts and definitions 
necessary for the creation of an educational institution consistent with the Occupy 
movement. In addition to the large working group meetings, and the smaller Nomadic 
University subcommittee meetings, these task forces met weekly. The final group I 
mentioned—the Concepts and Definitions Task Force of the Nomadic University 
subcommittee of the Empowerment and Education working group—held such meetings 
to discuss the meaning and significance of words like nomadism, university, hospitality, 
and emancipation. After one week of work at Zuccotti Park and participating in the first 
meeting of the Nomadic University subcommittee, I joined this task force, which was 
called “C&D.” 
In an effort to stay true to the movement’s habit of occupying public space at 
symbolic centers of Wall Street and financial power, C&D met in privately-owned public 
spaces around midtown Manhattan. The task force eventually made Trump Towers on 
57
th
 Street and 7
th
 Avenue its home base. The group spent hours reading texts, discussing 
passages, and composing its own texts to create satisfactory understandings of these 
terms, which it would then present to the larger Nomadic University subcommittee. After 
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a month of thinking through these concepts and definitions, C&D became interested in 
ways of actually practicing the ideas it had discussed. As the reflective arm of a project 
devoted to creating an educational institution, the group wanted to experiment with ways 
of learning, studying, and teaching consistent with its social and political values and 
those of the Occupy movement. The group agreed that different members of C&D would 
facilitate a series of interactions, using whatever techniques each member saw fit to use 
while facilitating. Members drew from student-centered facilitation practices such as 
Harkness pedagogy, practices from the community of inquiry model of philosophy for 
children (in particular a model practiced by Walter O. Kohan in Brazil), psychoanalytic 
techniques used in Lacanian psychoanalysis, as well as the direct-democratic consensus-
oriented procedures widely practiced in Zuccotti Park. The first night of the experiment 
the group examined a passage from Sen. Carl Levin’s 2009 report on the 2008 financial 
crisis. At the end of the discussion, another member volunteered to facilitate the 
following week. 
This experiment occurred the same week that the Nomadic University 
subcommittee was considering foundational proposals for beginning the work of creating 
the educational institution. One such proposal was to create a wing or arm of the 
institution that devoted itself to ways of teaching, learning, and studying—a kind of 
internal education department or ongoing workshop for prospective students and 
teachers. A report-back from the Levin experiment at Trump Tower formed the substance 
of this proposal, to which the Nomadic University subcommittee consented (along with a 
proposal to create a system for creating new courses, an outreach program, and a “core 
civic curriculum” outlining themes and topics Nomadic University courses might 
140 
 
address).   
Pedagogy was first described as “horizontal” in this context (though not for the 
first time, and mentioned previously
261
) in the body of a long email summarizing these 
foundational proposals. Describing the pedagogical proposal, the author of the email 
wrote that 
Nomadic University classes would follow many different pedagogies—we 
wouldn’t try to impose one ‘correct’ pedagogy on every class. But in line OWS’s 
general commitment to horizontal and consensual processes, we would 
encourage/stipulate that NU classes try to adopt a more horizontal and non-
hierarchical pedagogy than conventional education offers. 
 
C&D used its Levin experiment as a model for this proposal. We attempted to practice 
education that was “in line with OWS’s general commitment to horizontal and 
consensual processes” which we took to be “more…non-hierarchical than conventional 
education.” After this proposal passed, four members of the newly formed horizontal 
pedagogy workshop facilitated interactions over the course of a month in the way already 
described. Each encounter resulted in a new question, topic, or text that the group would 
study the following week with a different facilitator. This workshop had two functions. 
First, horizontal pedagogy was an ongoing course offered by Nomadic University. 
Second, members of this workshop facilitated other courses that Nomadic University 
offered (and changed its name to Occupy University in January 2011). Members of the 
horizontal pedagogy workshop facilitated meetings of courses like Studying May Day, 
Poetry and Political Feeling, Radical Economics, Critical Walking, and Occupy 
Algebra.
262
 While members of the horizontal pedagogy workshop wrote down certain 
procedures and habitually used them during Occupy University’s courses, the pedagogy 
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 The term “horizontal” had been used in reference to pedagogy by Paulo Freire (1998) in Pedagogy of 
the Heart, though in a somewhat different sense.  
262
 For an archive of courses offered by the Occupy University, see university.nycga.net. 
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was not necessarily the procedures themselves but the way in which the group had come 
to them, for the essence of the pedagogy is to teach, learn, and study in line with a 
general commitment to non-hierarchical conventions and procedures, such as those 
direct-democratic procedures used by the occupiers in Zuccotti Park. What does this 
mean, exactly? 
First, members of the group identified as belonging to the Occupy movement. 
This sense of belonging created a shared sense of purpose, an interest in occupying Wall 
Street and the social-political motivation involved therein: namely protesting, 
demonstrating against, and manifesting discontent with the “financial Gomorrah of 
America.” Second, the members of the group were also members of the Empowerment 
and Education working group, and active participants in the Occupy University 
subcommittee (as well as other working groups and subcommittees). While our common 
interest was protesting against the social world of financial capitalism, our particular 
project was to create an educational institution, a university which would carry the flame 
of the initial occupation called for by Adbusters in July 2011. These two premises created 
the conditions for what that group at that time would eventually call “horizontal 
pedagogy,” a way of learning, teaching, and studying “in line with” OWS’s general 
commitment to non-conventional, non-hierarchical educational approaches.  
One may be tempted to claim that horizontal pedagogy that requires learners, 
studiers, and teachers do certain things and not others. The basic list of procedures the 
group drew from was as follows:  




Check-in (everyone goes around and says their name, preferred gender pronouns, 
and something else--typically how they’re feeling);  
Physical Education (the group agrees to do some kind of embodied movement or 
exercises);  
Examination (everyone looks at something closely together);  
Collective Questioning (participants ask questions about the thing under 
examination while the facilitator writes them down);  
Discussion (address the question(s) with equal and various turn-taking); and  
Debrief (talk about how the discussion went; this procedure may happen either at 
the end of the present interaction or at the beginning of the next as part of the 
introduction). 
  
Despite these procedures, which also varied from interaction to interaction and 
were in flux throughout the period of the group’s activity, horizontal pedagogy does not 
require that participants in educational moments do anything in particular, except those 
educational activities to which they themselves perpetually consent, and which the 
facilitators enact. Participants in the educational moment must propose and consent to the 
pedagogical behaviors, curricular movements, and other educational behaviors they will 
undergo. Insofar as the participants in the educational moment consent to the way in 
which they will learn, teach, and study—and insofar as they understand their location to 
be a symbolic center of a dominant social arrangement which they are in the process of 
resisting—then these participants are enacting horizontal pedagogy. The pedagogy is not 
any one set of procedures, but rather the procedures the participants propose, to which 
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they consent, and with which they experiment in a location they take to be symbolically 
definitive of a social arrangement they protest. 
I therefore claim that horizontal pedagogy, as described here, is a discussion 
pedagogy because there is no one leader or leading idea that defines it procedurally. 
Though it is not a requirement, the way the horizontal pedagogy workshop practiced 
horizontal pedagogy actively worked against the establishment of a single leader or 
leading idea that would replace ego ideals at every encounter (and over time). The group 
instituted a perpetual dehiscence in its interactions, carefully discussing the ways in 
which their psyches would interact. In principle, if each participant of an educational 
moment perpetually consented to having a leader or leading idea during that educational 
moment, then the pedagogy would still be horizontal. This in no way demeans the 
discussive foundation of horizontal pedagogy, however. It means that discussion is not 
always the dominant script of a horizontal pedagogy encounter, but is the script with 
which it operates foundationally, since it requires perpetual consent from those who will 
participate in the educational encounter. Horizontal pedagogy must begin with discussion 
in a symbolic center of a protest-worthy and dominant social arrangement, though it does 
not require a particular script or activity afterwards. 
In conclusion, both horizontal and Harkness pedagogies share a set of tactics that 
facilitators can use to promote prolonged dehiscence, the complement of reification. In 
the Conclusion I will draw together the many insights from this chapter as they relate to 
the previous chapters. For now I will end with the following list of tactics. Though the list 
is not exhaustive, these are practices with which facilitators and participants may work to 




After speaking, wait. Permit long silences. Do not be the first to break a silence. 
Dillon (1994) recommends singing a song to oneself after speaking (“Bah Bah 
Black Sheep” is his preference.) The purpose is to allow others the opportunity to 
speak before you speak again. 
Be rude. Make your eyes and posture unavailable and disengaged, particularly at 
the outset of the interaction. Partial hypnosis may take effect quickly without 
words. Attend to posture, eye contact, and hand movements. 
When determining the group’s next steps, phrase several options as “proposals” 
and allow time for deliberation over them. It may be best to have a highly visible 
system of determining what participants’ feelings about the various proposals may 
be. Nodding is rarely sufficient. Twinkling fingers up, middle, or down is more 
visible, or raising hands.  
Take copious notes on what participants say. If a facilitator is looking down and 
writing feverishly then participants will not look to them for attention.  
Be a mirror or a map to what the group has said rather than stating what you 
think. Taking notes can help in this tactic. If a facilitator uses the exact words 
uttered by participants then there is less risk of the facilitator’s idea becoming the 
leading idea, which can happen quite quickly, even if the facilitator has been quiet 
during the interaction. 
Speak in phatics and unfinished sentences. Phatics are confirmatory or 
encouraging noises such as “mmm” or “ahhh.” Unfinished sentences and 
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stuttering are ways to invite others to being speaking.  
Pass facilitation. Different members of the group, independently of status, should 










In the following conclusion I will present the basic premises of the dissertation’s 
argument, summarize its central claim, and draw forth the relevance of this claim for the 
literature on discussion in general. I will then consider two objections, the first from a 
critical pedagogue and the second from a Foucauldian skeptic. In responding to these 
objections I narrate two anecdotes portraying discussion-as-prolonged dehiscence. 
Throughout the conclusion, I ask the reader to imagine the social-political world as a pile 
of pebbles to which we are always adding new pebbles. The relations between pebbles 
constitute its form, and every new interaction adds a pebble to the pile. According to this 
metaphor, any discussion may conform to the existing shape of the pile or work against 
it; in other words, one might neatly place a pebble on the pile or throw a pebble against 
the pile, disrupting a tiny region of the pile’s shape. Facilitating and participating in 
discussion, I claim, is an instance of the latter rather than the former.   
 
Premises, Conclusion, and the Pebble Metaphor 
In chapter three I claimed that a homogeneity in the sequence of turns taken 
during an interaction is a basic recitative quality. To summarize the basic premises and 
claim of the dissertation, I will argue here that an equality and variety in the sequence of 
turns taken during interaction is a basic discussive quality. I will move step by step, 
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beginning with the claims in the most recent chapter. In chapter four I argued that, if 
there is not an equality and variety in the sequence of turns, dehiscence will end quickly 
during an interaction. Since dehiscence is the complement of reification, we cannot work 
against capitalist relations of production in our social form if we insist on ending 
dehiscence quickly during interaction. There are ways to work for a prolonged 
dehiscence, or what I have called group formation: tactics indigenous to pedagogies such 
as Harkness and horizontal styles of facilitating. Group formation, with its prolonged 
dehiscence, deactivates extant prohibitions (de)formed within the psyche, deactivating 
the immanent effects of the capitalist social form that have “impacted” the psyche over 
time. These impacts, which I understand immanently and not mechanically, distort 
discussion. There are two such distortions, which I analyzed in chapters two and three 
respectively. The first distortion is to consider discussion an exchange of ideas, which 
emerges when persons alienate their labor in a capitalist social formation, construing 
themselves and others in commodity terms. Thinking of themselves in terms of 
commodities they also think of interactions in terms of commodities, though exchange 
language and other economic terms are discrepant with talking and listening. The second 
distortion is to permit recitation to pass as discussion, which occurs when the word 
“discussion” and the verbal form of interaction that goes by its name discrepantly 
reflect/refract aspects of the base and superstructure in a neoliberal-capitalist social 
formation.  
According to the analysis of the second distortion, if the word discussion is 
uttered in reference to a verbal form of interaction which has an inequality and 
homogeneity in the sequence of turns taken, the resultant pedagogical ideologeme is a 
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distorted discussion. If the word discussion is uttered in reference to a verbal form of 
interaction with an equality and variety in the sequence of turns, the pedagogical 
ideologeme is undistorted. Why must a verbal form of interaction with a basic recitative 
quality not be a discussion? Again, the distortion occurs when discrepant terms are 
uttered together. The discrepancy in this pedagogical ideologeme is between discussion’s 
connotation of freedom, participation, and equality and recitation’s closedness, 
constraint, and inequality.
263
 Homogeneity and inequality in the sequence of turns could 
not satisfy discussion’s connotation of freedom, since mass formation replaces extant ego 
ideal contents with a new, singular object or voice. Only an equality and variety in the 
sequence of turns satisfies this connotation. To claim that discussion can have a basic 
recitative quality is to claim that freedom can be closed and constrained and equality 
unequal. Such a discrepancy iterates and constitutes the discrepant quality of neoliberal 
capitalism, where political discourse in the superstructure includes ideas of freedom and 
equality while lived realities in the economic base contradict those ideas. Distorted 
discussions are a lifeblood of neoliberalism: when facilitators and participants engage in a 
recitation that they call a discussion they add another pebble to the vastly complex heap 
whose immanent shape we call neoliberal, a social formation where the freedom of the 
market substantiates freedom in general. To claim that discussion can have a basic 
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 Here is an apt place to pause and consider the status of equality in this dissertation, as the concluding 
remarks will focus primarily on freedom. There is a question regarding what kind of equality I advocate, if 
any, in dehiscence. Admittedly this is a complex question and I field it here by distinguishing between two 
varieties of equality and choosing a combined stance. There is a difference between formative and 
distributive justice, a distinction to which McClintock’s (2012) arguments in Enough: A Pedagogic 
Speculation have brought attention. According to these distinctions, there will be an equality with respect to 
allotment of a resource over a series of individuals (in our case, turns during discussion) and an equality 
with respect treatment/development of those individuals’ psyches, or inner worlds. Regarding equality, my 
argument in effect claims that an equality in the sequence of turns (distributive) will create an equality 




recitative quality is therefore also to condone neoliberal-capitalist relations of production. 
Insofar as one does not condone these states of affairs, an equality and variety in the 
sequence of turns must be the basic discussive quality. 
In general, this claim asks researchers, facilitators, and participants of discussion 
to consider the social-political significance of discussion in a new way, such that words 
and verbal forms of interaction iterate and constitute the social formation in which they 
occur. How we speak with one another and what we say when we speak are sites of 
resistance and compliance with the social formation within which we live. This social-
political conclusion will sound both familiar and strange to educational discourse 
theorists. While most researchers in this field profoundly engage with aspects of political 
theory, this immanent view of the connections between words, verbal forms of 
interaction, and capitalist relations of production is absent from the literature The absence 
is both in the method and content of educational discourse theory. In terms of content, 
thinkers such as Hess, Parker, Bridges, Burbules, Harotounian-Gordon, and others 
emphasize the ways in which discussion prepares citizens for democracy, produces a 
more democratic society, and constitutes democracy itself. These thinkers concern 
themselves only with superstructures, rather than the total social formation: both 
superstructure and economic base. Drawing from Marxism, this dissertation extends the 
purview of philosophical thinking about educational discussion to relations of production 
in the economic base. In terms of method, researchers in the social sciences such as 
Dillon and Cazden examine educational interaction within a positivist framework. They 
are concerned with operationalizing distinctions between forms of interaction and 
measuring discrete instances of discussion with these distinctions, rather than addressing 
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with the ways in which the social formation informs both the operationalized distinctions 
and the discrete instances of interaction. Drawing from Voloshinov’s Marxist theory of 
language, this dissertation includes social and political significance of verbal forms of 
interaction.  
Certainly critical pedagogues like Freire, Giroux, and Schor address the 
significance of discussion within the economic base, as well as the way in which 
capitalism comes to bear on verbal forms of interaction. However, their research tends to 
cast this relationship in terms of the reproduction of capitalist relations in schools and 
institutions of learning.
264
 The preceding argument differs from this critical-pedagogical 
project in two ways (and also a third, which I will mention in the next section).  
First, I have broadened the scope of my argument beyond interactions occurring 
in institutions of learning to include any educational discussion occurring in the various 
corners of society. This scope includes schools and institutions of learning, but is not 
limited to them. I have addressed facilitators and participants rather than merely teachers, 
professors, and students. Second, this dissertation’s argument explicitly rejects the 
mechanical view of causality between base and superstructure, and mechanical effectivity 
within the social formation as a whole. Capitalism is not an overarching phenomenon that 
transitively effects educational interactions. Discussions do not reproduce capitalist 
relations of production because discussants, living in a capitalist social formation, are 
determined by that social formation. Discussions are not causally determined by 
capitalism. Rather, from the Voloshinovian perspective, discussions (and verbal forms of 
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There are traditions of critical-pedagogical work that go beyond institutions of learning like schools. 
Paulo Freire’s adult education work, Myles Horton’s Highlander School, and Ron Glass’s recent 
community organizing work in California stand as examples. I consider my work here a kind of 
theorization of these activities: particularly Horton.  
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interaction like it) mediate the causal relationship between base and superstructure in a 
social formation. From the Althusserian perspective, discussions are immanent effects of 
the social formation rather than reproductions. Taken together, this mediated view of the 
causal effectivity of the social formation yields a different conclusion than many present 
in the critical pedagogy literature. According to the present view, discussions are 
themselves capitalist relations of production in a social formation where the commodity 
is the universal social category. Rather than reproducing capitalist relations of 
production, I have claimed that discussions produce relations of production that may be 
more or less iterative and constitutive of neoliberal capitalism or other forms of 
capitalism (depending how the discussions are facilitated).
265
  
A distinguishing feature of this argument, in contrast to the critical pedagogues 
mentioned, is that content, topic, and curriculum are incidental. Discussants need not 
speak about critiquing capitalism. Participants may discuss any subject, and from this 
factor alone (what the discussion is about) it is not clear whether the second distortion is 
present or absent; that is, whether a pebble has been added to or thrown at the pile. 
Pedagogy is neither critical nor uncritical because of its curriculum. Certainly the subject 
matter is a factor, but it is not essential. An interaction among Marxists may be just as 
complicit with neoliberal-capitalist relations of production as an interaction among 
Taylorists, so long as either the Marxists or Taylorists refer to the homogeneity and 
inequality in the sequence of turns as a discussion. What matters therefore is the 
facilitation and the words uttered to describe the interaction. Has the word “discussion” 
been uttered? Are economic terms pervasive when talking about talking? During the 
interaction itself, who speaks after whom? Does the facilitator wait after initiating? Does 
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he or she wait after the first, second, and third comments from participants? Are the 
facilitator's eyes available? Is the facilitator mirroring the participants' exact words or 
rephrasing them? Is any one participant (whether facilitator or otherwise) following up 
each comment? Do the same people facilitate interactions over and over again? These are 
the salient questions to ask regarding the social-political significance of a discussion with 
respect to its complicity with the social formation.  
In terms of the dissertation’s argument, these questions may be compressed in the 
following ways: Has recitation has passed for discussion? Have another set of prohibitive 
contents have been introjected? Has dehiscence been prolonged? Each of these three 
questions present different possibilities for interaction within the scheme of the social 
formation. When recitation passes for discussion, a mass formation has been deemed free 
and equal, and neoliberal-capitalist relations of production are vindicated. In this case, a 
pebble is neatly placed upon the neoliberal heap. When another set of prohibitive 
contents have been introjected (during a recitation which is called a recitation, or lecture), 
dehiscence has occurred, though reification may quickly reactivate via mass formation. In 
this case, a pebble is dropped and may disturb the heap or nestle into the extant order. 
When dehiscence prolongs, however, extant prohibitive contents deactivate, suspending 
reification and permitting a powerful and evanescent collective freedom; a freedom 
within which nothing will be as it is, and, having introjected many voices and objects, 
after which the discussant retains the capacity to re-formulate themselves into a novel 
psychical configuration in the presence of other discussants. 
While I hesitate to theorize the possibility of a mass dehiscence across the 
infinitely complex arenas and regions of the social formation, I speculate that if enough 
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interactions eventuate in prolonged dehiscence the shape of the social formation will 
change bit by bit. If enough pebbles are thrown into the heap its form will shift. Certainly 
discussion is not sufficient for actively transforming a social formation, but enough 
prolonged dehiscences may influence the relations of production enough to transmogrify 
our social formation into something less discrepant and objectionable: in Marxist terms, 
the class struggle may ease. Discussing is necessary but not sufficient for changing this 
aspect of the capitalist social formation. Citizens must discuss all the various questions 
which directly impact the social formation: tax policies, wages, property, war, public 
education, health-care, or housing. If enough pebbles are thrown at the heap from these 
different directions, the immanent shape of the heap will change. I will go so far as to 
speculate that, with group formation as the iterative and constitutive pedagogical 
ideologeme (rather than the discrepant first and second distortions), the cooperative may 
take the place of the commodity as the universal social category. This succession of the 
cooperative as the universal social category is perhaps the most concise statement of my 
goals in writing this dissertation.  
 
Objections and Responses 
There are objections to consider. For one, I have read widely in the Marxist and 
Leftist philosophical tradition to make my claims. I have engaged with extremely 
complex concepts in Marxism and psychoanalysis, and perhaps in too broad a fashion.
266
 
I reply to this methodological worry by citing Marx’s famous imperative regarding theory 
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 One minor objection at this juncture, or rather a question, may come from the Freudian-Marxist 
tradition. Reich or Berenfeld, Zizek or Wolfenstein or Laclau, might ask how I construe these two 
intellectual traditions together in my research. Each them think anti-capitalist political economy with 
psychoanalysis in unique ways. I reply that there is much research to do on this subject, but as of this 
writing I see two points that fold upon one another: signifier and commodity. 
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and practice: “the philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the 
point is to change it.”
267
 I have taken praxis seriously while composing the various 
aspects of this dissertation. My engagement with these complicated concepts has been 
guided by the goal of inspiring differences in activity rather than differences in 
hermeneutics. If the reader has come away with an interest in trying out new participation 
and facilitation tactics, and has social-political arguments with which to justify these 
experiments, then my work is complete. Rather than pointing to the breadth of 
philosophical material, a more serious objection is that my tactical suggestions are 
counter-productive for resistance against neoliberal-capitalist relations of production. I 
anticipate this sort of objection will come from critical-pedagogical and Foucauldian 
directions. The former takes issue with the content of interaction whereas the latter takes 
issue with the form of interaction. I will address each in this order. 
Critical pedagogues may object that Marxist content, or at the very least anti-
oppressive, anti-dominant, or anti-exploitative content, must be part of an interaction if 
the interaction has any chance of changing an oppressive, dominant, or exploitative social 
formation. We should teach Howard Zinn’s People’s History of the United States rather 
than McGraw-Hill’s textbook. We should focus our attention on the oppression of 
marginalized peoples, colonized territories, and exploited workers. We should carefully 
study political economy and demonstrate time and again the ways in which modernity 
has committed crimes against humanity. These curricular choices are of extreme 
importance. I have experienced many crucial realizations and epiphanies while going 
through such materials, subjects, and texts. I am still making my way through them. They 
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should be available, abundant, encouraged, and even foregrounded. These texts and 
themes should be used in the best way possible, and it is with this moral in mind that I 
respond, in an initial way, to the objection from critical pedagogy. If the way in which we 
confront these crucial and difficult topics with others is stultifying, citing Ranciere’s 
(1991) important work
268
, then the topics’ efficacy in combating oppression, dominance, 
and exploitation is tragically undermined. If teachers, facilitators, and participants in 
discussion insist, in a brutalizing way, that others come to certain conclusions, think 
certain thoughts, or take up certain causes, then a number of unappealing consequences 
occur. Students, colleagues, and friends-in-conversation will lose interest or be turned off 
to important questions. Worse, however, is the case where participants develop an 
interest in the material but are brutalized in the process: in learning about oppression, 
they become dependent on others to do their thinking; in studying dominance, they 
become distrustful of their own intelligence; or in thinking critically about exploitation, 
they become disrespectful to others’ intelligences.
269
 Form matters as much as content in 
this case, perhaps even more so when it comes to provocative social and political 
questions. Facilitating discussion with an equality and variety in the sequence of turns 
may be the best way to work with such topics and themes. 
The critical pedagogue will respond that while it may be true that anti-oppressive 
content should be treated with care, it does not follow that dominant, exploitative, and 
oppressive content is equally disruptive, particularly if one has activist proclivities. We 
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recommendations are Rancierian. 
269
 Biesta, G. (2010). “A New Logic of Emancipation: The Methodology of Jacques Rancière.” 




cannot leave freedom to chance, particularly in a world so threatening to freedom. 
Neither can we rely on “chaos” or unguided “group therapy” sessions where participants 
say whatever they like about whatever they like. To this second remark, I say that a well-
facilitated discussion is different than chaos or unguided bull sessions where participants 
follow any communicative fancy. Good facilitation is neither abandonment nor total 
permissiveness. To the first remark regarding freedom, I respond that prolonged 
dehiscence is a robust form of collective freedom that may occur during interaction and 
that the only way to iterate and constitute a free social formation is to increase the 
instances of robust freedom as relations of production occur. The critical pedagogue 
would have a difficult time arguing that collective freedom within the capitalist social 
formation is best achieved by limiting the instances of collective freedom throughout that 
formation. As a final note, it should please the critical pedagogue that experiences of 
collective freedom, according to this dissertation, are now possible for many more 
subjects than just those in the humanities: any subject matter is an opportunity to prolong 
dehiscence, and work against capitalism, so long as facilitation has dehiscence as its aim. 
Another objection regarding freedom emerges, however, but now from a different 
direction. As mentioned in chapter 1, it could be the case that discussion is a more 
powerful form of control than recitation. I have recommended that facilitators fade into 
the background of interaction, speak less, and become less available for engagement, and 
also, in so doing, focus attention on tracking the quality and quantity of behaviors during 
interaction. The facilitator surveils participants in this case. One finds a similar 
recommendation in 19th century penitentiary thinking. In Foucault’s (1979) Discipline 
and Punish he argues that approaches to punishment transitioned from centralized-visible 
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forms to decentralized-invisible forms in the 18th and 19th centuries. My arguments 
about discussion are similar, Foucauldians can object. The facilitator increases control 
over participants by working for an equality and variety in the sequence of turns.  
There is a superficial path of response to this critique and a profound path of 
response. The superficial path will concern itself with the specifics of the argument’s 
premises. Is the transition from execution and torture to the panopticon the same kind of 
transition as that from a basic recitative quality to a basic discussive quality? Such a path 
would be interesting to pursue, since the cases are different. However this response does 
not address the heart of the complaint: why must an equality and variety in the sequence 
of turns during interaction be freedom? Might dehiscence be another form (or forum) of 
dominance? The question is a profound one and provokes the foundations of my 
arguments throughout the dissertation, since the term freedom has haunted them.  
I argued in the fourth chapter that dehiscence is the deactivation of extant 
prohibitions (de)formed in the psyche. When a prohibition deactivates, what was once 
impossible is now no longer impossible. Certain embargoes on the whole world have 
lifted in a state of Aufhebung. What may have been an embargo on the whole world is 
suspended since the superego’s office has no officeholder during dehiscence. This lifting 
is not only an individualized phenomenon but rather a collective one, since the 
dehiscence proper to discussion occurs through an equality and variety in the sequence of 
turns among participants who speak and listen to one another.
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 It is a collective 
phenomenon. To continue with their objection the Foucauldian will reject this state of 
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affairs as freedom. There are two ways he might do this: an argument from the psyche 
and an argument from the polis.  
The argument from the polis, of which I have not found specific expression in 
Foucault’s work, would claim that institutions, as regional aspects of the social formation 
(and perhaps the social formation as a whole), will continue to dominate psyches even 
during prolonged dehiscence. A response to the argument from the polis comes from the 
immanence picture of causality. If we permit the distinction between base and 
superstructure as I have construed it with Cohen and Althusser, the economic structure is 
composed of relations of production. Relations of production hold between persons and 
other persons, as well as persons and things. The effectivity of the social formation is 
immanent among these relations. Insofar as discussion occurs in the midst of (or are 
perhaps identical to) relations of production and dehiscence deactivates extant 
prohibitions within the psyche, then the immanent effects of the structure must 
incorporate deactivated extant prohibitions during such interactions. The social 
formation, composed as it is of relations of production, must change according to the 
immanent picture of causality. The Foucauldian may respond that we cannot know which 
extant prohibitions deactivate in dehiscence, and that perhaps the wrong ones deactivate, 
though the specificity of this response requires much further argumentation than a brief 
conclusion permits. 
The argument from the psyche is more difficult. It may be expressed by a 
conclusion Foucault reaches in an interview, “The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a 
Practice of Freedom.”
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 In this interview, Foucault asserts that freedom requires 
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choosing the ways in which one “masters” oneself: he bids us, with Socrates, to “‘take 
care of yourself’,” in other words, “make freedom your foundation through the mastery 
of yourself.”
272
 The practice of freedom in this case requires that one decide for oneself 
how one will be “mastered.” Extrapolating from this conclusion we might say that 
participation in prolonged dehiscence does not qualify as a practice of freedom because 
the facilitator acts in such a way as to deactivate the ego ideal contents of participant 
psyches. There are weaker and stronger versions of the Foucauldian point in this case. 
The weaker version of the point states that the participant’s capacity to master themselves 
is lessened when their extant ego ideal contents deactivate. These contents ground the 
compunctions which would compel the participant to master themselves in whatever way 
they saw fit to do so. The stronger version of the objection is that discussion is an 
exercise of the facilitator’s “relations of power”
273
 with participants and not the 
participant’s engagement with a practice of freedom. Group formation therefore 
distributes power in a particularly unnerving form, one where participants have the 
“positively uncanny” feeling of lifted embargoes but, in reality, are fabricated in relations 
of power with the facilitator. I will respond to this objection with anecdotes, which have 
influenced my understanding of prolonged dehiscence and which I also interpret as being 
instances of discussion-as-group formation. If these anecdotes do not convince the 
Foucauldian that dehiscence is a form of freedom then either I am fundamentally 
mistaken about freedom or there is some intuition that renders us in basic, 
uncompromisable disagreement. 
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Standing up: Anecdotes of Dehiscence 
 Each of the following anecdotes portrays discussion. My interpretive claim is that 
in each case collective prolonged dehiscence deactivated certain extant prohibitions in 
such a way as to, at the very least, model the forms of interaction that I believe have the 
potency to slowly change the shape of a social formation.  
At a friend’s elementary school, his fourth grade students were studying the 
Oregon Trail. He had gotten into the habit of facilitating discussion circles with his 
students each Tuesday. I would come observe these discussions, takes notes, and debrief 
with him. His classroom was set up with rows of desks in the front, facing a whiteboard. 
Behind the desks lay a blue circular carpet surrounded by maps, bookshelves, and 
drawers for assignments. Most lessons took place at the desks, in front of which he stood 
to teach (or roved around checking assignments and progress). On Tuesday, when it was 
time for discussion, my friend and his students went to the blue carpet. They sat in a 
circle together and passed around a marker, which served as a talking stick. My friend 
wrote down what the students said in a notebook.  
During one particular discussion the group addressed two distinct questions 
simultaneously. Each participant addressed both questions in their comments. The first 
question was how to prevent wagon wheels from rotting while on the trail, particularly in 
rain or when fording a river. The second question regarded the presence of other people 
in Oregon: whether there were inhabitants already living in the Oregon territories. About 
twenty minutes into the discussion one student became convinced that there were other 
people in the West, while another student disagreed. The first student asked for the 
marker. He then stood up and went to a map of the United States hanging on the adjacent 
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wall, pointing to the areas he thought might be inhabited by Spanish and British colonists. 
Still seated on the carpet, my friend and the other students watched him. When the first 
student finished speaking, the second student (who disagreed with the first) stood up and 
joined the first student at the map. The second student pointed to a space to the right of 
the map, indicating where Europe would be if it were a full map of the world, and 
claiming that Europeans lived in Europe and not the Oregon territories. 
There are three things to notice in this anecdote. First, the students addressed two 
distinct questions simultaneously. They passed the marker back and forth while my friend 
said very little. These students introjected not one but two questions rather than any 
single idea, object, or question. After the introjection of two distinct questions, the first 
student stood up from the circle, approached a map, and articulated an argument to the 
other students. After this first student stood up another student stood up as well. A 
partially hypnotized participant, particularly a very young participant accustomed to 
sitting and watching an older person stand, would most likely not stand up. If this 
participant did stand up, in this particular context, they would be breaking a rule and 
punished in some way. During the rest of the week my friend’s students did not stand up 
and do the teaching. However in this case the prohibition deactivated and students stood 
up. I emphasize the action of standing because of its educational and political 
significance. In schooling institutions, teachers and professors traditionally stand and 
move around whereas students sit and watch. If a student stands during class time for 
anything other than a stretch or bathroom break there is a certain provocative quality to 
the movement. This provocative movement is also a potent metaphor for political action. 
In resisting policies we cannot abide we must stand up to confront the powers that be, 
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transitioning from passive to active postures.  
I observed another instance of standing in a different classroom, this time a high 
school. Another friend, a teacher I had met during the 2011 Exeter Humanities Institute, 
was gone that day. A substitute taught the class. The students were meant to study the 
system of American government in the 19th century. My friend had been experimenting 
with Harkness teaching for the first time that year. The class I will describe occurred at 
the end of the first semester, after several months of facilitated discussions. At the 
beginning of the class the students asked a peer to go to the board and draw a picture of 
the various branches of government. She did so, and two or three others joined her at the 
board while others took notes. The substitute, a student teacher, asked “Is this how your 
class is usually?” “Yes,” one of the students said, “but you shouldn’t teach this way. It’s 
way too hard for students.” I paraphrase the remainder of his comment, which concluded 
that students in this class had to “make their own facts” rather than “being told what the 
facts are.”  
In this anecdote we see the same “standing up” as occurred in the first anecdote: 
students stood up from their desks and taught themselves. However the student’s 
comment about “making our own facts” adds a layer of significance not present in the 
first vignette. The reader will first notice the slight trace of reification in the idea of 
“making” a fact. Though economic, the distinction between “making” one’s own facts 
and “being told what they are” is remarkable. Superficially the first half of the phrasing is 
economic and the latter directly speech-related: the economic ideologeme vanishes and 
reduces to the simplified form of “being told,” as opposed to “being given” facts. More 
profoundly however, working with the economic quality of the phrasing, there is a 
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difference between making something for oneself and consuming a prefabricated good. In 
terms of relations and production this is a revolutionary difference: when a person makes 
a good for themselves that person owns the mode of production with respect to that 
particular good. The person has a direct relation of production to raw materials, 
instrumentation, and labor. In fact, the idea that labor is a commodity deactivates in such 
a case since the person is not required to sell his or her labor for wages. Making 
something for oneself is simply a meaningful activity, uncommodified (unless one 
chooses to sell what one produces). There is a profound political significance to the 
student’s comment, which implies a kind of “standing up” to capitalist social formations. 
Persons engaged in capitalist relations of production seldom make products for 
themselves, but rather sell their labor for wages to make products for others, a minority of 
whom accrue sufficient wealth with which to purchase these products. My friend’s 
classroom had become a space to stand up against such relations of production. 
The Foucauldian objector may insist that these anecdotes portray discussion’s 
dominance. According to the arguments of this dissertation however, these anecdotes 
portray the prolonged dehiscence of group formation which occurs during an equality and 
variety in the sequence of turns taken during interaction. Extant prohibitions, which 
compel participant psyches to experience limits and prohibitions, lift. Students become 
teachers, facilitators become participants, consumers become producers, and together 
“stand up” to traditional forms of interaction. The group is therefore engendered with a 
collective freedom via the deactivation of their extant prohibitions. Further, these 
discussants avoid the second distortion of discussion. There is discussion with a basic 
discussive quality, rather than a recitation. These anecdotes portray a different 
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pedagogical ideologeme, another way of being together. At the very least, these 
interactions model the type of interaction that must (necessarily, but not sufficiently) 
occur if relations of production within the neoliberal capitalist social formation are to 
change. At most, the interactions are pebbles thrown against the neoliberal heap. If more 












Althusser, L. (1970). Reading Capital. New Left Books. 
 
Althusser, L. (2005). For Marx. (Vol. 2). Verso. 
 
Backer, D. & Wood, S. & Gennaro, T. (2011). “Excerpts from an Annotated Archive of 
The Washington Circle: An Experiment in Breaking Barriers.” Ecogradients. 
http://ecogradients.com/post/3553431231. 
 
Bagley, W. (1931). “The Textbook and Methods of Teaching.” The Textbook in 
Education. Thirieth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part II, 
ed. Whipple, G. Bloomington. 
 
Barr, A. (1929). Characteristic Differences in the Teaching Performance of Good and 
Poor Teachers of Social Studies. Bloomington Public School Publishing Co. 
 
Bellack, A & Kliebard, H., & Hyman, R., & Smith, F. (1963). The Language of the 
Classroom. New York: Institute for Psychological Research, Teachers College. 
 
Berry, T., Fischer, N., Greenberg, A., & Polendo, A. (2013). “Occupy Museums as 
Public Pedagogy and Justice Work.” Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, 29(2). 
 
Bewes, T. (2002). Reification, or, the Anxiety of Late Capitalism.Verso. 
 
Biesta, G. (2010). A New Logic of Emancipation: The Methodology of Jacques Rancière. 
Educational Theory, 60(1), 39-59. 
 
Bion, W. (2004). Experiences in Groups. Taylor & Francis. 
 
Boltanski, L. (2012). On Critique: A Sociology of Emancipation. Polity Press. 
 
Brandist, C., & Tihanov, G. (Eds.). (2000). Materializing Bakhtin. Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Bridges, D. (1979). Education, Democracy, and Discussion. Windsor NFER. 
 
Briggs, T. (1935). “Practices of Best High School Teachers.” The School Review (43). 
 
Brookfield, S. D., & Preskill, S. (2012). Discussion as a way of teaching: Tools and 
techniques for Democratic classrooms. John Wiley & Sons, p.14. 
 




Burbules, N. C., & Abowitz, K. K. (2008). “A Situated Philosophy of Education.” 
Philosophy of Education Archive, 268-276. 
 
Burbules, Nicholas C., & Bruce, Bertram C. (2001). “Theory and research on teaching as 
dialogue.” In Virginia Richardson (ed.), Handbook of Research on Teaching, 4th Edition 
(pp. 1102-1121), Washington, DC: American Educational Research Association. 
 
Burgh, G. & Yorshanky, M. (2011). “Communities of Inquiry: Politics, Power, and 
Group Dynamics.” Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 43, No.5, p.463. 
 
Burris, V. (1988). “Reification: A marxist perspective.” California Sociologist, 10(1). 
 
Bush, G. (2000). “Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican 
National Convention in Philadelphia,” The American Presidency Project, retrieved at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25954 
 
Cazden, C. (1986). Classroom Discourse: The Language of Teaching and Learning. 
Heineman, Portsmouth. 
 
Chieza, L. (2007). Subjectivity and Otherness: A Philosophical Reading of Lacan. MIT 
Press. 
 
Chomsky, N. (2011). Profit Over People: Neoliberalism & Global Order. Seven Stories 
Press. 
 
Cohen, G. (2000). Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence. Oxford. 
 
Colvin, S. (1931). An Introduction to High School Teaching. MacMillan. 
 
Corey, S. (1940). “The Teachers Out-talk the Pupils.” The School Review (48).  
 
Crouch, C. (2011). The Strange Non-death of Neo-liberalism, Polity Press. 
 
Delong, L. & Smith, H. (1931). “Discussion Technique.” School and Society (33). 
 
Derrida, J. (1992). Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money (Vol. 1). University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
Dewey, J. (1954). Democracy and Education. Free Press. 
 
Dewey, J. (1998). How We Think. Houghton-Mifflin. 
 
Dillon, J.T. (1994). Using Discussion in Classrooms. Open University Press. 
 




DiSalvo, J. (2013). “Political Education--Occupy Wall Street's First Year.” Radical 
Teacher, (96), 6-15. 
 
Duménil, G. and Lévy, D. (2013). The Crisis of Neoliberalism. Harvard University Press. 
 
Eagleton, T. (1991). Ideology: An Introduction. Verso. 
 
Ellsworth, E. (1997). Teaching Positions: Difference, Pedagogy, and the Power of 
Address. Teachers College Press. 
 
Evans, F. (2003). “Witnessing and the Social Unconscious.” Studies in Practical 
Philosophy, 3(2), p.57-83. 
 
Farrar, M. T. (1988). “A Sociolinguistic Analysis of Discussion,” in Questioning and 
discussion: A multidisciplinary study, ed. James Dillon, p.29-73. 
 
Fink, B. (1995). The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance. Princeton. 
 
Foucault, M. (2008). The Birth of Biopolitics Lectures at the College de France, 1978–
1979. London: Palgrave. 
 
Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage. 
 
Foucault, M. (1997). “The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” in 
Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Rabinow, P. Free Press. 
 
Fourtounis, G. (2005). “On Althusser's Immanentist Structuralism: Reading Montag 
Reading Althusser Reading Spinoza.” Rethinking Marxism, 17(1). 
 
Gadamer, H. G. (2004). Truth and Method. Continuum International Publishing Group. 
 
Freire, P. (2000). The Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Continuum. 
 
Freire, P. (1998). Pedagogy of the Heart. Continuum. 
 
Freud, S. (1949). Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, trans. Strachey, J., 
Hogarth Press. 
 
Freud, S. (1918). Totem and Taboo, trans. Brill, A. Moffat, Yard and Company. 
 
Golding, C. (2011). “The Many Faces of Constructivist Discussion.” Educational 
Philosophy and Theory, 43(5). 
 
Grant, J. K. (2010). “What the Financial Services Industry Puts Together Let No Person 
Put Asunder: How the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Contributed to the 2008-2009 American 




Graeber, D. (2011). Debt: The First 5,000 Years. Melville House. 
 
Grice, H. P. (1975). “Logic and Conversation” in P. Cole and J. Morgan (eds.) Syntax 
and Semantics Volume 3: Speech Acts. 
 
Gutierrez, K., & Larson, J. (1994). Language borders: Recitation as hegemonic 
discourse. International Journal of Educational Reform, 3(1). 
 
Guattari, F. (2000). The Three Ecologies, trans., Pindar, I. and Sutton, P, The Athlone 
Press. 
 
Habermas, J. (1970). “On Systematically Distorted Communication.” Inquiry, 13(1-4), 
205-218. 
 
Habermas, J. (1978). Legitimation Crisis. Heineman: London. 
 
Habermas, J. (1991). Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. MIT Press. 
 
Hansen, D. T. (2001). Exploring the Moral Heart of Teaching: Toward a Teacher's 
Creed. Teachers College Press. 
 
Hardman, F., Smith, F., & Wall, K. (2003). “Interactive Whole Class Teaching'in the 
National Literacy Strategy.” Cambridge Journal of Education, 33(2). 
 
Harvey, D. (2005). Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford University Press. 
 
Harvey, D. (1982). The Limits to Capital. Basil Blackwell. 
 
Haroutunian-Gordon, S. (2009). Learning to Teach through Discussion: The Art of 
Turning the Soul. Yale University Press. 
 
Haroutunian-Gordon, S. (1998). “A Study of Reflective Thinking: Patterns in Interpretive 
Discussion.” Educational Theory, 48(1). 
 
Hess, D. (2009). Controversy in the Classroom: The Democratic Power of Discussion. 
Routledge. 
 
Jackson, L. (2008). Dialogic pedagogy for social justice: A critical examination. Studies 
in Philosophy and Education, 27(2), 137-148. 
 
Hoetker, J., & Ahlbrand Jr, W. P. (1969). “The Persistence of the Recitation. American 
Educational Research Journal, 145-167.  
 




Hulan, N. (2010). “What the Students Will Say While the Teacher is Away: An 
Investigation Into Student-Led and Teacher-Led Discussion Within Guided Reading 
Groups.” Literacy Teaching & Learning: An International Journal of Early Reading & 
Writing, 14. 
 
Hursh, D. (2000). “Neoliberalism and the Control of Teachers, Students, and Learning: 
The Rise of Standards, Standardization, and Accountability.”  Cultural Logic, 4(1), 
retrieved at http://clogic.eserver.org/4-1/hursh.html. 
 
Hursh, D. (2005). “Neoliberalism, Markets and Accountability: Transforming Education 
and Undermining Democracy in the United States and England. Policy Futures in 
Education, 3(1). 
 
Jameson, F. (1981). The Political Unconscious. Cornell University Press. 
 
Joyce, R. E. (1968). Toward a philosophy of discussion. Improving College and 
University Teaching, 16(1), 8-11. 
 
Keith, W. (2007). Democracy as Discussion: Civic Education and the American Forum 
Movement. Lexington Books. 
 
Kennedy, D. (2010). “Communal philosophical dialogue and the intersubject.” 
International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 18(2), 203-218. 
 
Kristeva, J. (1980). "Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art". 
Ed. Leon S. Roudiez. Trans. Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine, and Leon S. Roudiez. New 
York: Columbia UP. 
 
Lacan, J. (2006). Ecrits. W.W. Norton. 
 
Lacan, J. (1991). The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book II, The Ego in Freud’s Theory 
and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-1955, ed. Mill, J.A, trans. Tomaselli, S., 
Norton. 
 
Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the Social: an Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. 
Clarendon. 
 
Le Doeuff, M. (2002). The Philosophical Imaginary. Continuum International Publishing 
Group. 
 
Lévi-Strauss, C. (1966). The Savage Mind. University of Chicago Press. 
 
Lipman, M. (2003). Thinking in Education. Cambridge University Press. 
 




Lyotard, J. F. (1984). The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Vol. 10). 
University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Marx, K.(1977).  A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Progress 
Publishers, retrieved at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-
economy/preface.htm. 
 
Marx, K. (1986) Capital, Vol.1. Penguin. 
 
Medvedev, P. (1978). The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship: A Critical 
Introduction to Sociological Poetics. Trans. Wehrle, A. Johns Hopkins UP. 
 
Milton, J. (1644). Areopagitica. Retrieved through The University of Oregon’s 
Renascence Editions at http://pages.uoregon.edu/rbear/areopagitica.html 
 
Montalban, F. (2011). Dialogue between Marxism and Psychoanalysis: the Legacy of VN 
Voloshinov. Universitas Psychologica, 10(1), 263-277. 
 
Moran, P., & Murphy, M. (2012). “Habermas, Pupil Voice, Rationalism, and Their 
Meeting with Lacan’s Objet Petit A.” Studies in Philosophy and Education, 1-11. 
 
Morris, M. (2001). Rethinking the Communicative Turn: Adorno, Habermas, and the 
Problem of Communicative Freedom. SUNY Press. 
 
Mill, J.S. (2006). On Liberty. Pearson. 
 
Miller, W. (1922). “The Administrative Use of Intelligence Tests in the High School.” 
The Administrative Use of Intelligence Tests. Twenty-first Yearbook of the National 
Society for the Study of Education, Part II, ed. Whipple, G. Bloomington. 
 
Nystrand, M., Gamoran, A., and Carbonaro, W. (2001). "On the Ecology of Classroom 
Instruction." Writing as a Learning Tool, p. 57-81. 
 
O'Connor, M. C., & Michaels, S. (1993). “Aligning academic task and participation 
status through revoicing: Analysis of a classroom discourse strategy.” Anthropology and 
Education Quarterly, 24, 
 
Parker, W. C., and Hess, D. (2001). “Teaching with and for discussion.” Teaching and 
teacher education, 17(3). 
 
Parker,W. (1996). "Public discourses in schools: Purposes, problems, possibilities." 
Educational Researcher 35 (8). 
 
Parrington, J. (1997). “In Perspective: Valentin Voloshinov,” International Socialism, 





Plant, R. (2009). The Neo-liberal State. Oxford University Press.  
 
Reich, W. (1946). The Mass Psychology of Fascism, trans. Wolfe, T. Orgone Institute 
Press. 
 
Reyes, C. (2013). “In Letter, Teachers College Students Slam TC President Susan 
Fuhrman,” Columbia Spectator, retrieved from http://www.columbiaspectator.com. 
 
Reynolds, W. M. (Ed.). (1995). Inside/Out: Contemporary critical perspectives in 
education. Psychology Press. 
 
Rikowski, G. (1996). “Left Alone: End Time for Marxist Educational Theory?” British 
Journal of Sociology of Education, 17(4). 
 
Rowe, M. (1983). “Questions and Wait time,” in Questioning and Discussion: A 
Multidisciplinary Study, ed. Dillon, J. Greenwood Publishing Group. 
 
Santoro, D. (2008). “Women’s Proper Place and Student-centered Pedagogy.” Studies in 
Philosophy and Education, 27(5), 313-333. 
 
Sarid, A. (2012). “Systematic Thinking on Dialogical Education.” Educational 
Philosophy and Theory, 44(9), 926-941. 
 
Sarup, M. (2013). Marxism and Education: A Study of Phenomenological and Marxist 
Approaches to Education. Routledge.  
 
Simmel, G. (2004). The Philosophy of Money. Routledge. 
 
Sinclair, J. M., & Coulthard, M. (1975). Towards an analysis of discourse: The English 
Used by Teachers and Pupils. London: Oxford University Press 
 
Sloterdijk, P. (1991). Critique of Cynical Reason, University of Minnesota Press. 
Small, R. (2005). Marx and education. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 
Smith, S. B. (1988). “Considerations on Marx's base and superstructure.” Karl Marx's 
Economics: Critical Assessments, 4(4), 315.  
 
Smith, A. (1762). Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence, Vol.5, Lectures on 




Spinoza, B. (1970). Ethics. J. Gutmann (Ed.). Simon and Schuster. 
 
Splitter, L. J., & Sharp, A. M. (1995). Teaching for better thinking: The classroom 
172 
 
community of inquiry. Melbourne: Australian Council for Educational Research. 
 
Stark, D. (2009). The Sense of Dissonance, Princeton. 
 
Stevens, R. (1912). The Question of a Measure of Efficiency in Instruction: A Critical 
Study of Classroom Practice. Teachers College, Columbia, Contributions to Education 
No.48. 
 
Swidler, S. A. (2000). “Notes on a Country School Tradition: Recitation as an Individual 
Strategy.” Journal of Research in Rural Education, 16(1), 8-21. 
 
Steger, M, and Roy, R (2010). Neoliberalism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Swift, J., C. Gooding, and P. Swift (1988). "Questions and wait time" in Dillon, J.T, ed. 
Questioning and discussion: A multidisciplinary study. Greenwood Publishing Group. 
Tarde, G. (1898). “Opinion and Conversation,” in Clark, T. (1969). Gabriel Tarde on 
Communication and Social Influence: Selected Papers. University of Chicago Press. 
Taylor, F.W. (1911). The Principles of Scientific Management. Harper & Brothers. 
 
Thompson, E. P. (1963). The Making of the English working class. London: Victor 
Gollancz Ltd.  
Voloshinov, V. (1973). Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. trans. Matekja, M. and 
Titunik, I. Seminar Press. 
Volosinov, V. N., & Neal H.. Bruss. (1976). Freudianism: a Marxist critique. New York: 
Academic Press. 
 
Walton, D. (2010). Place of Emotion in Argument. Penn State Press, p.25. 
Williams, R. (1991). “Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory.”  Rethinking 
Popular Culture: Contemporary perspectives in cultural studies, 407.  
Williams, R. (1976). Keywords. Oxford University Press.  
Wittgenstein, L. (1999). Philosophical Investigations, Macmillan. 
Wittgenstein, L. (2001). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Routledge. 
Wolfenstein, E. (1993). Psychoanalytic-Marxism. Guilford. 
Zizek, Slavoj. (1989). The Sublime Object of Ideology. Verso. 
Zweig, P. (1995). Wriston: Walter Wriston, Citibank, and the Rise and Fall of American 
Financial Supremacy. Crown. 
